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ABSTRACT 
 
Leif Christian Tornquist: Propagating the Divine: Protestant Modernism and the Rise of Anglo-
American Eugenics 
(Under the direction of Professor Yaakov Ariel) 
 
The socialization of eugenics in the United States at the turn-of-the-twentieth century was 
facilitated by transformations within Anglo-American Protestantism. Protestant modernism, a 
theological practice of interpreting providence in evolutionistic terms, contributed to affluent 
Anglo-Americans’ acceptance and endorsement of eugenic ideas and initiatives. Eugenics rose to 
prominence in middle class Anglo-America as influential liberal Protestants began to reconceive 
God as a deity who sought to realize his redemptive purposes through the propagation of a 
righteous race.   
This dissertation traces the intersections of modernist thought, on the one hand, and 
eugenic ideas, practices, and policies on the other, illustrating how the two developed hand-in-
hand during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. Theological modernism and Anglo-
American eugenics converged through a propagative faith in the ability and authority of society 
to direct the hereditary sources of human life so as to ensure its Christian development.  
This analysis pursues its arguments by exploring the development of modernism as an 
evolutionistic faith. It begins with the works of two famous nineteenth century Anglo-American 
theologians who inaugurated the modernist tradition, Horace Bushnell and Henry Ward Beecher, 
and proceeds to consider the labors of influential twentieth century modernists like Shailer 
Mathews. It also considers the life and professional labors of America’s foremost eugenicist, 
Charles B. Davenport. The purpose is to demonstrate that while eugenics represented a modern 
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scientific movement, its success in capturing public imagination and shaping public opinion in 
the United States intimately depended upon transformations within elite Anglo-American 
religiosity. 
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From atop the head of Caesar, 
Through the scape of his breath; 
Into the lungs of the dogs, 
That guard eagles’ nests. 
 
I hope you’re as free as the mountain air now, Dad. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Introduction 
On Sunday, June 20, 1926, Rev. Kenneth C. MacArthur delivered a pro-eugenics sermon 
to his congregation at the Federated Church in Sterling, Massachusetts. A self-described “liberal 
evangelical Protestant minister,”1 MacArthur preached his sermon as part of a contest sponsored 
by the American Eugenics Society (AES) that year. The purpose of the contest was to promote 
the message of eugenics in America’s churches, institutions that, AES leaders imagined, tended 
to attract mentally and morally superior people. MacArthur was one of over a hundred Protestant 
ministers who participated in the AES contest. Like his colleagues, MacArthur was a modernist, 
a religious leader who looked to forge partnerships between Christianity and science in 
propagating a more righteous race. “If we take seriously the Christian purpose of realizing on 
earth the ideal divine society,” MacArthur implored his congregants, “we shall welcome every 
help which science affords. Eugenics offers a great assistance in this effort to establish a race of 
people who approximate the Christian ideal.” 
MacArthur’s motivations for participating in the contest were at once religious and racial. 
He was, as he insisted at the beginning of the sermon, deeply concerned about the “welfare of 
our race.” He warned his congregants that fit white American families were being out-
reproduced by immigrants recently arrived to the country and by a growing class of “unfit” 
whites who were responsible for propagating criminality, poverty, and sexual perversion, among 
																																																								
1 “Random Materials,” American Eugenics Society Papers, American Philosophical Society, 
Philadelphia, PA.  
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other social maladies. He encouraged his congregants to support eugenic measures like the 
segregation of the unfit and immigration restriction in order to stem the tide of degeneracy 
allegedly threatening the race. He also admonished his congregants not to “shirk parenthood.” 
Marriage and children, MacArthur explained, must become a source of “noble pride,” a badge of 
honor and esteem that reflected the fulfillment of one’s obligation to the race. “We must 
inculcate the religious duty of parenthood on the part of the fit people,” MacArthur declared, 
“because the family is the ideal society, the working model” of the Kingdom of God on earth. 
“Its laws are service, sacrifice, love, ‘the joint service of the common life’.” The holy institution 
of the family, MacArthur insisted, was a means to a healthier, happier race and the 
materialization of the kingdom of God on earth. 
MacArthur saw his support for eugenics as an organic outgrowth of his modernist 
commitments. In supporting eugenics, he was not simply endorsing science. MacArthur 
envisioned the familial and racial pride fostered by eugenics as a way of encouraging allegiance 
to God’s kingdom. Eugenics even functioned as a vital part of his ministry as Rural Secretary of 
the Massachusetts Federation of Churches, with MacArthur promoting the eugenic message of 
race betterment as a way of bringing Massachusetts’ rural churches into a “modern, unified, and 
efficient program.”  
MacArthur, who was so convinced that eugenics represented a Christian means of 
salvation, became a eugenics enthusiast. He educated himself on the subject of genetics and 
practiced as an amateur breeder of purebred cattle. He also served as head of a eugenically fit 
family. Along with his wife and children, he participated in a “Fitter Families Contest” at an 
Eastern States Exposition in the late 1920s. Staged by local and national eugenics organizations, 
Fitter Family contests were designed to stimulate a “feeling of family and race consciousness and 
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responsibility.”2 MacArthur and his family exuded such consciousness after being awarded a 
“silver cup.” An archival photo depicts a proud and stately MacArthur family, radiating the 
confidence of having been selected as a model of eugenic fitness. MacArthur’s enthusiasm for 
eugenics as a Christian program is also evidenced by the fact that his sermon took second-prize 
in the AES’ 1926 eugenic sermon contest and, moreover, by his 1928 selection to the 
Massachusetts Eugenics Committee by then president of the AES, C.C. Little. MacArthur 
remained active in local and national eugenics organizations well into the 1930s.3  
This dissertation is not a biography of Rev. MacArthur. Rather, it asks how a faith like 
MacArthur’s, one so enthusiastic about propagating a better human stock, came to exist? 
MacArthur was only one of hundreds of Protestant modernist leaders during the early twentieth 
century who saw eugenics as a modern Christian program for propagating a more righteous 
people, many of whom were far more famous than MacArthur. While MacArthur’s certainly 
stands out for his enthusiasm, the list of famous modernists who promoted eugenic ideas and 
practices includes turn of the twentieth century liberal Protestant luminaries like Josiah Strong, 
Newell Dwight Hillis, and Shailer Mathews. This is a dissertation about the rise of MacArthur’s 
brand of piety. It is an attempt to account for the deep, powerful, and earnest connections 
between Protestant modernism, on the one hand, and eugenic thought and practice, on the other. 
MacArthur represents a historical entanglement, a knot of discursive and embodied dimensions 
that demonstrates the ways in which, inextricably, modernist religiosity and zealotry for eugenics 
developed together.  
																																																								
2 Christine Rosen, Preaching Eugenics: Religious Leaders and the American Eugenics 
Movement (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 113-14. 
 
3 “MacArthur, Kenneth C.,” American Eugenics Society Papers, American Philosophical 
Society, Philadelphia, PA. 
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Defining Protestant Modernism 
 Modernism was a term used self-consciously by early twentieth century liberal 
Protestants as part of their efforts to distinguish their religiosity from “fundamentalism.” 
Modernism most broadly described a religious openness to “modernity,” a comportment that was 
understood in a variety of ways but most commonly as an acceptance of scientific methods. As 
opposed to fundamentalists, modernists embraced Higher Criticism and the interpretation of the 
Bible as a historical document. They also accepted and even championed evolution as an account 
of the origins of human life. Indeed, evolution is often seen as the most divisive point of 
disagreement between modernists and fundamentalists. The 1926 Scopes “Monkey” trial is 
traditionally interpreted as the culmination of the religio-cultural war between modernists and 
fundamentalists, with the trial allegedly marking the defeat of Protestant fundamentalism until its 
resurgence with the rise of the Christian “Right” in the 1970s and ‘80s.4 Conversely, the trial is 
taken as a victory for modernists, even though modernism, as an ardent faith in the inherent 
progress of Christian civilization, declined precipitously in the 1930s, a theological shift that 
historians mark with the rise of “neo-orthodoxy” and its much soberer view of human nature and 
progress. 5 
 In addition to its characteristic embrace of modern science, scholars have used other, 
broader rubrics for distinguishing modernism as a religious platform. Church historian Martin E. 
Marty describes modernism as one of several turn-of-the-twentieth century Protestant 
comportments towards modernity. Marty distinguishes modernists from “moderns” and 
																																																								
4 Rosemary Radford Ruether, Christianity and the Making of the Modern Family: Ruling 
Ideologies, Diverse Realities (Boston: Beacon  Press, 2000), 158. 
 
5 William R. Hutchison, The Modernist Impulse in American Protestantism (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1976), 288-89. 
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“countermoderns.” Moderns consisted of men and women who “thought of themselves as the 
developers of a distinctly modern consciousness.”6 Moderns believed themselves to “have been 
liberated from historic forms of religion,”7 with their ranks including American philosophers like 
William James, John Dewey, Charles Sanders Peirce, and Alfred North Whitehead.8 
Countermoderns, on the other hand, were those who resisted modernization by claiming to return 
to “simple and primitive forms of their faith” and included movements like premillennialism, 
fundamentalism, and various “new kinds of culture-negation.”9 Both moderns and 
countermoderns contrasted sharply with modernists, who Marty characterizes as the “liberal 
agents of the modern, progressives who actually wanted to advance the processes of change from 
within the Protestant core-culture.”10  
In his introduction to his three-volume work, Modern American Religion, Marty defines 
modernity cognitively, as a spatial or temporal sense, especially one of disjuncture. For him, 
modernity denotes a cultural consciousness that anxiously perceives itself as a rupture with 
everything that has come before. In modernity, Marty suggests, religion is forced to reckon with 
a temporality that locates meaning on the horizon of what is yet to be.11 Modernism, therefore, 
denotes the religiosity of those turn-of-the-twentieth century American Protestants who 
																																																								
6 Martin E. Marty, Modern American Religion: The Irony of It All 1893-1919 (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1986), 13. 
 
7 Ibid.  
 
8 Ibid., 64. 
 
9 Ibid., 210. 
 
10 Ibid., 13. 
 
11 Ibid., 1-2.	
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attempted to locate socio-political progress within the future-oriented, redemptive framework of 
Christianity itself.  
 In his classic 1976 work, The Modernist Impulse in American Protestantism, William R. 
Hutchison attempted to define modernism using three criteria, all of which correspond with 
Marty’s temporal characterization. Hutchison wrote, “I have found […] that when ‘modernism’ 
finally became a common term in the early part of this century, it generally meant three things: 
first and most visibly, it meant the conscious, intended adaptation of religious ideas to modern 
culture.” Along with this most prominent significance, Hutchison argued, modernism also 
typically referred to the “idea that God is immanent in human cultural development and revealed 
through it” and the “belief that human society is moving toward realization (even though it may 
never attain the reality) of the kingdom of God.”12 Hutchison’s work, which so acutely registered 
the hopefulness that animated modernism as a theological habit of embracing modern culture as 
an agent of progress, was written with the gravity of a post-modern perspective. Penned on the 
far side of major twentieth century wars and atrocities, Hutchison was soberly aware of the 
dangers of modernism as a religious program.   
 The most characteristic, yet unsavory, aspects of Protestant modernism, scholarship 
suggests, correspond with its conscious conflation of Christianity and progress, especially the 
racialized understanding of civilizational advance propounded by leading modernist voices. 
Marty, for example, uses the 1893 World’s Parliament of Religion at the Columbian Exposition 
in Chicago to demonstrate modernists’ characteristic faith in the “ceaseless, irresistible march of 
civilization.”13 The Parliament, which staged an American encounter with the world at a time in 
																																																								
12 Hutchison, The Modernist Impulse in American Protestantism, 2. 
 
13 Marty, Modern American Religion: The Irony of it All, 18. 
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which the United States was realizing its imperial ambitions, can be understood as a pivotal 
moment in American pluralism, especially white Protestant America’s increasing contact with 
religio-racial otherness. The Parliament and the Exposition can also be taken as measures of the 
limitations that have historically imposed themselves on American pluralism, especially the 
perpetual conflation in American political discourses between Christianity, whiteness, and fitness 
for democracy.14 Marty’s own interpretation of the Parliament emphasizes the latter hermeneutic 
by underscoring its connections with a waxing “racial outlook” that championed the evolutionary 
fitness of the Anglo-Saxon body as the foundation for Christian civilization. Here, Marty cites 
Josiah Strong’s participation at the Parliament and his articulation of a racialized “cosmopolitan 
vision” that declared the Anglo-Saxon race as “the great physical basis for empire!” Strong’s 
modernism championed science and “Anglo-Saxon religious life” as copartners in building a 
global kingdom of God.15 
 My own interpretation of modernism synthesizes these frameworks while emphasizing 
the importance of race for the development of modernism as a distinct theological outlook. Or to 
be more exact, this dissertation focuses on a particular theistic habit within a broader modernist 
tradition, a habit of associating Christendom –its stability, perpetuity, and overall progress –with 
the development of the white racial body.  
In understanding modernism this way, I draw upon a particular definition of the concept 
of modernity itself, one that I take from Michel Foucault and his theory of “biopower.” In his 
first volume of The History of Sexuality, Foucault writes,  
																																																								
14 Richard H. Seager, The World’s Parliament of Religions: The East/West Encounter, Chicago, 
1893 (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1995). 
 
15 Marty, Modern American Religion: The Irony of it All, 23.	
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But what might be called a society’s ‘threshold of modernity’ has been reached when the 
life of the species is wagered on its own political strategies. For millennia, man remained 
what he was for Aristotle: a living animal with the additional capacity for a political 
existence; modern man is an animal whose politics places his existence as a living being 
in question.16 
 
As part of his theory of biopower, Foucault defined modernity in terms of the emergence of 
populations (their development and wellbeing) as objects of governance. Modern, biopolitical 
society, in Foucault’s idiom, denotes the emergence of a governmental apparatus (including 
discourses, institutions, techniques, and policies) that make the development of its people its 
primary concern. In this way, modernity is not simply a historical self-consciousness 
dialectically born through the temporal rupture of progress. It denotes the emergence of a 
historical subjectivity that equates progress with the development of human life itself. For 
Foucault, a “pre-modern” society is one in which human life remains outside of the calculations 
of power-knowledge, while in a modern society human life is “penetrated by […] techniques of 
knowledge and power.”17 In American history, the threshold of modernity began to be crossed 
during the nineteenth century, when institutions like homes and schools were rationalized in 
terms of the production of a healthy, moral, responsible body politic and when new institutions 
arose aimed at the normal development of American life.  
For Foucault, modern racism, while irreducible to biopower, nonetheless corresponds 
with the rise of modernity, with racism emerging as a rationale or logic for distinguishing 
between which forms of life within a given population should be made to grow and which should 
be eliminated or left to die. Racism, for Foucault, is thus connected to modern governance as an 
administration of life. Racism, Foucault writes, “is primarily a way of introducing a break into 																																																								
16 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality: An Introduction, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: 
Vintage Books, 1990), 143. 
 
17 Ibid. 
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the domain of life under power’s control: the break between what must live and what must 
die.”18 In other words, racism is a way of differentiating between qualified and unqualified forms 
of life, between those forms that guarantee the normal development of a population and those 
that threaten to pollute or disturb its normal development.  
In the United States, racism frequently fostered the deployment of eugenic ideas and 
practices. As I discuss below, the related concept of hereditarianism –or the idea that the inborn 
capacities and physical characteristics of races and stocks developed over time through 
biological processes –also facilitated eugenics as a formation of biopower. Premised upon the 
maximization of life, eugenics emerged with the notion that the elimination of unfitness within a 
population would strengthen the life of the body politic overall. In the United States specifically, 
eugenics developed along with the discriminatory discourses of hereditarianism and racism, with 
these discourses rationalizing the eugenic argument that socio-political progress necessitated the 
elimination of allegedly degenerate elements within the population. Applying Foucault’s 
framework to nineteenth and early twentieth century American society, eugenics worked by 
identifying whiteness with political fitness and by associating the normal development of the 
country with propagation of white bodies, especially “fit” white bodies. Conversely, eugenics 
worked by associating the propagation of non-white or hereditarily unfit bodies with the 
degeneracy of the body politic, which was conceived as a living organism whose normal growth 
																																																								
18 Michel Foucault, ‘Society Must Be Defended’: Lectures at the Collège de France 1975-1976, 
eds. Maurio Bertani and Alessandro Fontana, trans. David Macey (New York: Picador, 2003), 
254. 
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required the collaboration of important institutions like homes, churches, schools, hospitals, and 
prisons.19  
In using the term modernism, therefore, I understand a Protestant religiosity that was not 
only open to, but that was a champion for, modern techniques of power aimed at the normal 
development of the body politic. During the nineteenth and early twentieth century, these modes 
of power were hereditarian and racist and so was Protestant modernism. Functioning as an elite 
religious discourse of white middle class Protestants –especially “old stock” New England 
Protestants –modernism facilitated the rise of eugenics by fostering two overlapping modes of 
discrimination. Hereditarianism and racism provided frameworks for hierarchizing the body 
politic in terms of its reproductive potential and for understanding which segments of the 
population should be encouraged to reproduce for the sake of national development and which 
should be discouraged. Modernism, I argue, socialized these modes of discrimination within 
white middle class communities by theistically reconceiving human heredity as a medium 
through which God worked to propagate his righteous kingdom on earth.  
In its earliest iterations, modernism developed as a discourse of racial theism that located 
providence and national prosperity within the hereditary cultivation of the white racial body. 
Importantly, this theistic discourse supported a form of elite Anglo-American Christianity that 
was racially propagative in scope and practice, with modernism developing as a theological 
discourse that sanctified the transformation of the home into a racially propagative institution. In 
this way, modernism fostered the rise of eugenics during the late nineteenth century, with 
eugenic ideas and practice maturing as white middle class Americans –especially New 
																																																								
19 For an extended reflection on Foucault’s theory of biopower and the history of American 
racism, see Ladelle McWhorter, Racism and Sexual Oppression in Anglo-America: A Genealogy 
(Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2009). 
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Englanders –learned to identify race propagation with national progress or decline. Eugenics, in 
my understanding, was thus not simply a science, but a religiously motivated attitude or 
comportment taken with respect to the relative worth of one racial group or stock’s reproductive 
potential over another’s. Eugenic ideas and practices rose to prominence in the United States as 
affluent whites Northerners came to identify their power with their hereditary potential and, in 
turn, to read this potential in both theistic and nationalistic terms. 
As a theistic practice of reconciling evolutionism and God, modernism emerged at the 
intersection of theology, religious practice, and a tendency to locate progress within the 
purposeful propagation of human life. My central thesis is that Protestant modernism and 
eugenic thought and practice developed together in the United States, with the former emerging 
and maturing as a theological habit of naturalizing propagative methods aimed at the 
development of a better body politic. My purpose, therefore, is to present neither an exhaustive 
history of modernist Protestantism nor American eugenics. The objective instead is to show how 
modernist Protestantism nurtured eugenic ideas and practices in predominantly Northeastern 
Anglo-American society by promulgating the hope that Christian families could advance a godly 
civilization through the propagation of a more righteous race.  
Pursuing this objective necessitates writing a history of eugenics that is different than the 
traditional narrative. I depart from the standard historiography of viewing eugenics as part of the 
history of science by showing how eugenic ideas developed at the same time affluent Anglo-
Americans in New England and elsewhere began to identify their propagation with national 
destiny. Eugenic thought and practice, in other words, emerged in tandem with a Protestant 
theistic habit of viewing God as a deity who sought to realize his creative purposes through the 
propagation of a righteous race. The ultimate objective is, therefore, to show how a modernist 
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religiosity like MacArthur’s was part of a much longer elite Anglo-American tradition of 
viewing propagation as a divine method. Beginning with Horace Bushnell, who, in the mid-
nineteenth century, prophesied the peaceful conquest of the world through the propagative power 
of Anglo-Saxon “seed,” and ending with twentieth century modernists’ like MacArthur who 
foretold the coming of a race that approximated the Christian ideal, this dissertation traces the 
intersection of modernism and eugenics through the practice of race propagation. 
Defining American Eugenics 
American eugenics was a popular and professional movement for reproductive hygiene 
that peaked in the decades leading up to World War II. The fundamental assumption advanced 
by eugenicists and their supporters was that society could and should improve the population by 
controlling hereditary aspects of human reproduction. Eugenics thus developed as part of 
biopolitical processes associated with modernization. As scholars of international eugenics 
argue, understanding eugenics as a part of modernization helps to explain why countries around 
the globe –including in Europe, Africa, Latin America, and Asia –developed eugenics programs. 
Eugenics often developed in modernizing countries during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries 
as governmental administrations became tasked with the care and cultivation of their respective 
populations.20  
																																																								
20 Marius Turda has written extensively on eugenics in Eastern Asia: Marius Turda, Blood and 
Homeland: Eugenics and Racial Nationalism in Central and Southeast Europe 1900-1940 (New 
York: Central European University Press, 2006); Modernism and Eugenics (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2010); Eugenics and Nation in Early Twentieth Century Hungary (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan 2014). See also, Christian Promitzer, Sevasti Trubeta, and Marius Turda, 
eds., Health, Hygiene, and Eugenics in Southeastern Europe to 1945 (New York: Central 
European University Press, 2011); Marius Turda, ed. The History of East-Central European 
Eugenics 1900-1945: Sources and Commentaries (New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2015). 
For a discussion of eugenics in Turkey, see Ayça Alemdarağlu, “Politics of the Body and 
Eugenics Discourse in Early Republican Turkey, Body and Society, Vol. 11, No. 3, 2005, pp. 61-
76. Turda has also written on Latin Eugenics: Latin Eugenics in Comparative Perspective 
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 Building on previous scholarship, I define eugenics as a set of modern naturalistic 
discourses, practices, techniques, and policies that identified reproductive hygiene with socio-
political progress. Eugenics was built upon the concept of hereditarianism, which, at the time, 
equated biology with national destiny. Eugenics emerged as a reproductive morality built upon 
the hereditarian assumption that one could discern between qualified and unqualified forms of 
life, especially those whose heredity supposedly precipitated progress and those whose heredity 
allegedly produced decline. Because it located national development within heredity, eugenics 
matured through the development of measures aimed at fostering reproduction among 
supposedly fit groups and discouraging and even preventing reproduction among the allegedly 
unfit. Eugenic ideas and practices rose to prominence in the late nineteenth century United States 
and peaked during the early twentieth century, an era of rapid demographic and cultural change 
initiated by industrialization, urbanization, and immigration. Eugenics represented a modern 
approach to governance in so far as it sought to achieve societal progress through the healthful 
development of population and to the extent that it viewed the body politic as something that 
could be grown and cultivated. 
Scholars have described eugenics as a racist pseudoscience,21 one that sought to preserve 
Anglo-American socio-political power in the face of a number of cultural shifts initiated by turn-
																																																																																																																																																																																		
(London: Bloomsbury Academic 2014). For another treatment of Latin American eugenics, see 
Nancy Stepan, The Hour of Eugenics: Race, Gender, and Nation in Latin America (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 1991). For a treatment of eugenics in China, see Frank Dikötter, 
Imperfect Conceptions: Medical Knowledge, Birth Defects, and Eugenics in China (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1998). For a history of eugenics in Kenya, see Chloe Campbell, Race 
and Empire: Eugenics in Colonial Kenya (New York: Manchester University Press, 2011). 
 
21 Elazar Barkan, The Retreat of Scientific Racism: Changing Concepts of Race on Britain and 
the United States Between the World Wars (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991). 
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of-the-twentieth century industrialization.22 Matthew Frye Jacobson, for example, characterizes 
eugenics as an ideology of scientific racism that rationalized xenophobic attitudes and responses 
toward immigration. Jacobson’s classic analysis locates eugenics at the intersection of scientific 
racism and nativist sentiment, with Jacobson reading the rise of eugenics as a consequential 
development within a longer Anglo-American tradition of identifying political fitness with 
whiteness.23 
While eugenics helped to rationalize American nativism during the early twentieth 
century and while it more generally made racist ideas and practices towards non-white groups 
respectable, eugenics is irreducible to scientific racism. As it developed in the United States, 
eugenics was always hereditarian but it was not always racist. Hereditarianism supported racism, 
but hereditarianism was not racist per se. Hereditarianism referred to the idea that human 
differences were perpetuated reproductively through biology. It also suggested that, via the 
control of human propagation, one could normalize the development of populations. In this way, 
hereditarianism could and did support scientific racism in so far as it served as the foundation for 
																																																								
22 There is an ongoing debate over the relationship between eugenics and scientific racism. The 
emerging consensus argues that while eugenics and scientific racism are not the same thing, the 
former was often used as mode of discrimination that justified eugenics as mode of power. 
Nikolas Rose, for example, argues that race and nationalism, while irreducible to eugenics, 
intersected with it ways that ultimately defined its operation. In a book in which he distinguishes 
between twentieth and twenty first century biopolitics, Rose writes, “‘population’, ‘quality,’ 
‘territory’, ‘nation’, ‘race’,” –these were the terms that were fused in the discourse of eugenics 
and the terms that gave it its specific, and ultimately murderous character.” Nikolas Rose, The 
Politics of Life Itself: Biomedicine, Power, and Subjectivity in the Twenty First Century 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006), 56. I agree with Rose and other who maintain 
a distinction between eugenics and scientific racism but who also view scientific racism as an 
integral part of the development of eugenics as a set of historical discourses, practices, and 
policies. Maintaining this distinction is important because, as I discuss below, the victims of 
scientific racism, like African Americans, also promoted and adopted eugenic practices. 
 
23 Matthew Frye Jacobson, Whiteness of a Different Color: European Immigrants and the 
Alchemy of Race (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998), 39-90. 
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thinking about race in terms of biology. But one could subscribe to hereditarianism and not be 
racist. One could, for example, believe that heredity produced innate differences but that these 
differences could not be used to make generalizations about the dispositions or capacities of 
entire races. Furthermore, one could be racist while insisting that there were members of one’s 
own race who were hereditarily inferior.  
Distinguishing between hereditarianism and racism helps to explain important 
dimensions of Anglo-American eugenics. During the early twentieth century, for example, 
eugenic policies targeted poor “feebleminded” whites in addition to non-whites, a fact that 
proves difficult to explain when one equates eugenics solely with scientific racism. The fact that 
eugenic sterilization laws focused on the fecundity of poor white women during the 1920s and 
‘30s, for example, demonstrates that the discriminatory framework of hereditarianism cut both 
ways, allowing eugenicists to discriminate against the reproductive behavior of whites and non-
whites alike.24  Linked to hereditarianism, eugenics developed as a matrix of discourses, 
strategies, techniques, and policies intended to promote, enforce, and normalize propagative 
behavior as a means to national advancement. As it matured in the early twentieth century, 
eugenics included “positive” strategies that attempted to incentivize procreative behavior among 
fit groups and “negative” measures (e.g., immigration restriction and compulsory sterilization) 
that sought to curb the propagative impact of allegedly unfit groups.  
 Scholarship distinguishes between three forms of eugenics discourse in the United States. 
Only one of these discourses, referred to by scholars as “mainline” eugenics, was supported by 
whites, although it was the most popular eugenics discourse, the most politically dominant, and 
																																																								
24 Wendy Kline, Building a Better Race: Gender, Sexuality, and Eugenics from the Turn of the 
Century to the Baby Boom (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), 32-94. 
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the most consequential with respect to American social policy.25 Rising to prominence in the first 
few decades of the twentieth century, mainline eugenics sought to improve the population 
through policies that supported white reproductive hygiene. Advocates of “hard” heredity, 
mainline eugenicists endorsed a eugenics program that privileged hereditary interventions over 
environmental reforms in endeavoring the preserve the racial hierarchy of segregated America. 
Charles Davenport, a proud scion of New England, was one of America’s most prominent 
mainline eugenicists. An evolutionary biologist and a defender of scientific racism, Davenport 
saw eugenics as a means to strengthening national life through the hereditary cultivation of the 
white racial body. Mainline eugenicists believed that national prosperity necessitated the 
preservation of a racial hierarchy in which different racial stocks played different socio-
economic roles. The leadership of the native white stock, mainline eugenicists insisted, needed to 
be preserved and enhanced in order to ensure national greatness. Davenport developed eugenics 
as a scientific practice during the 1910s and ‘20s, while also promoting eugenics as a popular 
movement.26 He supported negative eugenic measures like immigration restriction and 
sterilization in addition to positive eugenic incentives, both of which were aimed at the 
preservation and enhancement of native Anglo-American stock. American mainline eugenics has 
received the most scholarly attention to date. 																																																								
25 Daniel Kevles coined the term “mainline” eugenics in his classic 1985 work. Daniel Kevles, In 
the Name of Eugenics: Genetics and the Uses of Human Heredity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1999 [1985]), 96-112. Since then, scholars of eugenics in the United States 
have followed suit, using the term mainline eugenics to distinguish an elite white supremacist 
scientific discourse promoted by the white Protestant establishment from other eugenics 
discourse in the United States. See, for example, Michele Mitchell, Righteous Propagation: 
African Americans and the Politics of Racial Destiny after Reconstruction (Chapel Hill, NC: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2004), 86. 
 
26 Kevles, In the Name of Eugenics, 41-66. Harry Bruinius, Better for All the World: The Secret 
History of Forced Sterilization and America’s Quest for Racial Purity (New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf, 2006), 108-37). 
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Mainline eugenicists promoted population development through three general race 
hygiene initiatives during the 1910s, ‘20s and ‘30s: 1) the encouragement of “fit” whites to 
marry and have more children; 2) the elimination of inferior stock within the white race; 3) the 
biological protection of white America from the hereditary influence of allegedly inferior races. 
In pursuing the first initiative, mainline eugenicists developed positive eugenics programs, 
including popular education campaigns and eugenic sermon contests that facilitated cooperation 
with churches in order to spread the gospel of reproductive fitness.27 In pursuing the second 
initiative, eugenicists promoted negative eugenic measures like the segregation and sterilization 
of unfit whites,28 while they advocated and helped to enact immigration restriction and anti-
miscegenation laws in pursuing the third.29 
Twenty-first century Americans’ tend to associate eugenics almost exclusively with what 
scholars have come to identify as mainline eugenics. Mainline eugenics was an elitist scientific 
discourse promoted by old stock Anglo-Saxon Protestants like Charles Davenport and Madison 
Grant. Mainline eugenicists like Davenport and Grant characteristically linked the fate of the 
country to the continuing socio-political dominance of historically powerful New England 
families. American national identity and superiority, they argued, was located within the elect 
hereditary comportment of native New England stock.  
																																																								
27 Rosen, Preaching Eugenics, 111-37. 
 
28 Nicole Hahn Rafter, ed. White Trash: The Eugenic Family Studies, 1877-1919 (Boston: 
Northeastern University Press, 1988). Matt Wray, Not Quite White: White Trash and the 
Boundaries of Whiteness (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2006), 65-95. 
 
29 Jacobson, Whiteness of a Different Color, 77-90. Gregory Michael Dorr, Segregation’s 
Science: Eugenics and Society in Virginia (Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia Press, 
2008), 137-166.	
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Contemporary scholars and popular writers alike have unearthed the mutually formative 
relationship between the rise of mainline eugenics and the development of Nazism, 
demonstrating how mainline eugenics’ quest for national development through white racial 
purity directly influenced the rise of race hygiene in Germany.30 The salient connections between 
American eugenics and Nazi race hygiene have come to dominate contemporary Americans’ 
understandings of eugenics in the United States, with American eugenics becoming almost 
exclusively associated with the scientific discourse of white supremacism. However, while 
eugenics and scientific racism in the United States developed hand-in-hand, eugenics is more 
accurately conceived as part of an apparatus that developed around and through the concept of 
hereditarianism, an apparatus that supported scientific racism but that is irreducible to racism 
itself. 
As a science of population development, mainline eugenics developed largely through the 
efforts of Charles Davenport, who claimed inspiration from the British statistician and cousin of 
Charles Darwin, Sir Francis Galton. Galton coined the term “eugenics” (literally, “wellborn”) in 
1883 to denote his hereditary science of statecraft and empire building.31 Galton’s work had an 
early influence in the United States through the utopian labors of John Humphrey Noyes and his 
Oneida experiment.32 Galton’s work did not find mainstream influence in the United States, 
																																																								
30 Stefan Kühl, The Nazi Connection: Eugenics, American Racism, and German National 
Socialism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994). Edwin Black, War Against the Weak: 
Eugenics and America’s Campaign to Create a Master Race (New York: Four Walls Eight 
Windows, 2003). 
 
31 Francis Galton, Inquiries into Human Faculty and its Development (London: Macmillan, 
1883).  
 
32 Louis J. Kern, An Ordered Love: Sex Roles and Sexuality in Victorian Utopias: the Shakers, 
the Mormons, and the Oneida Community (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 
1981), pp. 205-80. 
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however, until Davenport’s work in the early twentieth century. Davenport updated and adapted 
Galton’s ideas, largely by placing eugenics on the footing of modern genetics. Combining 
Gregor Mendel’s work on dominant and recessive traits with August Weismann’s 1893 theory of 
heredity, Davenport created a hereditary science that predicated national advancement upon the 
cultivation of the white racial “germ plasm.”33 Technically, the germ plasm referred to the 
hereditary substances located within human sex cells. But Davenport also used the term to 
denote the propagative potential of the country. Indeed, for Davenport the germ plasm was a 
national resource.  
Most scholarship to date has focused on mainline eugenics’ successful enactments of 
negative eugenic policies. Mainline eugenicists, for example, directly influenced the passage of 
the highly restrictive 1924 Immigration Bill, the enactment of Virginia’s sterilization law that 
was upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1927 decision in Buck v. Bell, and the institution of 
anti-miscegenation statutes. As scholars have documented, each of these components of mainline 
eugenics’ race hygiene program had serious consequences. Over the course of the twentieth 
century, for example, over sixty thousand Americans were legally sterilized thanks to the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Buck v. Bell.34   
The other two American eugenics discourses identified by scholars were developed and 
promoted by African Americans seeking socio-political empowerment in segregated America. 
These eugenics discourses were smaller in scale and influence than their mainline counterpart. 
Gregory Michael Dorr and Angela Logan refer to the first of these as “assimilationist” eugenics, 
																																																								
33 Charles B. Davenport, Heredity in Relation to Eugenics (New York: Henry Holt, 1911). 
 
34 For a recent history of state-sponsored sterilization in North America, see Randall Hansen and 
Desmond King, Sterilized by the State: Eugenics, Race, and the Population Scare in Twentieth-
Century North America (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013). 
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which is distinct from the other mode of African American eugenics that supported the separatist 
racial politics of black nationalist groups like Marcus Garvey’s Universal Negro Improvement 
Association (UNIA) and the Nation of Islam (NOI).35 Both of these African American eugenics 
discourses, scholars suggest, can be understood as responses to mainline eugenics, especially the 
claims it made regarding black racial inferiority and the policies it enacted to promote white 
racial hygiene.36  
Black support for eugenics was considerably smaller than whites’. Nonetheless, eugenic 
thought and practice found some popular endorsement among African Americans. 
Assimilationist eugenics represented a popular eugenics discourse promoted by leading race 
intellectuals like W.E.B. Du Bois, male and female African American medical and scientific 
professionals, and health minded women’s writers who sought to develop programs of black 
racial uplift in segregated America.37 Assimilationist eugenics rejected mainline eugenicists’ 
racism while accepting hereditarianism, insisting that, while there were no significant differences 
between human races with respect to intelligence and morality, each race consisted of good and 
bad stocks. Under Du Bois leadership, the NAACP served as the mouthpiece for assimilationist 
eugenics, staging positive eugenics programs to promote reproductive hygiene within “fit” 
																																																								
35 Gregory Michael Dorr and Angela Logan, “‘Quality, Not Mere Quantity Counts’: Black 
Eugenics and the NAACP Baby Contests,” in A Century of Eugenics in America: From the 
Indiana Experiment to the Human Genome Era (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 
2011), 68-92. Mitchell, Righteous Propagation, 218-39.  
 
36 Dorr and Logan, “‘Quality, Not Mere Quantity Counts’: Black Eugenics and the NAACP 
Baby Contests,” 70-71. Nathaniel Deutsch, Inventing America’s ‘Worst’ Family: Eugenics, 
Islam, and the Fall and Rise of the Tribe of Ishmael (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
2009), 139-54. 
 
37 Daylanne K. English, Unnatural Selections: Eugenics in American Modernism and the Harlem 
Renaissance (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2004), 35-64. Mitchell, 
Righteous Propagation, 76-140. 
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African American communities.38 Assimilationist eugenics never developed an operative 
negative eugenics agenda and, in contradistinction to mainline eugenics, emphasized 
environmental reforms over hereditary interventions. Yet leading proponents of assimilationist 
eugenics made hereditarian distinctions between racially worthy and unworthy individuals while 
also endorsing birth control for poor blacks whose fecundity supposedly stymied racial uplift.39 
The goal of assimilationist eugenics was to ensure full socio-political enfranchisement for 
African Americans through a racial uplift program grounded in reproductive hygiene. 
Black nationalist movements like the UNIA and the NOI adapted popular eugenic ideas 
and practices in their separatist racial programs.40 Black nationalist groups inverted the racist 
claims made by mainline eugenicists, upholding the black body as a reproductive ideal. Unlike 
those who supported assimilationist eugenics, black nationalist groups embraced certain eugenic 
ideas as part of their efforts to preserve black racial purity in the face of white oppression and, 
especially in the NOI’s case, as part of a commitment to a political ideology that envisioned the 
restoration of black political dominance. In inverting the racism advanced by mainline 
eugenicists, the UNIA and NOI thus modified many of its key moralizations, including mainline 
eugenics’ emphasis on progress through white racial hygiene. As Michele Mitchel demonstrates, 
																																																								
38 Dorr and Logan, “‘Quality, Not Mere Quantity Counts’: Black Eugenics and the NAACP 
Baby Contests,” 75.	
 
39 Deutsch, Inventing America’s Worst Family, 151. 
 
40 Ibid., 130-54. Mitchell, Righteous Propagation, 218-39. I am aware of the issues raised by 
Edward E. Curtis in defining the NOI as a nationalist, rather than a religious, movement. I agree 
with his argument that the religious dimensions of the NOI were a vital part of its group identity 
and solidarity. Edward E Curtis, Black Muslim Religion in the Nation of Islam, 1960-1975 
(Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2006), 1-14. I include the NOI here as a 
black nationalist group simply for the sake of convenience. Its association with black nationalism 
also helps to underscore the eugenic components of the NOI as a race conscious group.  
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black nationalist groups like the UNIA promoted race hygiene through pro-natal ideologies that 
supported traditional gender roles and sexualities.41 
Eugenics and American Religions 
 Eugenics frequently bridged religious and scientific aspirations for social betterment, 
while eugenic ideas and practices were promoted by a number of American ethnic and racial 
groups who belonged to different and even competing religious traditions. As scholarship 
increasingly shows, American religions played a leading role in shaping public acceptance of 
eugenic ideas and practices. Far from describing a war between American religions and 
eugenics, scholars instead highlight the ways in which American religious expression positively 
and negatively influenced the social acceptance of eugenics as a professional and popular 
discourse of reproductive hygiene. 
 As Sharon Leon argues, American Catholics were the most vociferous opponents of 
mainline eugenics.42 Although American Catholics demonstrated qualified support for particular 
aspects of eugenics –especially aspects of its pro-natal morality –scholars like Leon emphasize 
concerted Catholic opposition to negative eugenic policies like sterilization and the hereditarian 
and highly racialized models of degeneracy that scientifically and morally authorized these 
policies. Importantly, Catholics opposed negative eugenics ideas and policies on both religious 
and scientific grounds. 43 
																																																								
41 Mitchell, Righteous Propagation, 218-39. 
 
42 Sharon M. Leon, An Image of God: the Catholic Struggle with Eugenics (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 2013), 3. 
 
43 Ibid., 5. Rosen, Preaching Eugenics, 204. Marouf A. Hasian, The Rhetoric of Eugenics in 
Anglo-American Thought (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1996), 107.	
		
	
23 
  Before the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1927 constitutional endorsement of eugenic sterilization 
in Buck v. Bell and Pope Pius XI’s 1930 condemnation of sterilization in Casti Connubii, “a 
spectrum of Catholic opinion [on eugenics] existed.”44 Catholics tended to support positive 
eugenics initiatives aimed at strengthening family life.45 They also sympathized with the general 
aim of improving the human race.46 Yet scholars argue that Catholics grew more uniform in their 
opposition to eugenics as mainline eugenicists succeeded in enacting negative eugenic initiatives 
during the 1920s,47 with Catholics attacking the empiricism of mainline eugenicists’ claims 
regarding the hereditary basis of moral and physical degeneracy. Catholics forged one of the 
most consistent and successful oppositions to state sterilization laws across the country.48 
 Catholics were often drawn to eugenic ideas and practices out of an interest social 
reform. Yet Catholics opposed eugenics as a practice of race hygiene, especially the practice of 
sterilization. Scholars argue that much of Catholic moral opposition to sterilization originated 
within Catholicism itself, with Catholics drawing upon the Thomistic tradition of natural law to 
counter the ethical precepts of negative eugenics. This tradition included an emphasis on the 
dignity of the person,49 recognizing the “potential for every member of [of society] to contribute 
to the common good, regardless of material limitations.”50 
																																																								
44 Rosen, Preaching Eugenics, 139. 
 
45 Leon, An Image of God, 9. 
 
46 Rosen, Preaching Eugenics, 143. Hasian, The Rhetoric of Eugenics in Anglo-American 
Thought, 102. 
 
47 Ibid., 100. 
 
48 Leon, An Image of God, 66-88.	
 
49 Rosen, Preaching Eugenics, 140. 
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 But, as scholarship also emphasizes, Catholic opposition to negative eugenics arose from 
the unique position of the American Catholic community with respect to mainstream American 
religious life. Recently arrived Catholics from Ireland and Southern Europe were often the 
objects of eugenic discrimination, particularly the nativism that characteristically found 
expression in negative eugenic policies like immigration restriction.51 Indeed, Catholic 
engagements with mainline eugenics cannot be dissociated from the issue of immigration, the 
question of assimilation, and, as Matthew Frye Jacobson attests, the politics of whiteness during 
the early twentieth century.52 With American mainline eugenicists and their sympathizers 
understanding religious life in hereditarian terms, viewing themselves as racially Protestant while 
vilifying the degeneracy supposedly represented by Catholicism, mainline eugenic thinking and 
initiatives underscore the fact that race, religious affiliation, and the question of socio-political 
fitness were inextricably bound up with one another during the eugenics era.53 Catholic 
opposition to mainline eugenics, therefore, often focused on the intrinsic connections that 
eugenicists drew between religious affiliation and hereditary fitness, frequently by calling public 
attention to the ways in which mainline eugenic science and policies perpetuated Nordic 
Protestant prejudice.54 
 Catholic opposition also took aim at mainline eugenicists’ claims regarding the power of 
biology, with Catholics insisting that environment played an equally powerful role in 																																																																																																																																																																																		
50 Leon, An Image of God, 4. 
 
51 Hasian, The Rhetoric of Eugenics in Anglo-American Thought, 93-94. 
 
52 Jacobson, Whiteness of a Different Color, 69-70. 
 
53 Sean McCloud, Divine Hierarchies: Class in American Religion and Religious Studies 
(Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2007), 39-42. 
 
54 Leon, An Image of God, 60-61.	
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determining human potential. Importantly, as Leon argues, Catholic challenges to hereditary 
determinism did not represent a clash between religious and scientific worldviews, but rather, an 
opposition to the empirical dubiousness of a eugenicists’ scientific methodology.55 To a much 
greater extent than Protestant leaders, Catholic clergymen were critical of the mainline eugenic 
claim that degeneracy was transmitted solely through human heredity.56 In disagreeing with 
mainline eugenicists’ principal scientific tenet (i.e., that biology determined destiny), Catholic 
leaders often articulated competing versions of race betterment that focused on social justice 
issues and environmental reforms that could ameliorate the same socio-economic disparities that 
the mainline eugenic language of hereditarianism sought to naturalize.57 
 Christine Rosen briefly considers the support that eugenic ideas and practices found 
within Reformed Jewish communities in New York. During the early years of mainline eugenics’ 
rise to power, Reformed Jewish leaders, Rosen argues, demonstrated a “measured support for 
eugenics,”58 typically out of an interest in social reform like their Catholic and Protestant 
counterparts. While Jewish engagements with eugenics in the United States remains one of the 
most neglected dimensions of American eugenics, no doubt because of its potential controversy, 
Rosen shows that there is evidence to suggest that Jewish attempts to wrestle with eugenic ideas 
and practices constituted an important part of Eastern European Jews’ attempts to navigate 
assimilation. Leading Reformed Rabbis like Stephen S. Wise, Rosen argues, engaged eugenics in 
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debating the question of intermarriage.59 Rosen suggests that the eugenic question of national 
development through race betterment was seen by growing ethnic minorities as a prerequisite for 
socio-political inclusion, with politically powerful non-white groups like Catholics and Jews 
understanding that their acceptance into the American mainstream (racially, religiously, and 
politically defined) depended upon their ability to publicly tackle the eugenic syllogism of socio-
political progress through racial improvement. 
 While there is a growing body of scholarship on African American engagements with 
eugenics, there is still very little known about how black religious life shaped said engagements. 
In one of the most important works on American eugenics published to date, Michele Mitchell 
demonstrates how the hereditarian discourse of eugenics provided race conscious African 
Americans, particularly modernizing medical professionals, intellectuals, clergymen, and women 
writers, with an ideology and practice for affirming the nobility of the black body in the face of 
the racism and oppression perpetuated by white eugenicists and other pro-segregation whites. 
Most generally, her work uncovers the flexibility of eugenics with respect to the politics of 
segregation after Reconstruction, with eugenics capable of supporting the scientifically encoded 
white supremacism of mainline eugenics, the scientifically informed assimilationist agenda of 
elite African Americans like Du Bois, and the separatist ideology of black nationalists like 
Marcus Garvey. Unfortunately, however, the role of religion in African American cooption of 
eugenics discourse remains a peripheral concern for Mitchell, with her work sometimes 
including the voices of race conscious religious leaders but not pausing to reflect upon the 
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specific role that black religion or churches may have played in shaping these leaders’ support 
for science inspired racial uplift.60 
 Nathaniel Deutsch’s 2009 work sheds light on the relationship between African 
American religious expression and the socialization of eugenic ideas and practices in African 
American communities. Deutsch’s work underscores the important role that Islam, as a claim to 
“Asiatic” otherness, played in the development of black religious movements like Noble Drew 
Ali’s Moorish Science Temple and the NOI. The claim to Islamic identity allowed race 
conscious African Americans to sever ties with the history of Christian oppression (of which 
mainline eugenics was seen as a part) by enabling an alternative and empowering narrative of 
black racial otherness. In fact, “one of the most fundamental and enduring beliefs of the Nation 
of Islam,” the Yakub myth, demonstrates the ways in which Islamic otherness permitted NOI 
members to incorporate eugenic ideas into their quest for racial separation while at the same time 
inversing the racial stereotypes of blacks perpetuated by mainline eugenicists.61 In this way, the 
NOI represents an important example of the ways in which religious identity fostered a 
historically oppressed minority’s appropriation of eugenic ideas and practices into an 
empowering, if politically marginalized vision of racial progress. Although he does not talk 
about eugenics per se, Edward J. Curtis’ history of the NOI and its “ethics of the black Muslim 
body” help to confirm Deutsch’s depiction of the importance of racial health for the NOI as a 
religious group.62 
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 Scholarship on eugenics and American religions has primarily focused on liberal 
Protestantism. This body of research has zeroed in on one question in particular: why were 
liberal Protestants such vocal supporters of eugenic initiatives? As Christine Rosen observes, 
“[Liberal] Protestants proved the most enthusiastic and numerically powerful group of religious 
participants in the eugenics movement.”63 Rosen and others have uncovered the leading role 
played by liberal Protestants in the popularization of mainline eugenic initiatives, arguing that 
liberal Protestant clergymen embraced eugenics through their progressive faiths and their 
modernist commitments to forging partnerships with science in building a Christian society. 
 More broadly, research suggests that explaining liberal Protestant support entails 
understanding the ways in which mainline American Protestantism facilitated the mainstreaming 
of eugenic modes of discrimination, including the justification of socio-economic hierarchies in 
hereditarian terms and a racialized morality of evolutionary struggle. Some scholars also suggest 
that comprehending liberal Protestant Christianity, as a matrix of mainstream ideals for human 
embodiment, shaped the secularity of eugenics, especially mainline eugenic knowledge and 
practice. In insisting as much, these scholars have nuanced the conclusions drawn by some 
historians who explain the development of eugenics in terms of the waxing authority of science 
as an agent of modernization. Michael Burleigh, for example, argues that the appeal of eugenics 
lay in its capacity to inspire devotion to a new scientistic creed that outmoded the “Judeo-
Christian moral tradition.”64 Scholars who have focused on eugenics in the American context, 
however, argue that Anglo-American Protestantism itself facilitated the mainstreaming of 
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eugenic modes of discrimination, thereby emphasizing continuities between mainline 
Protestantism and eugenic morality and ideals. 
 Thus, for example, in the earliest critical history of eugenic thought in the United States, 
Richard Hofstadter argued that nineteenth century liberal Protestants like Henry Ward Beecher 
embraced social Darwinism as a way of translating Calvinist doctrines of election and innate 
depravity into the deterministic idiom of heredity, which helped to acculturate social Darwinist 
concepts by fusing them to middle class American socio-economic ideals.65 Hofstadter’s 
argument suggests that eugenic ideas and practices did not arise in spite of culturally dominant 
patterns of American religiosity or apart from these patterns, but within and through them, with 
eugenic modes of discrimination achieving social legitimacy in the American context through the 
theological, moralistic, and racialized lineage of Calvinist Protestantism. 
 Since the 1990s, a number of analyses of the intersections between liberal Protestantism 
and eugenic thought and practice have been published.66 This work corresponds with a broader 
“discovery” of the popular dimensions of American eugenics, especially recent revelations 
regarding the extent to which eugenic thought and practice saturated nearly all dimensions of 
white middle class American culture in the decades before World War II.67 Taken as a whole, 
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this body of research confirms and expands Hofstadter’s early conclusions, revealing that public 
acceptance of eugenics was advanced by transformations within white Protestant Christianity 
itself. 
 Two examples from this body of scholarship will help convey this point. In her 2008 
monograph, Amy Laura Hall shows how mainline eugenic modes of discrimination gained social 
acceptance through the development of early twentieth century Protestant domesticity, 
illustrating how eugenic ideas and practices successfully folded religious and scientific 
aspirations together into a common discourse of procreative hygiene.68 Her work thus 
demonstrates that the white, middle class, religiously liberal household functioned as one of the 
most important relays for the social dissemination of eugenic morality. In this way, Hall’s 
analysis contributes to an emerging body of work on eugenics, gender, and sexuality,69 in 
addition to enlarging our understanding of an important chapter in American Protestant history. 
More recently, Brian C. Wilson has explored the popularization of eugenics through the life and 
labor of John Harvey Kellogg. Wilson uses the professional labors of Kellogg, the famous 																																																																																																																																																																																		
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Seventh Day Adventist and American health reformer, to demonstrate the ways in which 
Protestant modernism, as a theological commitment to seeing human evolution as an ongoing 
work of redemption, boosted liberal Protestant acceptance of mainline eugenics as a practice of 
race hygiene. Wilson’s autobiography of Kellogg helps us to understand how Kellogg’s 
theological modernism bridged religious and eugenic discourses, providing a crucial discursive 
matrix through which mainline eugenics claimed Christian, and thus social authenticity.70  
 For some scholars, explaining liberal Protestant support for eugenics has also involved 
attending to the ways in which Protestantism shaped and legitimated mainline eugenics’ 
secularity, especially the moral idealism that animated its hereditary struggle for race hygiene. 
Harry Bruinius, for example, shows how the career of Charles Davenport, America’s most 
prominent eugenicist during the teens and twenties, bore the moralistic impress of his proud 
Puritan identity.71 Sean McCloud’s book on class in American religions and Ava Chamberlain’s 
reinterpretation of the life and legacy of Jonathan Edwards’ paternal grandmother, Elizabeth 
Tuttle, reveal how the secularity of mainline eugenics was premised upon racial categories and 
ideals that were profoundly Protestant in inspiration and implicitly and explicitly rooted in a New 
England sense of hereditary election.72 These works help to resolve a major oversight in existing 
scholarship on whiteness and eugenics in America by showing how mainline eugenic categories 
of racial fitness were barely conceivable apart from Northeastern middle class Protestant norms 
and ideals for human embodiment. Moreover, they help us to account for white middle class 
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America’s general willingness to accept or even embrace negative eugenic policies like 
sterilization, policies that were premised upon “ideas of human perfectibility.”73  
Thesis, Outline, and Limitations 
 Drawing upon original archival research and building upon existing scholarship on 
American religions and eugenics, this dissertation argues that Protestant modernist religiosity 
facilitated the socialization of eugenic ideas, practices, and policies within religiously liberal, 
white American middle and upper classes. Protestant modernism and eugenic thought and 
practice, I argue, emerged and developed together as affluent white Protestants in the Northeast 
began to associate propagation with the advance of Christian civilization.  
This dissertation enhances previous scholarship on American religions and eugenics in 
two important ways. First, it pushes the narrative back by showing how eugenic ideas and 
practices did not emerge in the twentieth century with the rise of science, but rather, in the mid-
nineteenth century, as white New England Protestants began to view propagation as a method for 
advancing Christendom. Second, and relatedly, it broadens our understanding of the relationship 
between American religiosity and eugenics by defining the latter not in terms of science but in 
terms of a modern tendency to locate socio-political stability and progress within human 
reproductive practices. Protestant modernism, as a religiosity of the white elite in the 
Northeastern United States, did more than any other form of American piety to promote such a 
propagative vision of progress.  
Chapter one explores the work of Horace Bushnell, a nineteenth century New England 
minister who is credited as being the founder of Protestant modernism. Bushnell provided the 
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framework for the development of modernism as a propagative theology. In his famous work, 
Christian Nurture, Bushnell argued that Christians could be grown and not converted. He 
insisted that the redemptive scope of Christianity should focus on the propagation of a “godly 
seed.” In so doing, Bushnell inaugurated modernism as a discourse of racial theism, that is, as a 
theistic habit of identifying providence with the hereditary development of the white racial body. 
Racial theism supported the development of eugenic ideas and practices by rooting providence 
within a hereditary conception of life that privileged the white racial body as a vehicle of socio-
political advance.  
The second chapter traces the development of modernism in the latter half of the 
nineteenth century through the preaching of Henry Ward Beecher. Like Bushnell, Beecher 
conceived piety in propagative terms and identified the advance of American national life with 
the hereditary development of the white racial body. Beecher, however, further developed 
modernism as a propagative faith by adapting it to the tenets of evolutionism. Unlike Bushnell, 
Beecher accepted the idea that humans had evolved from animals while he championed the 
notion that the destruction of unfitness enhanced human life. Redefining Christian redemption as 
a “great struggle of extrication,” Beecher believed that God sought to weed out degeneracy as 
part of his loving labor to draw out or “unfold” a higher spiritual nature in the race. Beecher 
promoted a racial theism that facilitated the rise of eugenic modes of discrimination in the latter 
half of the nineteenth century, believing that providence sought to advance American national 
life through the hereditary advancement of the white racial body. 
The third chapter explores the intersections of Protestant modernism and the rise of 
eugenic ideas, practices, and policies at the turn of the twentieth century through the work of 
Newell Dwight Hillis. Hillis was an intellectual disciple of Beecher and the indirect heir of 
		
	
34 
Beecher’s pulpit at Plymouth Church in Brooklyn, New York. Hillis’ work shows how 
modernism developed as part elite white Protestants’ efforts to redefine and retool Christianity 
for an evolutionary struggle against degenerate elements of the American population. Hillis’ 
work also demonstrates how modernism continued to socialize eugenic modes of discrimination 
through a discourse of racial theism that identified national stability and advance with the 
propagation of Anglo-American religious ideals. The chapter uses Hillis’ writings to reflect upon 
the variability of racial theism as a modernist discourse. 
Chapter four departs from the central narrative by considering modernism as a discourse 
of evolutionary –as opposed to racial –theism. Using archival research conducted at the 
University of Chicago Library, the chapter explores the work of Shailer Mathews, Dean of the 
Divinity School at the University of Chicago during the 1910 and ‘20s and one of the preeminent 
modernist theologians during the early twentieth century. Unlike Bushnell, Beecher, and Hillis, 
Mathews rejected the biological superiority of white America. He dismissed Anglo-America’s 
sense of racial superiority as social prejudice. Yet Mathews endorsed eugenic practices and 
initiatives as part of his attempt to retool Christianity as a “religion of life.” In Mathews’ 
modernist vision, Christians out to cooperate with God in his evolutionary work to perfect 
human society, a cooperative endeavor that, according to Mathews, necessitated the eradication 
of human degeneracy. 
The fifth chapter argues that mainline eugenics itself functioned as a discourse of racial 
theism. Drawing upon archival research in the Charles Davenport Papers, I use the writings and 
correspondence of one of America’s most preeminent eugenicists to show how mainline 
eugenics was premised upon the idea that Anglo-America represented a providentially elect 
racial stock. A proud descendent of the puritan founder of New Haven, Connecticut, John 
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Davenport, and a man who was reared attending Beecher’s Plymouth Church in Brooklyn, 
Davenport saw eugenics as a way of protecting and strengthening the birthright of old stock 
America. An evolutionary biologist by training, Davenport was not religious in a traditional 
sense. Yet his science of the germ plasm perpetuated important theistic assumptions about the 
biopolitical destiny of New England, assumptions that were put into place by Bushnell and 
developed by Beecher. Davenport also encouraged modernists to help him promote mainline 
eugenic initiatives. 
The final chapter draws upon archival research in the American Eugenics Society Papers 
to investigate the pro-eugenic sermons written and delivered for the American Eugenics Society 
(AES) in the late 1920s by modernist ministers like Kenneth C. MacArthur. The AES was a 
mainline eugenics organization that sought to ensure American national advance through race 
propagation. The AES staged sermon contests in its effort to cultivate partnership with churches. 
Rather than focusing on contest participants’ willingness to engage science, the chapter instead 
explores how the interests of mainline eugenics and modernist churches overlapped through a 
shared commitment to viewing propagation as a divine method for ensuring socio-political 
progress. Conducting the first close analysis of the AES sermons as a modernist discourse, the 
chapter demonstrates how modernist churches helped to promote the mainline eugenic concept 
of “trusteeship,” which referred to a modern reproductive morality aimed at preserving and 
enhancing the racial germ plasm.  
The conclusion considers the decline of modernism and mainline eugenics in the 1930s 
and ‘40s. While eugenic ideas and practices did not disappear after World War II, the 
mainstream United States did witness the collapse of a theistic discourse that framed the political 
significance of reproduction in racial and evolutionary terms. After the Second World War, 
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Americans would stop speaking of propagation as a godly means to evolve a better race, even 
while eugenic modes of discrimination and eugenic policies nonetheless persisted.  
 As a note on organization, one will observe that each chapter advances a discussion about 
the development of modernism as a pro-eugenics discourse. Toward this end, I have chosen to 
include a discussion of the AES sermons in each of the chapters in order to underscore how the 
developments covered in each chapter led to modernists’ vociferous public support for mainline 
eugenics during the teens and twenties, those years in which eugenics was most influential with 
respect to American social policy. This organization facilitates the development of my central 
question regarding how pro-eugenic modernist piety came to exist. Referencing sermons that 
demonstrate ministerial enthusiasm for twentieth century eugenics while conducting a genealogy 
of modernist religiosity allows one to mark important developments and continuities within the 
maturation of modernism as a pro-eugenic faith. 
 Perhaps the biggest shortcoming of the project thus far concerns the fact that it grossly 
underrepresents female voices. This is partly due to the fact that the discourse of Protestant 
modernism was dominated by elite white males. But the omission of female voices also speaks to 
an important assumption that has guided this work since nearly the beginning: theological 
modernism, as a discourse predominantly written by elite Anglo-American men, and Protestant 
domesticity, as a discourse predominantly written by elite Anglo-American women, were both 
justified by, and oriented towards, the same goal –namely, the propagation of a Christian society. 
In other words, as I see things, theological modernism and domesticity represent overlapping and 
complementary discourses. Hence, the entire project, as thus far conceived, presumes that 
nineteenth and early twentieth century Anglo-American Protestant women played a leading role 
in the formation of the modern home. I also assume that the theological ambitions of modernists 
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to reconceive God in propagative terms make little sense apart from this formation. In important 
ways, my intention has been to show how modernism, which has been understood as an 
intellectual discourse, plugged into and shaped the modern rationalization of the home as a 
propagative institution. In spite of these assumptions and whatever success achieved in 
accomplishing my intentions, however, more work needs to be done to flesh out the gendered 
complementarity between modernism and domesticity in defining the social function of the 
modern home. More female voices and greater attention to the masculine elements of modernism 
would greatly help in this respect. 
Terminology 
In this analysis, I make a general distinction between two kinds of modernists: racial 
theists and evolutionary theists. If the AES sermons are any indication of things, racial theists 
predominated throughout the development of modernism. The differences between these two 
kinds of modernists revolved around their differing conceptions of providence but also the 
specific eugenic initiatives they supported. In the early twentieth century, racial theists were 
more likely to emphasize mainline eugenic initiatives like immigration restriction and to support 
the eugenic regulation of reproductive sex out of a commitment to white racial hygiene. 
Evolutionary theists, on the other hand, saw eugenic initiatives as helpful in a broader human 
struggle against degeneracy. 
Racial theists included modernists who were committed to reading God’s evolutionary 
providence as the birthright of an elect American stock. Their brand of theism was tied up with 
white race nationalism and the idea that American religio-political ideals were the product of the 
unique hereditary endowment of old stock America. Racial theists promoted eugenics out of a 
sense of duty to protect and enhance what they saw as the essence of American national life: the 
		
	
38 
white racial body. Like evolutionary theists, racial theists read evolution in redemptive terms. 
Yet their vision of redemption saw the ethical and spiritual finality of evolution as a hierarchy of 
racial stocks with old stock America at the top. Racial theists clung tightly to racial 
immanentism, which, following Horace Bushnell, identified whiteness with divinity by believing 
that old stock America represented an elect and godly seed. I use the term racial theism to 
challenge the assumption that eugenic thought and practice developed along with the modern 
concept of race as a scientific category. In my narrative, the biological concept of race is 
preeminently a theistic category, with racial theism underscoring the idea that Anglo-American 
conceptions of providence suffused and supported hereditarian constructions of race.   
Evolutionary theists included modernists who coupled a more liberal racial outlook with 
a theistic commitment to viewing evolution as a divine process or method for achieving socio-
political progress. Shailer Mathews, for example, rejected white racial superiority as social 
conceit. He imagined evolution not as a process that inherently favored the propagation of 
allegedly more civilized races over supposedly more barbaric ones, but as a struggle that 
enjoined all races in the labor of procuring a higher spiritual nature. While Mathews rejected 
racial prejudice, however, he accepted hereditarianism and the concomitant notion that sinfulness 
could be propagated. Mathews’ modernism testifies to the fact that while eugenics was not 
always racist it was always hereditarian, employing an understanding of life that saw human 
nature (and the body politic) as a developmental thing.   
 As I use it, the term white racial body denotes the notion that national religio-political 
ideals represented the unique inborn inheritance of Anglo-American stock. Used in conjunction 
with racial theism, the white racial body refers to a theistic concept of inborn providence. But it 
also underscores the technical element of control that characterizes eugenic thought: the 
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hereditarian idea that one could, via propagation, protect and augment the development of 
Anglo-American stock and thus American national life. Most importantly, however, the term is 
meant to capture a hereditarian way of thinking about race as a common life or body, that is, as a 
unique inborn vitality shared by white Americans, especially old stock whites. In this respect, it 
is intended to underscore how hereditarianism fostered a racialized way of thinking about 
biological life as something shared and also something to be collectively venerated and 
preserved. 
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CHAPTER 1: ‘A GODLY SEED’: HORACE BUSHNELL’S ‘PROPAGATIVE’ 
RELIGION 
 
“Horace Bushnell taught us that ‘the child ought to grow up a Christian and never having known himself to have 
been anything else than a Christian’. Just so. And this is none other than the thought and passion of those who are 
promoting the Science of Eugenics. Science is making righteousness possible and is teaching us that goodness is 
inherited, that a love of the true and beautiful and the good has been transmitted by devout parents who reverence 
God and who worshipped Him ‘in Spirit and in truth’ and ‘in the beauty of holiness’.” 
 
-Anonymous Minister, AES Eugenic Sermon Contest, 1926 
 
 
Introduction 
Eugenics reminded a number of AES contest participants of Horace Bushnell’s famous 
work, Christian Nurture. Bushnell, a prominent mid-nineteenth century Congregationalist 
minister who scholars cite as one of the most important early figures in the development of 
modernist Protestantism, sought to reconceive and retool middle-class New England piety for a 
rapidly expanding young nation. Redefining religious devotion through the hereditary register of 
race and the nurturing space of the domestic sphere, Bushnell famously argued in Christian 
Nurture that the task of the church was not to convert Christians but instead to grow them in the 
home. Bushnell insisted that the contemporary task of Christianity was to re-envision piety in 
terms of the “propagative” power of the Saxon body and the gradual perfection of this body 
through reproduction. Drawing upon a Lamarckian framework of heredity, Bushnell maintained 
that, through propagation, Saxon “stock” could become “truly sanctified,”1 with fitness for 
family, church, and national life passing through the generations as a “natural gift or 
endowment.”2 In championing a partnership between the church and the eugenics movement, 																																																								
1 Horace Bushnell, Christian Nurture (New York: Charles Scribner, 1861), 205. 
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some AES contest participants in the 1920s invoked Bushnell’s work in order to argue that 
religion and eugenics had common aims, i.e., the propagation of a more righteous race. Like 
Bushnell, contest participants read racial development through the theistic lens of immanence, 
believing that God sought to build his kingdom on earth by propagating a race more naturally 
inclined to goodness. 
 In this chapter, I draw from Bushnell’s work in order to trace the origins of modernist 
Protestantism as a practice of writing racial theism. As I demonstrate throughout the course of 
this dissertation, modernism helped to popularize eugenic ideas and practices across middle-class 
Anglo-America during the 1920s and ‘30s. Here, I show how this modernist habit of viewing 
God as immanent within the development of the white race emerged simultaneously with a new 
propagative view of Christianity. Bushnell was the earliest and most famous promoter of this 
new way of conceiving the purpose and function of religion, and I use his work to show how 
racial theism and propagative Christianity emerged together. More specifically, I argue that his 
propagative method for ensuring the growth of Christian civilization provided the template for 
modernist Protestant ministerial engagements with eugenics in the early twentieth century. 
Protestant ministers supported eugenics not simply as part of an intellectual labor to place 
religion on the firm footing of evolutionary science. Their support should not be understood as a 
capitulation to scientific authority, even though they clearly saw their support for eugenics as a 
part of their desire to see religion and evolution epistemologically unified within a common 
system. Much differently, their support emerged as an intrinsic part of their racialized 
understanding of Christianity itself, an understanding that is best characterized as propagative. 
																																																																																																																																																																																		
2 Ibid., 202. 
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 In the following section, I introduce Bushnell’s propagative method and explore many of 
its distinctive features, including its prioritization of human physiology over scripture as the 
authoritative lens for interpreting providence and the consequences of this prioritization for racial 
thinking. In the second section, I discuss Bushnell’s propagative theory of sin and its relation to 
his understanding of racial development. In the third section, I focus on Bushnell’s concept of 
“sovereignty” to show how racial theism emerged with naturalistic understandings of race. In 
contrast to established narratives of the development of modernism, I argue that the modernist 
notion of racial immanence did not emerge with evolutionary thought per se but with naturalistic 
models of race development and a propagative understanding of religion. I conclude by briefly 
exploring the relationship between Bushnell’s work and modernist support for eugenics in the 
early twentieth century.  
Bushnell’s ‘Propagative’ Method 
 
Born on April 14, 1802, in Litchfield, Connecticut, Horace Bushnell was a prominent 
nineteenth century minister, public intellectual, and author. In 1831, Bushnell entered Yale 
Divinity School to pursue a career as a Congregationalist minister. Upon graduating, Bushnell 
became pastor at North Church in Hartford, Connecticut, where, as Glenn Hewitt narrates, he 
“remained for twenty-six years until ill health forced his early retirement.”3 During his years at 
North Church and after his retirement in 1859, Bushnell wrote prolifically. His works include 
God in Christ (1849) and Nature and the Supernatural (1858), but his most influential, and 
certainly most controversial work was Views of Christian Nurture. Originally published with the 
Massachusetts Sabbath-School Society in 1847, Bushnell revised, expanded and republished the 
work in 1861 under the shortened title, Christian Nurture. As Phillip P. Eppard writes, the 1861 																																																								
3 Glenn Hewitt, Regeneration and Morality: A Study of Charles Finney, Charles Hodge, John W. 
Nevin, and Horace Bushnell (Brooklyn, NY: Carlson, 1991), 126. 
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edition ultimately became the “accepted version.”4 In addition to Bushnell’s “Discourse on 
Language” that was published as part of God in Christ, William R. Hutchison cites Christian 
Nurture as one of the foundational texts for the development of a distinctly “modernist Protestant 
impulse.” Through its “environmental approach to religious nurture,” Hutchison argues, 
Christian Nurture “bolstered a growing confidence in the redemptive potentialities in the realm 
that had been known and feared as ‘the world’.”5 
Bushnell’s purpose in Christian Nurture was to promote a new method for expanding 
Christendom, one that, he hoped, would surpass revivalism as the principal means for growing 
Christian civilization. Writing just after the period of revivalistic fervor that historians refer to as 
the “Great Awakening,” Bushnell sharply criticized the turbulent spirit of conquest that he 
believed animated revivals. In contrast, Bushnell outlined a method of Christian expansion that 
sought to harness the nurturing power of the Christian home in order to rear Christians from 
birth. In the earliest version of his work, Bushnell took aim at those who privileged the revival 
system as a means of growth by famously declaring that the child ought to grow up a Christian:  
…the aim, effort and expectation should be, not, as is commonly assumed, that the child 
is to grow up in sin, to be converted after he comes to a mature age; but that he is to open 
on the world as one that is spiritually renewed, not remembering the time when he went 
through a technical experience, but seeming rather to have loved what is good from his 
earliest years.”6 
   
In contradistinction to what he considered to be the mechanical approach of revivalists, 
Bushnell argued that Christians could be “propagated,” a term that Bushnell used to refer to the 																																																								
4 Philip B. Eppard, introduction to Views of Christian Nurture and of Subjects Adjacent Thereto 
(1847), Horace Bushnell (Delmar, NY: Scholars’ Facsimiles and Reprints, 1975), vi. 
 
5 William R. Hutchison, The Modernist Impulse in American Protestantism (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1976), 47. 
 
6 Horace Bushnell, Views of Christian Nurture and of Subjects Adjacent Thereto (Delmar, NY: 
Scholar’s Facsimiles and Reprints, 1975 [1847]), 6. 
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idea that the righteousness of Christian parents could be infused organically into the 
development of the child. Propagation, in other words, referred to the idea that the “Christian life 
and spirit of the parents shall flow into the mind of the child, to blend with his incipient and half-
formed exercises” and, therefore, the notion that parents could thus “beget their own good” 
within their offspring, with “their thoughts, opinions, faith and love” becoming more and more a 
part of the child’s “own separate exercise.”7 But the notion of propagation also referred to the 
idea that the organic influence of the parents would be hereditarily transmitted, influencing the 
development of future generations. In the 1861 edition of his work, Bushnell thus cited a “very 
important fact in human physiology,” namely that “qualities of education, habit, feeling, and 
character, have a tendency always to grow in, by long continuance, and become thoroughly 
inbred in the stock.”8 As both meanings of propagation suggest, Bushnell’s method of Christian 
nurture was decidedly naturalistic, with Bushnell drawing inspiration from sciences like 
physiology and botany to reimagine Christianity as an organic, life-giving force and, thereby, to 
distinguish his system from what he viewed as the overly technical approach of the revivalists.  
Bushnell’s notion of propagation grounded an early iteration of American race 
nationalism, with propagation specifically seeking to harness the “potent and prolific energy of 
Saxon life.”9 In the edition of Christian Nurture that he published with the Massachusetts 
Sabbath-School Society in October 1847, Bushnell included an essay entitled, “Growth, Not 
Conquest, the True Method of Christian Progress,” a discourse that originally appeared in an 
																																																								
7 Ibid., 21. In another passage, Bushnell described propagation as a process by which the 
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8 Bushnell, Christian Nurture, 202. 
 
9 Bushnell, Views of Christian Nurture and of Subjects Adjacent Thereto, 149. 
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1844 volume of The New Englander under the title, “The Kingdom of Heaven as a Grain of 
Mustard Seed.”10 In this essay, Bushnell argued that the “true increase of a nation is not that 
which is made by conquest and plunder,” activities that he associated with revivalism, but “that 
which is the simple development of its vital and prolific forms.” After asserting this, Bushnell 
immediately began to narrate the story of the pilgrims and puritans who brought the “germ of a 
great nation” to Massachusetts’ shores, a germ that, through propagation, proliferated and 
eventually blossomed into the republic. Bushnell’s propagative method was thus a formalization 
of what he viewed to be the natural mode of New England’s growth, one that abided by the 
natural “laws of population” and one that had transformed a “few thousand men” into the 
wealthiest, freest, most powerful stock on the North American continent. Moreover, the 
naturalness of propagation made it inherently peaceful, providing the basis for national unity and 
civil prosperity, while also making propagation the truly legitimate method for expanding 
Christendom.11 Speaking inclusively as a scion of New England, Bushnell wrote, “We have 
made no conquests. We have only unfolded our original germ, the mustard seed of our first 
colonization. There is no other kind of national advancement which is legitimate or safe. The 
civil order must grow as a creature of life, and unfold itself from within.”12  
As his concern for unfolding the Saxon “germ” suggests, Bushnell’s notion of 
propagation was built upon a physiological understanding of race. For Bushnell, race referred to 
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11 Reginald Horsman locates the import of Horace Bushnell’s work in the development of 
Manifest Destiny as an ideology of Anglo-Saxon race nationalism. Reginald Horsman, Race and 
Manifest Destiny: The Origins of American Racial Anglo-Saxonism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1981), 209. 
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a reproductive unity, an idea that he clearly expressed in his repeated use of the term “stock” –as 
in Puritan, Saxon, or New England stock. His notion of propagation thus underscored the 
hereditary idea that, through human reproduction, “whole races of men are cultivated into 
properties that are peculiar.”13 Of course, by propagation Bushnell did not simply mean sex. But 
his entire plan did hinge upon the hereditary idea that qualities and dispositions were transmitted 
from one generation to the next through procreation and that such transmission influenced the 
development of distinct races.  
Hence, in the 1861 edition of his work Bushnell asked his readers to consider the 
physiological fact that “education, habit, feeling, and character” become inbred in racial stocks.14 
Bushnell plainly stated the import of such a physiological fact for the development of allegedly 
inferior races: “That which is inculcated by practice passes into tendency, and descends as a 
natural gift or endowment. The same thing is observable, on a large scale, in the families of 
mankind. A savage race is bred into low living, and a faithless, bloody character.”15  
Bushnell’s emphasis on character as a racial characteristic underscores the important idea 
that, for him, physiology explained not only the physical differences between inferior and 
superior races but also mental and spiritual ones as well. Thus, Bushnell argued that there was a 
direct correlation between the physical development of a particular race and its moral and 
spiritual capacities. After asking whether “souls” and “spiritual natures come into being through 
propagation” or through the “immediate inbreathing of God,” Bushnell averred, “…the outward 
man is [in either case] a fit organ for the person within. The dispositions, tempers, capacities –the 
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14 Ibid., 210. 
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natural, and, to a great extent, the moral character, have the outward frame, as a fit organ of use 
and expression.”16 
It is significant that Bushnell appealed to physiology and not scripture in justifying his 
notion of propagation and, furthermore, his views on racial differences. As scholars have 
demonstrated, his appeal to physiology and other naturalist paradigms established the precedent 
followed by modernists who sought to reconcile religious thought and practice with scientific 
knowledge. Yet scholarship on Bushnell frequently overlooks the fact that his propagative 
method revolved not simply around human physiology, but, more specifically, around the idea of 
heredity. It is certainly true that the novelty of Christian Nurture lay in its argument that 
Christians were to be grown and not converted as scholars have insisted; and it is moreover 
correct that Bushnell built his method upon what was for him the scientific verity of human 
physiological development. But Christian Nurture did not have the development of Christian 
children as its final objective as is commonly assumed. Its underlying aim was, to use Bushnell’s 
terms, the production of a “godly seed.” Nurturing children in righteousness was important 
precisely because it allowed one to further the development of Saxon stock. In short, Christian 
nurture was a means to an end, i.e., the propagation of an inherently righteous race. 
Anne M. Boylan, for example, identifies Bushnell as a key figure in the ascendance of the 
American Sunday school and thus the rise of a more developmental approach to human 
redemption that revolved around the then emerging concept of “childhood.”17 In promoting the 
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17 In a 1979 article in Church History, Boylan insists that the transformation of the United States 
from an agricultural to industrial nation changed the expectations for, and perceptions of, 
children in the family. Within such a socio-economic transformation, “childhood for middle class 
children acquired its modern shape as a period of preparation, ostensibly free of adult cares.” 
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idea that the natures of children are plastic and therefore susceptible to the molding influence of 
family life, Boylan argues that Bushnell played a vital role in the introduction of Christian 
education as an approach that gradually came to rival, if never outmode, conversion as a means 
of growing Christian civilization.18 Boylan’s analysis represents an established body of 
scholarship in American religious history that has come to see Bushnell as a founding figure of 
Protestant liberalism. Christian Nurture, it is commonly assumed, played a key role in loosening 
the hold of Calvinist doctrine by aligning religious thought with developmental understandings 
of human life.19 Yet historians of Protestant liberalism neglect to mention that Bushnell’s entire 
propagative method revolved not around the issue of Christian education per se but around 
propagating Saxon stock. For Bushnell, education was important only in so far as it allowed one 
to further develop races, while propagation, which included the practice of education, did not 
have the salvation of children as its ultimate objective, but rather, the hereditary development 
and territorial expansion of Saxon germ. To invoke the scientific idiom that would come to 
support eugenic thought and practice during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, 
Bushnell was concerned with ontogeny first and phylogeny second. Thus, Bushnell emphasized 
that propagation involved not only harnessing environmental forces but germinal ones as well: 
“By a kind of ante-natal and post-natal nurture combined,” he declared, “the new born 
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Haven: Yale University Press, 1988), 149. 
 
19 Importantly, Boylan argues that it is “erroneous to assume that Christian nurture quickly 
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generations will be started into Christian piety, and the world itself over-populated and taken 
possession of by a truly sanctified stock.”20 
The Hereditary Effects of Sin: Bushnell on the Propagation of Human Races 
Bushnell’s propagative plan revolved around a Lamarckian-inspired theory of 
inheritance. In the early nineteenth century, Jean Baptiste-Lamarck published a theory of species 
development premised upon the hereditary idea that acquired characteristics were passed on from 
one generation to the next. Over the course of the mid-nineteenth century, Bushnell adapted 
Lamarckian premises to develop his notion of propagation, with Bushnell grounding the latter in 
a much more explicitly hereditary framework in the 1861 edition of his work. Bushnell, who was 
decidedly less concerned with revivalism in this later edition, argued that righteousness could 
become inborn over the course of several generations. With the “familiar laws of physiology set 
before us,” Bushnell wrote, it is unreasonable to doubt that, “where there is a long line of godly 
fathers and mothers, kept up in a regular succession for many generations, a religious 
temperament may at length be produced, that is more in the power of conscience, less wayward 
as regards the principles of integrity, and more pliant to the Christian motives.”21 Bushnell did 
not refrain from arguing that, by influencing human heredity through religious nurture, one was 
adopting an approach that one would ordinarily employ in breeding animals. It is “well 
understood that qualities received by training, and not themselves natural, do also pass by 
transmission. It is said, for example, that the dog used in hunting was originally trained by great 
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care and effort, and that now almost no training is necessary; for the artificial quality has become 
[…] natural in the stock.”22 
If Bushnell believed that, like animals, humans were subject to natural laws of 
development, he nonetheless maintained an ontological distinction between humans and other 
species. Here, Bushnell also followed Lamarck, who, as part of his hereditary paradigm, 
advanced a theory referred to as the “Developmental Hypothesis.” Lamarck believed that species 
adapted to their environments and that they were therefore hereditarily mutable. However, as 
Ladelle McWhorter argues in her genealogy of modern racism, although Lamarck “believed in 
the transformation of species,” he “conceived of it ‘only upon the basis of ontological continuity, 
which was that of Classical natural history’.” In other words, unlike later proponents of evolution 
who argued that entirely new species developed from older ones, Lamarck “‘presupposed a 
progressive gradation” or an “unbroken process of improvement.”23 For Bushnell, who read 
Lamarck with eyes to his own theory, this meant that the hereditary improvement of the race 
necessarily implied its gradual moral and spiritual perfection. It also allowed him to insist upon 
the development of species as an organic process while simultaneously maintaining that, unlike 
animals, humans were ontologically special and God-like.  
The direct influence of Lamarck’s Developmental Hypothesis on Bushnell’s thinking is 
readily apparent in his 1859 work, Nature and the Supernatural. There, Bushnell outlined a 
scheme of creation that was decidedly developmental, with “man” appearing as the “last and 
most perfect of all living forms.”24 In outlining his view, Bushnell rejected evolutionary premises 
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(Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2009), 99. 
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that would come to be associated with Darwinism, confirming his commitment to a view of 
species development that one might call proto-evolutionary.  
For example, Bushnell reflected upon two evolutionary theories that were gaining 
prominence at the time, both of which were premised upon the continuity and adaptability of 
species’ through reproduction.  The first propounded that there was “a slow process of advance 
in order, through which the lowest forms of life gradually develop those which are higher and 
more perfect, and finally culminate in man.” The second appealed to a “vital power” in all 
organisms, “by which, at distant but proper intervals,” they develop into “higher” and necessarily 
distinct organisms. As Bushnell explained, “In one view the progress is a regular gradation; in 
the other it is a progress by leaps or stages.”25 Bushnell ultimately rejected both theses on similar 
grounds. In response to the former, Bushnell wrote, “All the orders, and genera, and species, 
maintain their immovable distinctions; and no trace can be discovered, whether there or in the 
now living races, of organic forms that are intermediate and transitional.” In response to the 
latter, Bushnell declared, “There neither is nor can be any middle position between humanity and 
no humanity.”26 “Any theory […] which throws a human child on the care of an animal 
parentage is too nearly absurd to require refutation.”27 This led Bushnell to endorse a view of 
creationism in which a “power out of nature and above it” acted upon the natural order to create 
“successive races of living forms,”28 a view which allowed him to reconcile three ideas that were 
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key to his thinking: a notion of propagation as a means of species development, a habit of seeing 
humankind as a special creation, and a commitment to a supernatural view of God.   
Bushnell thus rejected the Darwinian notion that species developed from other species, 
while at the same time affirming the idea that species adapt through propagation. But Bushnell’s 
notion of propagation was able to accomplish something else that would prove fundamental to 
the development of modernist Protestantism: he created and promoted a naturalistic 
understanding of sin. For Bushnell, sin was a physiological power, one of “bodily disturbance, 
shattering the nerves, inflaming the tissues, distempering the secretions, and brewing a general 
ferment of disease.” As a physiological power, sin was hereditarily transmitted. Or in Bushnell’s 
idiom, sin was propagated, producing not only what Bushnell referred to as the “organic 
deprivation of humanity” but what was the same thing, “conditions of hereditary damage.”29 In 
this way, Bushnell wrote, “The line of propagation is […] the line of transmission by which evil 
passes.”30 In effect, Bushnell translated the Reformed doctrine of human depravity into a 
physiological idiom of inheritance. “The doctrine of physiology,” Bushnell argued, “is the 
doctrine of original sin, and we are held to inevitable orthodoxy by it, even if the scriptures are 
cast away.”31 
Bushnell, who made a habit of qualifying his arguments, was careful to assert that the 
development of righteousness through propagation did not obviate personal struggle with evil 
and thus the Reformed idea that regeneration entailed a personal conflict with one’s fallen 
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nature. As he wrote in his 1861 edition of Christian Nurture, “The growth of Christian virtue is 
no vegetable process, no mere onward development. It involves a struggle with evil, a fall and a 
rescue.”32 Moreover, Bushnell insisted that the propagative power of goodness did not obsolesce 
human dependence upon God to know what was right and to follow him in choosing it. The very 
idea of propagation meant that human corruption was as intransigent as it was physiologically 
innate. Thus, Bushnell argued that if Christianity proclaimed “the fact of a properly supernatural 
power in man,”33 it also declared that man “has no ability, in himself and merely acting in 
himself, to become right and perfect.”34 In making these assertions, Bushnell was insisting that 
propagation did not undermine the redemptive message of Christianity and the truth the latter 
revealed about human nature. In fact, propagation confirmed Christian truth. If, through 
propagation, one could alleviate human struggle with evil by strengthening the will, one could 
not, at least never completely, eliminate sinfulness.   
The propagative nature of sin made it consequential with respect to Bushnell’s 
understanding of race and its relationship to the development of the species. While Bushnell 
maintained that all human races comprised the “genus humanity” and formed a “religious 
unity,”35 he subscribed to a polygenetic view of human origins, believing that the various races 
of mankind had been created separately. The real differences between the races, however, 
emerged not with their original creation, but through their subsequent propagation and through 
the propagative consequences that their sinfulness had upon their mental and moral development. 
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Supposing that each race had been created separately as an original pair (or as several original 
pairs) and arguing that each original pair had sinned, Bushnell concluded that the “descendants 
of the sinning pair, or pairs, born of natures thrown out of harmony and corrupted by sin, could 
not, on principles of physiology, apart from scripture teachings, be unaffected by the distempers 
of their parentage. They must have been constitutionally injured or deprivated [sic].”36 In short, 
the supposed moral, mental, or to use a word that was commonly associated with whiteness 
during the nineteenth century, spiritual differences between the races was caused by their 
relative sinfulness. Of course, the Saxons comprised the most spiritual race in Bushnell’s mind, 
while his entire method was designed to increase its spiritual inheritance and expand its 
dominion. 
In the next section, I reflect further on the relationship between race and sinfulness 
through Bushnell’s notion of sovereignty. Here, I want to focus briefly on the cosmological 
significance of Bushnell’s propagative method. In both Nature and the Supernatural and in his 
1861 edition of Christian Nurture, Bushnell insisted that God’s entire plan of redemption for the 
human race was the production of a “moral population.”37 As he put it in Christian Nurture, God 
was, “from the first, looking for a godly seed,” establishing his kingdom on earth by “inserting 
such laws of population that piety itself shall finally over-populate the world.”38 For these 
reasons, Bushnell called propagation an “ancient method” and referred to it as the true mode of 
salvation. Of course, these claims appeared extravagant to many of Bushnell contemporaries. 
And yet his method constitutes an early expression of a tendency that would come to define the 
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modernist practice of writing racial ontologies of the divine, namely, the habit of identifying the 
immanence of God and the earthly advance of his kingdom with the development of the white 
racial body. This same tendency animated many modernist Protestants during the early twentieth 
century who saw eugenics as a way of transforming race hygiene into a kind of domestic 
devotion. 
‘Sovereignty’: Bushnell and the Origins of Racial Theism 
 
In The Modernist Impulse in American Protestantism, William R. Hutchison follows 
Kenneth Cauthen in distinguishing between the emergence of “evangelical liberals” and 
“modernistic liberals” during the nineteenth century. The former refer to those who “made the 
Christian revelation normative and then merely interpreted it in the light of modern knowledge,” 
while the latter denotes a person who made “modern science his criterion and then, in a kind of 
afterthought, retained what he could of the Christian tradition.”39 It is this distinction that makes 
Bushnell such a key figure for Hutchison’s history of modernism, for Bushnell provided the 
template for what would become the controlling theological principle for the modernist position: 
the notion of immanentism. The latter refers to the idea that “God is immanent in human cultural 
development and revealed through it,” and it grounded the modernist practice of adapting 
Christianity to the revelations of science. If eighteenth and nineteenth century natural 
philosophers assumed that history was inherently progressive, modernist Protestants in the 
United States sought to supply such a liberal outlook with a religious underpinning by seeing the 
divine at work in the march of history and the advance of scientific knowledge. Hutchison argues 
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that Bushnell did more than any other American figure to “lay the foundation of cultural 
immanentism” and thus to inaugurate this perspective.40 
The impact of Bushnell’s work on the development of modernism, however, needs to be 
revisited in light of modernist engagements with eugenic thought and practice in the early 
twentieth century. Adapting Hutchison’s idiom, I argue that what Bushnell initiated is best 
described not as cultural immanentism but racial immanentism. In other words, Bushnell 
inaugurated a modernist habit of integrating the natural and the supernatural within the white 
racial body. Hutchison, who has written what remains the definitive work on modernism, argues 
that Bushnell’s scientific views would be obsolesced by the rise of Darwinism in the late 
nineteenth century, citing this as evidence that Bushnell’s influence on modernism was not 
specifically in the realm of science but in the broad contributions that he made toward opening 
religious sentiment to the “redemptive potentialities” of the “the world.”41 This is why Hutchison 
describes Bushnell as inaugurating a general shift toward cultural immanentism rather than an 
understanding of immanence specifically grounded in naturalism. But Hutchison does not see 
that the precedent for modernists’ habit of engaging evolutionary science emerged not with the 
specific epistemological claims made by Darwin (or with the notion of evolution per se), but 
with physiological, or hereditarily developmental, conceptions of race. The practice of writing 
racial theism began with the idea that there was, in developmental terms, a kind of incipient 
divinity within the white racial body and, moreover, that this divinity could be enhanced through 
the propagative devotion of domestic piety. In this section, I elaborate this point by focusing on 
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Bushnell’s notion of “sovereignty” as he developed it in both Christian Nurture and Nature and 
the Supernatural. 
Historians have often remarked about how unsystematic Bushnell was in his thinking, 
taking the wide variety of subjects about which he wrote as evidence that he was a religious 
leader who was more concerned about addressing the practical problems of churches than he was 
about formal theology. For these reasons, historians rarely attempt to read Nature and the 
Supernatural and the 1861 edition of Christian Nurture as constituting exercises in racial 
theology. And yet both works are built upon the same theistic premise: God’s redemptive plan 
for the human race is developmental in both purpose and design. If, in Christian Nurture, 
Bushnell outlined his notion of propagation, in Nature and the Supernatural Bushnell focused on 
reconciling the naturalistic fact of human physiological existence, on the one hand, and the 
religious fact of the human soul, on the other. His driving question in Nature and the 
Supernatural might be put as follows: What is the relationship between propagation, which is 
clearly an immanent process, and the human soul, which is obviously a transcendent and 
originative power? Or as Bushnell would pose the query, how can we “find a legitimate place for 
the supernatural” within the natural order? The book thus sets out to reconcile naturalism and 
religion, a difficulty that Bushnell resolved by identifying the supernatural with the sovereignty 
of the human will while at the same time arguing that the human will was subject to natural laws 
of development. It was this paradoxical resolution, I argue, that constituted the earliest statement 
of racial theism.  
In Christian Nurture, Bushnell argued that the human will was subject to the laws of 
propagation, which meant that it was the product of parental nurture and conditioned by the 
hereditary endowment of the child. Bushnell described the formation of the will as a gradual 
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“process of separation,” whereby the “will and character” of the child gradually emerged from 
the “matrix” of the parents’ “will and character.” Through this process, Bushnell wrote, the child 
“approaches more and more closely, and by gradual process, to the proper rank and 
responsibility of an individual creature [until] at last he comes forth to act his part in such color 
of evil, and why not of good, as he has derived from [his parents].”42 Bushnell famously drew 
upon this scheme to argue that the will and, therefore, human individuality were categorically of 
a mixed nature, with the notion of a “pure, separate, individual man, living wholly within, and 
from himself” constituting a “mere fiction.”43 Later on, Bushnell strove for a more qualified 
position in expressing this idea: “To a certain extent and for certain purposes, we are individuals, 
acting each from his own will. Then to a certain extent and for certain other purposes, we are 
parts of or members of a common body, as truly as limbs of a tree.”44 The propagated, common 
nature of the will meant that it was a product of racial development. In Nature and the 
Supernatural, Bushnell argued that the child receives from the parents “their embrace, circulates 
their blood, [bears] their name, and is looked upon, even by their selfishness, as multiplied and 
dearer self.”45 In other words, to say that the will was part of a common body was to say that, 
like “blood,” it could be racially propagated as a hereditary endowment.  
But if the will developed organically through the laws of propagation, it ultimately came 
to rise of above the natural order, demonstrating a position of height and superordination that 
Bushnell referred to as “sovereignty.” Born of natural development, the will was, in the end, 
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“supernatural,” which simply meant that the will was “not in the chain of natural cause and 
effect.” Defining the supernatural not as a mysterious or miraculous power but simply as that 
which “acts on the chain of cause and effect, in nature, from without the chain,”46 Bushnell 
described the will as being both within and above the natural order. The will emerged out of and 
over the natural order as the child developed a love for authority, truth, justice, and beauty, a 
love that became more complete through the process of separation described above. Developing 
within the parental matrix, the will acquired its sovereignty as the child gradually learned the 
difference between and right and wrong and came to love the good for its own sake. With the 
child slowly overcoming his or her selfishness, his or her will came to seek the good not out of 
self-interest but out of a genuine love for what was right. In other words, the will acquired 
sovereignty, achieving a degree of transcendence over the natural order in being able to direct 
action not through the promise of reward but through an earnest desire to serve God and an 
artless love for his commandments. Through sovereignty, therefore, Bushnell conveyed the idea 
that man is a supernatural being, ontologically distinct from animals and sharing in the divine life 
in so far as he possesses the power to resist base impulses and choose to do God’s will.  
Bushnell imagined the will as a force, while, to use his gendered idiom, he defined “man” 
in terms of sovereignty. To be a “man” was to act as an “original power,” which meant that man 
acted “not in the line of causality, but from himself.” And yet, however originative a power, the 
will was conditioned by the organismic faculties of the body, and this meant that man’s 
sovereignty was “partial.” Bushnell wrote, “[Man] is not independent of nature in the sense of 
being separated from it in his action, but he is in it, environed by it, acting through it, partially 
sovereign over it, always sovereign as regards his self-determination and not completely 
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sovereign as regards executing all that he wills in it.” For Bushnell, the sovereignty of man’s will 
was conditional because certain “departments” of the human soul were “dominated […] by the 
laws of cause and effect.” Faculties of the soul such as memory, appetite, passion, attention, 
imagination, association, and disposition were “partly governed by their own laws” so that when 
a man attempts to “exercise any control over them, or turn them about to serve his purpose” he 
can only do it “in a qualified sense and degree.”47 To be a man was thus to be both within nature 
and without, natural and supernatural, subject to natural laws of development while at the same 
time rising above them through a relationship of height and superordination. As Bushnell 
succinctly put it, men “live in nature and are of it, up to the point of their will, but there they 
emerge into qualified sovereignty.”48 
Historians of American religious history sometimes downplay the influence that 
naturalism had upon Bushnell’s thinking. Glenn Hewitt, for example, argues that it would be a 
mistake to “classify Bushnell under naturalism.” “While inclined to an early version of 
naturalism,” Hewitt writes, “Bushnell also continued to assert the necessity of the 
supernatural.”49 Such a position is supported by Bushnell’s work. In Nature and the 
Supernatural, for example, Bushnell declared, “[T]he Christianity that is becoming a part of only 
nature, or is classified under nature, is Christianity extinct.”50  
In spite of conclusions drawn by historians and despite his own assurances, it is 
surprising how much power Bushnell’s notion of sovereignty conceded to natural laws of human 
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development. In the same work in which he warned Christians against the danger of naturalism, 
Bushnell matter-of-factly observed that the development of the human capacity for goodness is 
“under physiological and cerebral limitations.” Using a naturalistic model for explaining why 
some people were more pious than others, Bushnell described several different bodily constraints 
that limited the development of the will. In each case, Bushnell conceived the body as a 
physiological entity, with the body imposing conditions that restricted sovereignty, or as 
Bushnell also put it, that reduced one’s “capacity of doing or becoming.”51 Bushnell offered a 
tripartite paradigm for categorizing these limitations. The first and most severe were limits of 
“organization,” or impairments that systemically affected the constitution of the body. The 
second and less critical were the limits imposed by education (or lack thereof). The final and 
least restrictive category included those of an environmental nature. Bushnell suggested that 
these three categories formed a scale, with organizational impediments often reducing “the will 
to nothing, as in some idiots” and thus constituting the “zero” position on the register. From 
there, the scale of limits became less imposing, moving upwards “by slight gradations” to 
educational and environmental conditions.52 
Keeping with his propagative method, Bushnell argued that physiological limits to 
sovereignty originated with sin. In a cyclical fashion, however, he also asserted that sovereignty, 
the prerequisite for free will, introduced sin into the world. Sin was a physical condition, a 
“general disturbance or collapse of nature” that upset the inherent and original harmony of the 
natural order.53 Sin was, in other words, a “violation of nature” that introduced the unnatural 
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“results of pain, disorder and death.”54 Bushnell used an anatomical example to illustrate this 
point: sin falls into nature “as a grain of sand into an eye –and as the eye is the same organ as it 
was before, having the same laws, and is yet so far changed as to be an organ of pain rather than 
of sight, so it is with the laws of nature, in the penal and retributive action now begun.”55 Like a 
grain of sand falling into an eye, humans introduced sin into the world by choosing to do wrong, 
with their choices ultimately disrupting the laws of nature. In other words, sin was an originative 
force like the will from which it issued, capable of producing a “new evolution of activities” in 
the natural order as sin became propagated.  
Technically speaking, sin was not inherited; rather sin produced an organizational taint or 
weakness in offspring that left them enfeebled in their struggle with evil and prone to more 
sinfulness.56 And this is precisely how Bushnell explained the development of races. Through the 
propagative nature of sin, physiologically distinct races emerged, and this meant that different 
races displayed varying degrees of sovereignty. Bushnell explained it in the following way: 
It is important […] considering the moral reactions of the body, and especially the great 
fact of a propagation of a species, to notice the disorganizing effects of sin, in the body. 
Body and soul, as long as they subsist in their organized state, are a strict unity. The 
abuses of one are abuses also of the other, the disturbances and diseases of one disturb 
and disease the other.57 
 
In establishing a propagative relation between sin and the physical impairment of the body, 
Bushnell in effect transformed righteousness into a measure of racial development, and vice 
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the laws of physiology […] compel the belief that the child is somehow depravated by descent 
from parents, who are under the corrupting effects of sin.” Ibid., 27.  
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versa. As already discussed, the propagative power of sin allowed Bushnell to interpret racial 
differences through a religious ontology. In Bushnell’s view, God created the races with the hope 
of propagating a godly seed. With the notion of sovereignty more specifically, Bushnell further 
advanced this religio-racial ontology by providing a more nuanced consideration of the 
immanent relationship between racial identity and providence, body and soul, nature and 
supernatural. For the twenty-first century reader, the notion of sovereignty stamps Bushnell’s 
method as a religiously inflected iteration of modern racism. But it also demonstrates that the 
scientific racism that was then gaining ground in the United States and that would rise to 
prominence with theological renderings of Darwinism and eugenic thought in the late nineteenth 
century was, from the beginning, a theistic discourse disseminated by American Protestant 
leaders. 
 Bushnell’s concept of sovereignty testifies to the fact that, as Joshua Paddison argues in 
American Heathens, “In the nineteenth century United States, religion and race were mutually 
constitutive systems, at times blending, at times conflicting, each capable of acting as a 
metalanguage for the other.” Paddison’s work focuses on Reconstruction in California, but his 
conclusion that “Americans debated issues of race within the idiom of Christianity” is 
generalizable for the country as a whole during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.58 
Applying Paddison’s conclusions to Bushnell’s work, one will notice that sovereignty was not 
simply modern racism dressed in religious garb, as if beneath its gilded layers of theism one 
would find a racist core. Its theistic import was central to what the term “race” meant to 
American Protestants like Bushnell. To be white, or in Bushnell’s case, to be of Saxon stock, was 
to be divine, or at least, divine-like. Of course, in Bushnell’s thinking one was sovereign 																																																								
58 Joshua Paddison, American Heathens: Religion, Race, and Reconstruction in California 
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regardless of one’s particular race; sovereignty was the human condition, humanity’s ontological 
distinction from the rest of nature. All races, to some extent or another, were both immanent and 
transcendent, within nature and above it. But not all races were sovereign to the extent that the 
Saxon was sovereign, as the Saxon possessed an innate height or transcendence over the natural 
order that other races could not achieve. The sovereignty of the Saxon testified to a special 
development, a propagated election, a historically peculiar endowment of providence, a godly 
seed. Therefore, if sovereignty exemplifies the theistic import of modern racism in the United 
States, it moreover indicates that the modernist notion of immanentism emerged not with the 
idea that God worked through human cultural development and that he would be revealed 
through it. More specifically, immanentism emerged along with theistic ideas that tied the 
concept of racial development together with providence and national advance. 
Bushnell’s Impact on Protestant Modernism 
 
Bushnell set three overlapping precedents with respect to the development of modernism 
as a discourse of racial theism. The first was practical and involved the reproductive space of the 
home; the second was developmental and associated sinfulness with racial inferiority; while the 
third might be described as biopolitical in so far as it identified the reproduction and gradual 
perfection of the white racial body with the advance of God’s kingdom on earth. The impact of 
Bushnell’s method on modernist Protestantism, therefore, should be assessed in terms of its 
influence upon the formation of three discursive tendencies that came to characterize the 
modernist position: 1) its gendered habit of identifying the purpose of religious practice with the 
propagative power of the Christian home; its tendency to see an isomorphic relationship between 
sinfulness and the evolutionary advance of stocks and races; and 3) its readiness to conflate 
providence, the perpetuity of Christian civilization, and the hereditary development (or 
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evolution) of the white racial body. Bushnell demonstrates that these three modernist motifs –
propagation, sin as devolution, and racial theism –emerged together and supported one another.  
The various positions that modernist ministers took on eugenics would largely be 
hammered out through debates that were shaped by these three discursive tendencies. Indeed, a 
close read of Bushnell’s work suggests that eugenic thought and in the United States did not 
emerge with science per se but with a whole new propagative way of conceiving religion itself. 
Participants in the AES sermon contests harkened back to Bushnell, either explicitly, by citing 
his propagative method as a precedent for forging a partnership between the churches and the 
eugenics movement, or implicitly, by reminding their audiences that propagation was already a 
Christian method of growth. To conclude this chapter, I would like to take a closer look at this 
point. 
In Nature and the Supernatural, Bushnell declared, “Christianity is the natural foster 
mother of science, and science the certain handmaid of Christianity. And both together, when 
rightly conceived, must complete one system of knowledge.”59 For Bushnell, the unity of science 
and religion was properly conceived in terms of propagation. Dr. William E. Griffin, a minister 
who delivered a sermon for the American Eugenics Society in 1926, echoed Bushnell. From the 
pulpit at Jethro Memorial Presbyterian Church in Atlantic City, New Jersey, Rev. Griffin 
averred, “Science in this particular field is not [a] stranger to religion, but her handmaid and 
daughter, and forever one and inseparable.” By “this particular field,” Rev. Griffin was referring 
to eugenic activities related to marriage, mate selection, and childrearing. In other words, like 
Bushnell, Rev. Griffin argued that the unity of science and religion was race propagation, a 
viewpoint that the minister later confirmed by insisting that the “most fundamental” problem for 
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society, and the problem that brought the church and eugenics together, was the “problem of 
marriage and parenthood” as they related to the “perpetuation of the race.”60 Of course, Rev. 
Griffin’s understanding of propagation was different than Bushnell’s, involving a eugenic 
emphasis on mate selection and not simply childrearing. But the minister nonetheless expected 
his congregants to agree with him in arguing that the social authority of the church was 
fundamentally of a propagative nature. Perhaps many also followed him in accepting the idea 
that this authority made the church and eugenics natural allies.  
Analyses of religious engagements with eugenics often emphasize the rising authority of 
science during the early twentieth century as one of the primary reasons for the appeal of 
eugenics among clergymen. Although I do not wish to dispute this thesis, it nonetheless deserves 
qualification. In the first case, historians of eugenics frequently overlook the fact that, as Amy 
Laura Hall demonstrates (albeit using different terminology), one of the primary ways in which 
American mainline Protestant denominations expressed their social power during the twentieth 
century was through their sense of duty and service as propagative institutions.61 Twentieth 
century mainline Protestant churches largely defined their social function in terms of their 
authority over hearth and home, a biopolitical function that emerged in the nineteenth century as 
part of broader modernizing patterns in which churches came to privilege the developmental 
sphere of the home. This allows one to see that, in the second case, Protestant churches’ 
endorsement of eugenics was never simply about capitulating to the growing authority of science 
but about continuing patterns of religious authority that began to emerge during Bushnell’s era, 
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patterns that his propagative method reflected and even furthered. Thus, Protestant ministers like 
Rev. Griffin endorsed eugenics from a position of confidence and authority in so far as mainline 
Protestant churches had come to define their social power in biopolitical terms, that is, through 
the propagative influence of the household. Although pro-eugenic ministers certainly recognized 
the rising authority of science in organizing American life during the early twentieth century and 
although they may have even believed that this authority came somewhat at the expense of the 
churches’ own, they nonetheless had every confidence to see their support for eugenics not as a 
capitulation to scientific authority but as an organic part of their religious commitment to 
growing a better body politic.
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CHAPTER 2: THE HUMAN ANIMAL: HENRY WARD BEECHER’S ‘GREAT 
STRUGGLE OF EXTRICATION 
 
“Henry Ward Beecher is said to have told Newell Dwight Hillis when the latter was starting out to preach, to study 
the horses in a community first instead of the people. He said, ‘If they have fine, spick and span horses, these people 
have high ideals and you can do them a lot of good. But if they have poor, broken-down, half-starved, low-bred 
horses, get out of there. You can’t save these people’s souls because they have no soul to save.” 
 
-Anonymous Minister, AES Eugenic Sermon Contest, 1926 
 
Introduction 
In a sermon that he preached at Plymouth Church in Brooklyn, New York, on Sunday 
morning, April 8, 1883, Henry Ward Beecher asked his congregants to take the “larger view” of 
human life and observe “that struggle which has been running on through thousands of years, 
and very likely will run on thousands of years to come.” Beecher challenged his congregation to 
take an evolutionary view of the work of providence, describing the human race’s evolutionary 
struggle against its animal nature as an upward process towards a more divine like nature. 
Evolution, Beecher averred, “is a struggle which has an inevitable termination –namely, in such 
an exaltation of the race that all those animal elements will finally be purged out of it, and a 
larger intelligence, and a better, more transparent moral element shall reign, to the glory of God 
and the joy of the universe.”1  
 In this chapter, I use the preaching of Henry Ward Beecher to trace important 
developments within modernism as a discourse of racial theism in the decades leading up to the 
rise of eugenic science in the United States. Like Bushnell, Beecher defined national 
development as a process of perfecting the white racial body. He also attributed alleged moral 																																																								
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and mental differences between races and stocks to the hereditary effects of sin. Yet Beecher 
embraced evolutionism and, along with it, two key ideas that were important for the further 
development of modernism as a discourse of racial theism: 1) the notion that humans had 
hereditarily descended from animals and 2) the idea that the destruction of unfitness had a 
positive affect on the development of the race. Reading human evolution as an upward process of 
embodied perfection while equating unfitness with sinfulness, Beecher was able to recast 
evolution as a “great struggle of extrication,”2 one that envisioned God propagating the race out 
of its animal nature and into the embodied ideal of Christ. In this way, Beecher’s work 
demonstrates how modernism reconciled evolutionary motifs of fitness, struggle, and survival 
with white middle-class Christian ideals of meekness, civility, and moral uprightness. 
Historians have appraised Beecher’s work and his role as a leading public figure in a 
number of ways, the majority of which emphasize his liberalizing impact upon American 
mainline Protestantism. In her 2006 biography, for example, Debby Applegate argues that 
Beecher played a pivotal role in the disestablishment of Calvinism, with Beecher helping to 
introduce Americans to a “Gospel of Love” by portraying God “not [as] an exacting judge but as 
a loving parent.”3 In an older biography, Clifford E. Clark endorses a parallel understanding of 
Beecher and his work, emphasizing that, through his liberalizing message, Beecher was able to 
“reinforce central tenets of the Victorian middle-class outlook.”4 I regard Beecher in a similar 
light, but my analysis focuses specifically on the ways in which hereditarian thought and practice 
																																																								
2 Ibid., 207. 
 
3 Debby Applegate, The Most Famous Man in America: The Biography of Henry Ward Beecher 
(New York: Doubleday, 2006), 13. 
 
4 Clifford E. Clark, Jr., Henry Ward Beecher: Spokesman for Middle-Class America (Urbana: 
University of Illinois Press, 1978), 4. 
		
	
70 
influenced Beecher’s attempts to modernize American Protestant Christianity. Additionally, I 
view Beecher’s work as part of a broader propagative turn in white American middle class 
Christianity in which nineteenth century Protestants began to reconceive religion as a force for 
normalizing the development of the body politic and thereby establishing national unity. In 
outlining the important components of Beecher’s racial theism, my intention is to uncover how 
Beecher facilitated affluent white New Englanders’ re-understanding of Christianity as a racially 
propagative force and a power for national advancement. 
Hereditary Thought at the End of the Nineteenth Century 
In today’s genomic world, we take the notion of heredity for granted. We readily assume 
that we inherit our physical traits and mental dispositions from our ancestors. We thus also 
presume that life has an agency of its own, one that, for better or worse, is often beyond our 
power to mediate. The agency that we ascribe to life corresponds with our conception of the 
latter as a kind of organizing vector or developmental substrate that transcends the being that we 
possess as individualized lives. Even if we are unable to express this idea in scientific terms, we 
nonetheless assume the existence of a biological substrate that we generally refer to as 
“heredity,” while also believing that this vector has a power and influence of its own.  
The naturalness with which we invoke the notion of heredity, however, blinds us to the 
fact that heredity is actually a relatively new idea. As Staffan Müller-Wille and Hans-Jörg 
Rheinberger argue, “Until the end of the eighteenth century, naturalists and physicians did not 
talk about biological ‘inheritance’, a substance transmitted independently from the processes and 
circumstances of conception and development.”5 Although the science of heredity has changed 
significantly over the past two hundred years, with contemporary genetics embracing an idiom of 																																																								
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“information transmission,” the notion of heredity has consistently referred to the existence of a 
germinal substance that makes the continuous development of life possible.6 Yet before the late 
eighteenth century, there was no conceptualization of life as a developmentally autonomous 
process and thus no concept of heredity.7 
The hereditary conception of life as a developmental substrate had a powerful effect on 
nineteenth century American society. As a number of histories of eugenics demonstrate, the 
concept of heredity supported the development of naturalistic approaches to social reform, which 
paved the way for the rise of eugenic thought and practice in the United States. After the Civil 
War, for example, heredity became the dominant mode for explaining the intergenerational 
persistence of crime. With reform-minded Americans increasingly reading human physical and 
mental characteristics as a product of heredity, it was during this time that, as Nicole Hahn Rafter 
argues, the criminal became someone who was “born” as such.8 In 1877, for example, a New 
York prison reformer named Richard Dugdale published his analysis of “the Jukes,” a criminal 
kin group who Dugdale argued represented a case of “hereditary pauperism.”9 Insisting that 
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heredity “fixes the organic characteristics of the individual” while the environment “affects 
modifications in that heredity,” Dugdale set out to investigate how much of “the Jukes’” “crime 
and public dependence” should be attributed to heredity and how much to the environment.10 As 
Matt Wray argues, Dugdale’s research was incredibly influential, representing the “beginning of 
a eugenics reform movement in the United States.”11  
The notion of heredity provided the basis for hereditarianism, a modern epistemological 
framework premised upon a developmental conceptualization of life and the concomitant idea 
that life can be controlled and augmented through human intervention. The problem with 
scholarly analyses of hereditarianism, however, is that most assume that the latter came at the 
expense of religious authority,12 when, in fact, during the nineteenth century hereditarian ideas 
actually strengthened Christianity as an important means to progress. It is certainly true that the 
rising influence of hereditary thought demonstrates the increasing influence of naturalism upon 
American society during the late nineteenth century. Heredity, for example, provided an 
emerging class of professional reformers with a naturalistic framework for conceiving social 
problems.13 It also enabled them to re-conceptualize specific approaches to reform in naturalistic 
terms. Thus, professionals like Dugdale argued that one needed to make interventions within the 
propagative cycle of human generations, which entailed intervening within the home lives of the 
poor, criminal, and allegedly degenerate. Yet with most reformers at the time subscribing to a 																																																								
10 Richard L. Dugdale, The Jukes: A Study in Crime, Pauperism, Disease, and Heredity (New 
York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1910 [4th ed.]), 11-12. 
 
11 Wray, Not Quite White, 66. 
 
12 See, for example, Mark H. Haller, Eugenics: Hereditarian Attitudes in American Thought 
(New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1984). 
 
13 Nicole Hahn Rafter, ed., White Trash: The Eugenic Family Studies, 1877-1919 (Boston: 
Northeastern University Press, 1988). 
		
	
73 
Lamarckian understanding of heredity, there was plenty of room for reformers to continue to 
promote the uplifting influence of Christianity and to view the latter as an important part of 
reform efforts. Nineteenth century reformers who advocated hereditary approaches to progress 
also endorsed the transformative power of Christianity as a means of providing an uplifting 
influence upon future generations. 
Nineteenth century reformers’ understanding of heredity involved a rudimentary 
combination of Lamarckism and vitalism. Although they conceptualized life as an organizing 
substrate that ultimately transcended the individualized bodies that it produced, nineteenth 
century reformers did not imagine a sharp separation between what one might call the 
ontogenetic body (or the body of the individual) and the hereditary substances. This was true for 
liberalizing religious reformers, like Beecher, and professionals who were affiliated with 
reformatory institutions, like Dugdale. In their Lamarckian understanding, the body interacted 
with the hereditary materials, with the former influencing the latter over the course of a given 
lifetime. Thus, healthful improvements made during an individual’s life were seen to have 
salubrious hereditary effects. As Brian C. Wilson argues, one of the widespread assumptions of 
hereditary thinking in the nineteenth century was the idea that “if a parent either improved or 
impaired him- or herself through virtuous or immoral practices, the child would consequently 
experience better or worse character and health.”14 This is different from contemporary genetics, 
which typically imagines less reciprocity between the vector of heredity and the corrective 
influence of individual initiative. As I discuss in chapter 5, nineteenth century assumptions 
regarding heredity also contradicted hereditary doctrines promoted by early twentieth century 
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mainline eugenicists like Charles Davenport, who insisted that the influence of training and 
environment upon heredity were much more limited.  
In addition to Lamarckism, pre-twentieth century understandings of heredity were 
influenced by nineteenth century vitalism. The latter assumed that life was animated by a “vital 
force” whose energy and power could be traced but not explained. According to Stephen 
Nissenbaum, vitalism represented a scientific perspective that sharply distinguished between 
animate and inanimate substances, with living things being governed by a vital force that was 
irreducible to the laws of chemistry or physics. As Nissenbaum narrates, for nineteenth century 
vitalists, “What distinguished animate from inanimate substances was precisely the fact that the 
laws governing the latter ceased to operate in the former. Living organisms, for instance, resisted 
such physical principles as the law of gravitation, just as they resisted such chemical principles 
as the law of decay.”15 Famous nineteenth century Christian health reformers like Sylvester 
Graham, William Alcott, and Elizabeth Blackwell were vitalists, promoting the idea that certain 
foods and habits had an enervating effect on the body’s vital energy. They especially targeted 
meat consumption, alcohol and tobacco use, and sexual overindulgence as practices that vitiated 
the vital force. In the vitalist model, health was understood as a diminishment or increase of the 
vital power. Thus, central to Christian health reform was the notion that the vital force could be 
increased through bodily regulation and proper diet. The result would be longer life, perhaps 
eventually equivalent to the long lives enjoyed by Adam, Methusaleh, and Noah.16 
Vitalist ideas infused popular and professional understandings of heredity, both of which 
tended to see the latter as a force that could be strengthened or weakened by a person’s lifestyle. 																																																								
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Unlike today where we often talk about heredity in the quantitative terms of “information 
systems” or “codes,” in the nineteenth century heredity was primarily conceived as a force or 
energy whose effects were registered in qualitative terms of power or magnitude. For instance, 
Christian health reformers promoted the idea that propensities to specific diseases were 
inheritable, a notion that was articulated in the vitalist framework of inherited debility.17  
Institutional reformers also understood heredity as a strengthening or enervating power. 
In fact, Dugdale’s entire 1877 analysis of “the Jukes” was premised upon vitalist principles. He 
argued that immoral behavior (and the condition of “pauperism” in general) resulted “from some 
form of waning vitality, actual or potential.” Diseases compounded the condition of pauperism 
by further vitiating the “vital force” and with it a person’s capacity for morality (an argument 
that underscores the equation between moral uprightness and vital power in vitalist thought).18 
Moreover, the loss of a person’s vital force had a direct effect upon heredity, causing the 
diminishment of life as a developmental power. Thus, Dugdale argued that pauper diseases like 
syphilis produced “cerebral atrophy” or “idiocy” in subsequent generations. Describing “idiocy” 
as an “‘arrest of development’, chiefly of the brain and of the nervous system,” Dugdale 
maintained that these hereditary effects resulted from “insufficient nutrition during ante-natal 
life.” But the influence of vitalism upon Dugdale’s analysis is best evidenced by his conclusion 
regarding the hereditary sources of pauperism: “Pauperism here stands as the social equivalent of 
disease, which is a form of weakness.”19 
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Vitalism dominated nineteenth century conceptualizations of heredity precisely because 
its theoretical framework allowed reformers to successfully fuse a Christian moral economy 
grounded in personal righteousness to a developmental understanding of life. In such a 
framework, sin became both the cause and product of bodily weakness (the precondition for 
immorality), while righteousness became the cause and product of bodily strength (the 
precondition for moral erectness). In this way, vitalism attests to the strong Christian dimensions 
of nineteenth century health culture, underscoring the inherently Christian aspects of the concept 
of health itself.  
Scholars of American religious history have uncovered many of the important ways in 
which vitalism shaped the Christian practice of health.20 But scholars have been less assiduous in 
uncovering the ways in which vitalism shaped the early development of eugenic-like ideas and 
practices within middle-class Anglo-American Protestant culture. If vitalism established a more 
or less seamless continuity between health as a physiological concept, on the one hand, and 
health as a religio-moral precept, on the other, it also allowed one to frame race propagation as a 
Christian enterprise, since it made personal righteousness fundamental to the development of 
life. And this is precisely what Beecher’s hereditarian ideas demonstrate, namely the intrinsic 
connections between the emergence of race propagation as a Christian practice and the rise of 
hereditarianism as a privileged approach to social progress.  
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Beecher & Race Propagation  
In a sermon that he delivered in 1883 at Plymouth Church and that he published in 
Evolution and Religion, Beecher heralded a coming age in which there was to be “such 
knowledge of heredity as shall lead men to wiser selections,” an age in which the society that 
“has learned how to breed sheep for better wool, horses for better speed, and ox for better beef” 
will have it “dawn on their minds that it is worthwhile to breed better men too.” In such an age, 
Beecher surmised, “Generation will […] supersede Regeneration.”21 Conceiving heredity as a 
kind of vital substrate that could be cultivated for advancing national progress, Beecher 
proclaimed, “We shall purge out vast amounts of the stock from which comes sin and children 
will begin higher, and be quicker to appreciate what is the genius of the gospel of Christ, and to 
carry it out in all the ways of life.”22 In a sermon that he delivered two years later and that he also 
published in Evolution and Religion, Beecher boldly asserted his theological commitment to 
better breeding: “I believe in the theology that stands directly connected with the discipline, the 
development, and the perfection of the human race.”23  
In insisting that heredity could be used for Christian ends, Beecher realized that he was 
promoting a novel approach to advancing Christendom, or, at least, an approach that only a few 
ministers had begun to advocate. Nonetheless, Beecher maintained that better breeding 
represented the path to true progress, for it would ensure the propagation of righteous bodies. 
“The human body must be born better,” Beecher averred,” the human mind and dispositions 
must come into life through better families; families must stand under better institutions and 
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better governments –under divine laws and institutions; and we can only come to the higher 
through the imitation of these.” Beecher admitted that this was “a slow work,” one that must 
patiently follow the gradual advance of human knowledge. For this reason, Beecher insisted, 
“There are very few pulpits that [presently] teach it, or that are competent to teach it; but it must 
come. It is a great work, it is a glorious work, the fulfillment of which will be the new heaven 
and the new earth.”24 
In arguing that the future of Christianity opened upon knowledge of human heredity, 
Beecher followed a precedent set by Horace Bushnell, who believed that the primary mode of 
Christian expansion should be the propagative development of the race. Both ministers preached 
a gospel of hereditarianism, as they each used heredity to reconceive God’s redemptive plan in 
terms of race propagation. In proposing a propagative plan for Christianity, both men viewed life 
as a progressive, healthful force that simply needed to be guided by righteous living, an outlook 
made possible by combining Christianity’s redemptive message with vitalistic precepts. But 
there is a major difference between the two ministers’ thinking, namely Beecher’s acceptance of 
“evolutionism,” which for him revolved around the idea that “higher” forms of life evolved from 
“lower” ones.   
Beecher was an early convert to Herbert Spencer’s evolutionary theory. In fact, Newell 
Dwight Hillis, who indirectly succeeded Beecher at the helm of Plymouth Church, praised his 
predecessor as “foremost among clergymen in utilizing Spencer’s expositions of the 
development theory.”25 Hillis’ characterization is supported by the fact that Beecher gave a 
speech at an 1882 dinner for Spencer in which he bluntly asserted, “I think that the doctrine of 																																																								
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Evolution and its relation to the work of Mr. Spencer […] is going to revolutionize theology 
from one end to the other.”26 In his speech, Beecher accepted the central hypothesis of 
evolutionism –i.e., that humans descended from animals. Beecher dismissed the controversy 
surrounding this hypothesis by suggesting that evolutionary processes had brought humanity 
across an ontological threshold that sharply distinguished it from the rest of the animal kingdom. 
Addressing the notion that humans evolved from the “immortal monkey,” Beecher declared, “A 
great many people are loath to think that such an origin should be hinted at by science, that it 
should stand even as a hypothesis. I would just as lief have descended from a monkey as from 
anything else if I had descended far enough.”27 
In general, human animality did not shake Beecher’s faith in life as a progressive power 
nor did it undermine his belief that Christianity offered a vision of redemption that supported 
natural laws of human development. This is because, in adapting Spencer’s ideas to his own, 
Beecher did not imagine evolution as a random, arbitrary process, but rather, as an ongoing act 
of creation or becoming whereby God incarnated his will through the propagation of a perfect 
race. As Richard Hofstadter observes in his classic work, Social Darwinism in American 
Thought, Spencer supplied a couple of key ideas that were crucial for Beecher and other 
theological liberals during the late nineteenth century. First there was Spencer’s doctrine of the 
“survival of the fittest” and the general idea that death and destruction had a positive effect on 
evolutionary development. I explore this idea in Beecher’s preaching in the next section of the 
chapter. Second, there was Spencer’s notion that human evolution was moral in scope and 
purpose, with the development of psychological powers (including the intellectual and moral 
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faculties) constituting the warp and woof of the evolutionary process. Subscribing to 
Lamarckism, Spencer believed that “[…] if mental as well as physical characteristics could be 
inherited, the intellectual powers of the race would become cumulatively greater, and over 
several generations the ideal man would finally be developed.”28 Beecher adapted this idea in his 
preaching, promoting a version of evolution in which God, through the incarnation of his son, 
Jesus Christ, revealed his plan for the human race, a plan that unfolded through the evolutionary 
perfection of humanity’s moral, intellectual, and spiritual powers.  
In accepting the idea that the human race had descended from animals, Beecher 
reconceived the human as an ontologically liminal organism consisting of two halves or natures. 
First, there was the “base under man,” which he associated with the “crude, primitive world of 
matter.”29 Beecher identified this half of the human with the primal or instinctual functioning of 
the body as expressed through appetites and desires. Second, humans (and especially the adult 
members of supposedly superior races), consisted of an upper half, which Beecher called the 
“spiritual upper-man” and which he identified with the transcendent powers of the mind. Beecher 
envisioned an eternal struggle between these two halves, the “base under-man” and the “spiritual 
upper-man.” As Beecher put it, “In the development along the middle line where the animal 
meets the spiritual man, there is an eternal storm, a cloud that never blows away, and thunder 
that never dies out of the horizon of time.”30 
In Beecher’s developmental conception, the human was stretched between a higher and 
lower nature, one nature aspiring toward the holy and divine and the other rooted in the primal 																																																								
28 Richard Hofstadter, Social Darwinism in American Thought (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 
1992), 39. 
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world of instinct and passion. The point of evolution was to enlarge the upper nature so that it 
held dominion over the lower. Thus, Beecher conceived evolution as a process of “unfolding,” 
whereby individuals and races passed through five ascending stages, with the unfolding of each 
stage depending upon the completeness of the previous one. The first stage was the animal, after 
which came the social, moral, intellectual, and spiritual. “At each stage of development,” 
Beecher argued, “the mind becomes sensitive to higher impulses and truths, and finally it is 
capable of receiving the direct influence of the divine presence.” The purpose of Christianity was 
to teach those godly ideals that hastened this unfolding process, with Beecher interpreting the 
importance of Christ in the following way: 
Christ called men from gross animal life to the moral life; there can be no doubt about 
that […] That was, however, but a beginning, a foundation on which a noble, invisible, 
spiritual structure was to be built. He taught that there was a stage yet beyond common 
morality; that it was possible to unfold man’s nature to a higher and nobler condition; and 
that man by nature was like a seed either not planted or not half-grown, and that there 
was, beyond mere civic morality –rectitude in ourselves and to our fellows –even beyond 
that there was a mighty sphere, into which every man should go; an ideal character, an 
unworldly condition, a heroic devotion to the right; and that such development was the 
direct result of divine influence.31 
 
Although Christ provided the ideal for the higher development of individuals, Beecher insisted 
that Christ’s ultimate objective was to unfold a higher, godlier race. As Beecher remarked in 
another sermon on evolution at Plymouth Church, “[…] that which I look for is the change of the 
human race. I am not thinking of men, but of mankind.”32 
Just as organic life defied the laws of inorganic life in the vitalist conception of things, 
Beecher imagined that humanity’s spiritual nature defied the primal economy of the material 
body. In his view, the two natures of man were developmentally continuous, with the “spiritual 
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upper-man” developing out of the material body, or, at least, with the development of the higher 
faculties depending upon the vitality of the material body. And yet, while the two natures were 
bound together, the spiritual faculties rose above the material body in a relationship of 
subordination that allowed the former to guide the impulses of the latter. The spiritual faculties 
were thus in a relationship of immanence and transcendence with the body, at once depending 
upon the latter for their proper development while exercising an independent power that allowed 
them to intervene within the body’s instinctual economy. This paradoxical relationship was key 
for Beecher’s concept of unfolding, for it was only by controlling the body’s urges (e.g., via 
inhibition) that the spiritual faculties could strengthen the vital power upon which both they and 
the body depended. This vitalist understanding of life allowed Beecher to draw a direct 
connection between individual righteousness and racial development, for the unfolding of the 
spiritual faculties in one generation increased the inborn potential of the next. 
Beecher believed that the spiritual faculties could be awakened in a number of ways, 
including by more traditional methods. No person, regardless of hereditary endowment, was 
completely bereft of a higher nature that could be aroused and developed by religious suasion. 
Thus, for example, Beecher thought that revivals were useful in waking those who, through 
disposition and the course of habit, had succumbed to their baser instincts. Adhering to a 
nineteenth century understanding of heredity, Beecher believed that the limits imposed by 
heredity could always be mitigated by religious influence, if not easily undone. Nonetheless, 
Beecher believed that the path to true progress meant working with heredity and not against it. 
As he bluntly averred, “A man who is born with robust health has a better chance than the man 
who is born an invalid for his father’s sins.” Indeed, heredity was crucial. By improving heredity, 
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people would be “well born,” already “half converted,” with Beecher going so far as to insist that 
the race must be first “regenerated by physical birth” before the “great ripeness” can come.33  
Beecher celebrated the redemptive power of the home as an institution for rearing 
Christians from birth, championing religious nurture and instruction as means to improving the 
inborn qualities of the race. Of course, this did not mean that Beecher rejected older approaches 
to salvation modeled on sanctification. As William R. Hutchison argues, the idea that Christians 
could be grown did not mean that nineteenth century liberals denied the power of God in 
initiating a conversionary experience or in transforming individuals’ lives.34 Nevertheless, 
Beecher emphasized the capacity of Christianity to act as an organic power, believing that 
salvation was most permanent and lasting when its effects were registered within the life 
processes. Hence, Beecher described a truly transformative Christianity as follows: “It begins as 
a seed. It develops as a growth. It is relative to the individual characteristics, to the age, the 
institutions, the whole economy of life.”35 Hence, too, Beecher advocated Christian nurture as 
the best method for salvation, as it allowed Christianity to be propagated into the development of 
the child and the race. In a sermon at Plymouth Church, he asserted that “the child brought up in 
the nature and admonition of the Lord may be trained into its spiritual birth gradually and 
easily.” Such a fact allowed Beecher to reason that the “whole unfolding process” whereby a 
child is trained to “right thoughts of God and Christ” is best undertaken in the “sanctuary of the 
household.” Beecher concluded by insisting that the home was the most important institution for 
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the redemption of the race: “I believe that household instruction will yet supersede all forms of 
moral influence.”36   
Beecher’s scheme of race propagation involved a new understanding of sin, one that 
departed from Calvinism. Beecher defined sin as follows: [S]in is the persistence of animal 
passions against the control of the moral sentiments.”37 Elsewhere, Beecher elaborated, “Sin lies 
in the conflict between animal nature and the dawning of spiritual, moral, and intellectual nature. 
It is the conflict in man between his upper and lower nature.”38 Such a conceptualization allowed 
Beecher to frame the consequences of sin in a vitalist framework, with a person’s iniquity 
weakening the physical constitution, precipitating more sinfulness, and inhibiting the 
development of the higher faculties. Distinguishing himself from the “old scholastic theology,” 
Beecher took pains to insist that, in arguing as much, he was not suggesting that sin issued from 
an inherently “corrupt nature.” Rather, sin resulted from a nature that was neither “unfolded nor 
harmoniously developed.”39 Through his notion of unfolding, Beecher thus attempted to show 
that he held a more optimistic view of sin than the Calvinist tradition, which asserted the 
“absolute corruption of the material body of man.”40 In his perspective, human sinfulness could 
be gradually diminished through the generations, although never completely eliminated.41 Of 
course, if Beecher argued that sin did not issue from an inherently corrupt nature as the old 
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theology believed, he nonetheless maintained that sin had a vitiating influence upon heredity and 
the unfolding of the higher faculties within the life of the race.  
Like Bushnell, Beecher used a hereditary concept of sin to explain the developmental 
differences that supposedly existed between the races. In his view, sin blocked hereditary 
development, which allegedly explained why some races stagnated in primitiveness. The 
development of “idolatrous” races, Beecher argued, had stalled because they practiced religions 
that were rooted in animal nature. He articulated this idea to his congregants in the following 
way: “Antiquity, and contemporaneous pagan nations yet living, have constructed their gods and 
their character of God by transferring that which they know in themselves to their deities; but 
they have constructed their deities from their animal passions.” (Among such passions, Beecher 
listed “pride,” “envy,” “selfishness,” “cruelty,” or, simply put, “the grosser appetites.”)42 Pagan 
religions, in other words, were rooted in primal urges and thus promoted sinfulness; in turn, 
sinfulness stunted the development of the higher faculties among “barbarians” and “savages.” In 
this way, Beecher described a developmentally isomorphic relationship between sinfulness, 
religious practice, and evolutionary stasis: living “by their senses, controlled by objects to be 
seen or heard or felt from without,” savage races practiced religions that effectively bound them 
to their “animal lives.”43 Although Beecher never discussed missions to savage nations in his 
preaching on evolution, his manner of thinking suggests that, for him, the only way to unblock 
the arrested development of savages would be to promote a spiritual conception of God among 
them, which would entail evolving their mental powers. As Beecher reasoned, “There must be 
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some similarity to God developed in the human consciousness before the mind can understand 
the inspired enunciations respecting God’s character and designs.”44 
Beecher’s hereditary understanding of sin also helped him to explain why certain classes 
of whites were superior to others. Beecher believed that unequal unfolding explained socio-
economic divisions and hierarchies within races. He formulated this idea through the following 
generalization: “Civilized society always has a specimen within it of every stage which mankind 
has gone through […] Society goes, as does the individual germ, through every stage, and shows 
us each through which in the process of history it has hitherto had to pass.”  At the bottom of 
civilized society were those who were given to animal impulses, an idle class consisting of the 
criminal and chronically poor. This was a stock of whites who “only give forth the energy of 
their passions –not intellectual energy, not moral, not aesthetic. They give forth simply the 
energy of selfishness, of pride, of vanity, of ambition, of avarice, combativeness, or 
destructiveness.” In evolutionary terms, this stock of people existed at the “lower tier of the 
human, and the upper tier of the animal.” After this stock, came the “constructors and workers” 
who were of meager intelligence but who possessed moral integrity and industriousness. This 
class represented the “vast mass of the respectable people” in civilized society. Next, Beecher 
described a class who are given to reflection, “men who live in the higher range of their 
faculties.” At the top, Beecher placed a class of teachers and poets, “who have given to 
knowledge a higher character and a winged form.”45 Beecher clearly conceived this social 
hierarchy through his hereditary understanding of sin, as each class was ranked according to its 
development of moral, intellectual, and spiritual powers. Indeed, there was something almost 
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ethereal about Beecher’s superior classes, who, in his description, seemed to live wholly within 
the bodiless world of thought. 
Beecher’s preaching on evolution underscores how, during the late nineteenth century, 
modernist Protestantism continued to develop as a form of Christianity articulated explicitly in 
the hereditarian terms of race propagation. Like Bushnell, Beecher saw heredity as a template for 
rethinking the scope and parameters of human redemption. In accepting the evolutionary notion 
of descent, Beecher departed from his distinguished predecessor; yet he followed Bushnell in one 
critical respect: he believed that heredity made it possible for Christianity to express its 
redeeming power within and through life. In Beecher’s understanding, heredity opened a 
progressive dynamic between individual righteousness and the evolutionary development of the 
race, while at the same time preserving the redemptive message of Christianity.  
The Destruction of Unfitness and the Human Animal 
For Beecher, evolution presented Christianity with two fundamental problems. The first 
was the idea that life evolved through the destruction of unfitness, which contradicted Christian 
principles of charity and compassion. The second was the evolutionary concept of descent, 
which, in Beecher’s middle-class Victorian perspective, revolved around the controversial idea 
that humans had evolved from ignoble animal origins. Beecher’s preaching on evolution 
demonstrates how modernism would come to address these issues over the course of the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century. Beecher reconciled the first issue through the personality 
of God. Reflecting the influence of white, middle-class domestic culture, Beecher modeled 
theology on the relationship between parent and child, re-imagining God as a nurturing parent 
who desired a perfect race. He envisioned the parental love of God in evolutionary terms, 
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viewing him as a stern but committed father who instructively used the destruction of life to 
guide his child, the human race, to perfection.  
Beecher addressed the second issue by consciously describing evolution as an ascending 
process whereby God was revealing his will through the propagation of a perfect humanity. 
Beecher described evolution as a gradual process of extrication, whereby the human (defined in 
terms of the higher faculties) would be gradually drawn out of and set over against the animal. 
The paradoxical result was that in becoming animal, the human also became more divine –or at 
least potentially so from a propagative perspective. The motifs of “ascent” and “extrication” 
would come to define modernists’ interpretation of evolution, while, both popularly and 
professionally, eugenics would be understood as a science that promised to evolve the race 
beyond its baser impulses and into a more divine-like comportment.  
Evolutionism challenged Beecher to address the idea that humans were simply evolved 
animals. Such a notion undermined the uniqueness of humanity as a special creation, one 
fashioned in the likeness of God and therefore distinct from the rest of the created order. But 
racial theism provided a way for liberals like Beecher to adjust to evolutionism, for it enabled 
them to frame evolution as an ongoing act of creation whereby God was realizing his will on 
earth through the propagation of a chosen, morally elect race. In Beecher’s imagination, the 
white race rose above the economy of primal forces that governed the animal kingdom through 
its special faculties of morality and intelligence, faculties that demonstrated the ontological 
uniqueness of humans in general but that also underscored the spiritual election of elite whites. 
Indeed, Beecher described evolution as an intrinsically ascending, albeit laborious process 
whereby the race was gradually extricating itself from its animal inclinations and becoming 
inherently disposed to love, mercy, and kindness. As Beecher optimistically declared,  
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The tendency of this great struggle of extrication is one direction. Not, however, that 
there are not rebounds, backsets; not that the tendency has not often been met and 
blighted. There is no fact more extraordinary that the human mind can contemplate than 
the prodigal waste of creation, the ends being attained finally after a bewildering 
expenditure of forces; but the tendency is away from violence and cruelty, and it is 
toward sympathy and love.46 
 
In reading evolution theistically –i.e., as a “tendency” away from animality and toward 
the divine attributes of love and kindness –Beecher’s preaching signals the most important 
consequence that racial theism had upon hereditarianism in the United States, including 
organized eugenic initiatives in the early twentieth century. As Beecher’s preaching attests, racial 
theism cosmologically depicted and morally encoded the evolutionary idea of struggle not as a 
tooth and nail contest between competing organisms or between an organism and its 
environment. Rather, racial theism cosmologically and morally affirmed evolutionary struggle as 
a fight against the animal within the race (or against those primal urges that circumscribed the 
unfolding of the higher faculties). In the United States, hereditarian thought and practice from the 
late nineteenth century through the early twentieth would continue to justify itself through this 
theistic framework. 
For Beecher, the problem of the human animal posed less significant of a problem for 
Christian theology than the important role that evolution assigned to the destruction of unfitness. 
As Beecher queried, what difference did it make if humans had descended from animals so long 
as they descended far enough? Yet the destruction of unfitness posed a more substantive problem 
in Beecher’s mind. Like Spencer, who coined the phrase, “survival of the fittest,” Beecher had to 
convince his congregation and his readership that destruction of unfitness accorded with God’s 
creative work.  
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“Death,” Beecher insisted, “seems to be the instrument by which life itself is supplied 
with improvement and advancement. Death prepares the way for life.” Beecher argued that the 
destruction of unfitness was part of the process of unfolding and thus a part of God’s propagative 
plan for the race. Death, he opined, carried “creation up to higher planes and upon higher lines, 
reaching more complicated conditions in structure, in function, in adaptation, with systematic 
and harmonious results, so that the whole physical creation is organizing itself for a sublime 
march toward perfectness.”47 In short, death –or the hereditary destruction of unfitness –had 
creative potential; it possessed a purifying, perfecting, and even consecrating power when it 
came to the form, expression, and purpose of life.  
In Beecher’s understanding, fitness was not primarily a measure of an organism’s 
strength and virility. Rather, fitness was a function of the moral, intellectual, and spiritual 
faculties and their relative development at both the individual and racial levels. Put differently, 
fitness was a measure of a person or race’s capacity to avoid sinfulness, which meant that fitness 
referred to an innate capacity to subordinate the animal half of the human. Thus, sinfulness and 
unfitness were more or less the same thing, with sinfulness thereby directly correlating with 
evolutionary development. Evolutionary death was productive in so far as it weeded out the 
sources of human sinfulness and hastened creation’s march toward perfectness.  
The destruction of unfitness, Beecher insisted, was a part of God’s evolutionary plan, an 
act of love by a devoted father toward his child. The love that Beecher had in mind when he 
described the destruction of unfitness was always a propagative love expressed by a divinity who 
kept a constant eye on the development of his child, the human race. This is why Beecher 
contrasted God’s love, which was a “conception of infinite love” with human love, which was 
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always a “conception of finite love.”48 The difference between the two, he argued, made it 
difficult for ordinary people to understand how the destruction of unfitness could be justified 
through the rubric of love and compassion. Only when people considered God’s love beyond the 
finite understanding of their own would they be able to comprehend evolutionary death from the 
viewpoint of love and devotion.    
Beecher explained that understanding the destruction of unfitness as part of God’s love 
was nearly impossible from the perspective of the individual. “If we look at the phenomena of 
suffering from the earthly point of view, and with the limitation of our faculties, and from our 
limited knowledge of moral uses and ways, darkness and doubt are not only extremely natural, 
but inevitable.”49 The trick, for Beecher, was to try to see how evolutionary death bespoke God’s 
constant devotion to his creation. From the individual’s perspective, Beecher admitted, 
evolutionary death seemed like a massive amount of waste and an inordinate amount of senseless 
suffering, but from the perspective of “infinite love” such waste and suffering signaled the 
divine’s perpetual devotion to his creation. Comparing God to a carpenter, Beecher articulated 
this idea to his congregants in the following way, 
As the carpenter has numberless shavings, and a vast amount of wastage of every log 
which he would shape to some use, so creation has been an enormous waste, such as 
seems like a squandering, on the scale of human life, but not to Him that dwells in 
Eternity. In bringing the world to its present conditions, vast amounts of things have lived 
for a time and were unable to hold on, and let go and perished.50 
 
In another sermon, Beecher compared God to a gardener, while suggesting that humans, who 
were simply individual plants within the “garden of the Lord,” could not see to what ends their 
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cultivation was working.51 In Beecher’s mind, the suffering and apparent senselessness that came 
with evolutionary death blinded people from seeing the infinite love that God demonstrated in 
his assiduousness to his ultimate objective, the production of a human race that increasingly 
shared his love of goodness and truth.   
Beecher attempted to illustrate the instructive value of evolutionary death by likening 
pain and suffering to purifying forces. Pain and suffering are, Beecher declared, “God’s 
ministers, God’s school masters, God’s police. Their function in the scheme of life is vital. 
Pressure and attrition are indispensible in the evolving of the race according to the terms and 
conditions of their creation.”52 In other words, pain and suffering taught individuals the path to 
righteousness, which ensured that they bequeathed a healthy heritage to their descendants. 
Drawing from a vitalist conception of sin, Beecher equated pain and suffering with bodily 
excess, as these weakened the body’s constitution and made it susceptible to disease and decay. 
Pain and suffering thereby helped to affirm righteousness, encouraging individuals to choose 
purity and life. “From childhood and its earliest days,” Beecher averred, “men need to be drawn 
and to be thrust upward. Pain and sorrow are the thrustings, the pushes, as it were […] Pain, from 
behind, pushes [men] up.”53 Just as the individual learns righteousness through pain and 
suffering, Beecher reasoned, so God “converts pain and sorrow to helpful uses”54 in order to 
push his creation toward a “final” and “transcendent” objective.55 Through such logic, Beecher 
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attempted to show his congregants how God’s infinite understanding of love overlapped with 
their own finite comprehension: just as pain and suffering purified the individual person, so these 
ministers of life also cleansed and advanced the race. 
 Beecher attempted to harmonize his concept of divine love with his theistic 
understanding of evolutionary struggle. The law of love, he argued, was a new law, one that 
would ultimately supersede the grand law of nature. Beecher described the law of nature in 
Spencerian terms. In nature, the strong prevail, while the weak “go to the wall,” an arrangement 
that ensured that the strongest in body survive to perpetuate their kind. Yet Beecher believed 
that, through its development into more complex forms, life was producing a new law, a law of 
love, nurture, and protection that he traced to the emergence of the parental instincts. This new 
law began as an imperfect tendency, “far back in the twilight, on the boundary that separates men 
from animals,”56 gradually evolving into the loving administrations of the white middle-class 
family.  
Importantly, however, the realization of this law within the life of the race was far from 
complete. The Bible, which Beecher described as “the most eminent record” of an “unfolding 
tendency” toward protection and nurture, heralded the day when the race would exhibit this 
higher law more naturally and immediately than any other disposition. Yet presently the race 
remained caught in a “mixture between these two tendencies,” which for Beecher denoted both 
the incompleteness of evolution and its promise. Revelation was an ongoing act, coterminous 
with the evolutionary process whereby the human unfolded from the animal. Thus, Beecher 
rejected the idea that the Bible is “the only revelation that [God] has ever made.” While the Bible 
“surely contains a revelation,” Beecher admitted, it is “not a completed revelation.” “God is not 
																																																								
56 Ibid., 194.	
		
	
94 
done revealing,” he averred. “The spiritual moral consciousness of Christendom does not annul 
the early teachings of the Sacred Scriptures, but unfolds and fulfills them.”57  
For Beecher, heredity transcribed revelation into the developmental idiom of life, 
opening a relatively fluid and reciprocating relationship between human righteousness, life, and 
the unfolding of providence. Gradually, Beecher maintained, the law of love would supplant the 
law of cruelty and force. In such an age, the higher faculties would be more perfectly unfolded 
within the race and the effects of sinfulness would gradually disappear as righteousness became 
more and more inborn. Pain and suffering would be increasingly unnecessary to guide the race 
along its upward course as the higher faculties came to regulate the body according to the 
dictates of providence. The result would be the slow but sure obviation of the grand law of nature 
with respect to human evolution and the gradual transfiguration of the human-animal into a more 
divine-like being.  
Beecher’s Racial Theism 
 
 Americans tend to associate eugenics with science. This view is supported by histories of 
eugenics, both scholarly and popular. In Daniel Kevles’ authoritative 1985 analysis, for example, 
the story of American eugenics begins with Francis Galton and continues with twentieth century 
Anglo-American scientists like Charles Davenport, who sought to place Galton’s reformist 
vision on the firm footing of classical genetics.58 Edwin Black’s popular 2003 work also narrates 
eugenics through the history of science, focusing on the professional collaboration between 
American eugenicists and Nazi racial hygienists during the 1920s and 30s.59 
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Narrating eugenics through the history of science, however, obscures the fact that 
eugenic-like ideas and practices emerged in the United States well before the rise of mainline 
eugenics in the early twentieth century. Just before and after the Civil War, hereditarian ideas 
allowed liberal Protestants to reconceive redemption through the framework of race 
perfectionism, which principally involved re-conceptualizing the relationship between 
providence and religious practice in the theistic framework of race propagation.  
Hereditarianism supported the liberalizing work of Protestants like Bushnell and Beecher, 
who looked to update Christianity for Victorian era society and to redefine the scope and aims of 
redemption through the reproductive function of the home. Their theological work 
complemented the labors of innovating nineteenth century feminists like Catherine Beecher who 
defined the home (and the work of women within it) in terms of national development.60 Race 
propagation transformed reproduction into a biopolitical act by teleologically linking 
reproduction, national progress, and the unfolding of providence. Modernizers who promoted a 
propagative understanding of Christianity, like Horace Bushnell and Henry Ward Beecher, 
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animalistic instincts, she once wrote, “[T]he history of the race, from infancy through its stages 
of barbarism, heathenism, civilization, and Christianity, is a process of suffering, as the lower 
principles of humanity are gradually subjected to the higher, while men learn to give up lower 
gratifications for the more elevated, and to sacrifice the lesser good of the minority to the well-
being of the majority.” Catherine Beecher, Common Sense Applied to Religion; or, the Bible and 
the People (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1857), 37. For a scholarly account of Catherine 
Beecher’s impact on the formation of domestic piety, see Kathryn Kish Sklar, Catherine 
Beecher: A Study in American Domesticity (New York: W.W. Norton, 1976). 
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supported the establishment of Christian creeds and practices that could harness the 
developmental potential of the American population, with these two leaders drawing upon 
theistic models of human development to rank and assess classes and races in terms of their 
respective reproductive promise. It was with the development of race propagation and the racial 
theism that supported it that eugenic-like ideas of controlled and purposeful population growth 
first appeared in the United States.  
Developing over the course of nineteenth century, race propagation was premised upon 
the idea that one could grow or rear Christians from birth. Race propagation developed as part of 
Protestant liberalism, which sought to loosen Calvinism’s hold on mainstream American 
religious practice in order to make Christianity an active, progressive part of social production 
and societal development. Over the course of the nineteenth century, a number of institutions 
arose to address the needs of the young nation, including the modern home, public school, and 
other institutions that could establish national unity by normalizing the development of the body 
politic. What made these institutions possible was a naturalistic or developmental understanding 
of life. The nucleated home and the public school, for example, were made possible by the 
modern notion of “childhood,” which confounded Calvinistic concepts of predestination and 
election by understanding human moral nature in developmental terms.61 As human nature came 
to be seen as an organic product of bodily development, reproduction, childrearing, and 
education became paramount political concerns, with the modern home and the school emerging 
to address the political exigency of normalized national growth. Modernizing Protestants like 
Bushnell and Beecher (along with other prominent members of the Beecher clan), came to view 
																																																								
61 See, for example, Anne M. Boylan, Sunday School, 1988; Robert W. Lynn and Elliott Wright, 
The Big Little School: Sunday Child of American Protestantism (New York: Harper & Row, 
1971). 
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Calvinism as a hindrance to the development of these institutions and thus to national progress. 
They often openly attacked Calvinism as an outdated and regressive religion, defining and 
championing a new, propagative version of Christianity that reconceived its message and scope 
in the developmental language of racial theism.  
Contemporary European scholars have used Michel Foucault’s theory of biopower to 
rethink the history of eugenics in the various national contexts in which it developed. These 
scholars have led a conscious shift away from understanding eugenics through the history of 
science and toward a historiography that broadly frames eugenics as a pro-natal approach to 
modernization and nation building.62 From the perspective of biopower, eugenics was not simply 
a science but a modern way of defining the relationship between citizen-subjects and the nation, 
one that viewed reproduction as a national resource and a means to national progress. Thus, 
Marius Turda characterizes eugenics as the “paradigmatic expression” of a process that he calls 
the “biologisation of national belonging.” In characterizing eugenics as such, Turda identifies 
eugenics as an intrinsic part of a modernizing process whereby, through the lens of population 
management, the nation is “progressively portrayed as a biological entity whose natality, 
longevity, morbidity, and mortality need to be supervised.”63 
For Turda, eugenic thought and practice emerged not with science per se, but rather, with 
a modern way of defining the relationship between power, reproductivity, and national 
development. But Turda, following Foucault, still imagines biologisation as a secularizing 
process whereby the livelihood of populations came under the care and protection of scientific 
authorities. In the American context, the biologisation of the country happened not in spite of 																																																								
62 See especially, Alison Bashford and Philippa Levine, eds., The Oxford Handbook of the 
History of Eugenics (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010). 
 
63 Marius Turda, Modernism and Eugenics (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 6. 
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religious authority, but because of it, that is, because modernizing reformers like Bushnell and 
Beecher began to reconceive religion as the most important developmental force in rearing a 
righteous body politic. The theistic idea that God was actively creating his kingdom on earth 
through the propagation of a perfect race was fundamental to this modernizing process. The 
discourse of racial theism developed over the course of nineteenth century as liberal leaders like 
Bushnell and Beecher sought to reconceive Christianity from a racially propagative point of 
view. Racial theism supported race propagation by providing a theological framework for 
justifying biopolitical discrimination, that is, for defending and promoting one group’s 
reproductivity over and against others’. 
As discussed in chapter one, Bushnell identified an incipient divinity within the Saxon 
stock, which for him testified to the hereditary election of New England, its natural propagative 
power, and its providential purpose with respect to national expansion. Bushnell propounded a 
kind of racial immanentism, believing that the divine-like attribute of sovereignty within the 
Saxon stock could be enhanced through the propagative devotion of domestic piety. Although 
Bushnell did not argue that God was literally inside the Saxon germ, maintaining at least a 
theoretical distinction between the natural and supernatural, he nonetheless understood the 
propagative development and territorial expansion of said germ as a part of God’s redemptive 
plan for humanity. In this way, Bushnell’s writing serves as an example of Turda’s concept of 
biologisation, for it marks one of the first clear-cut cases in which an American leader promoted 
national growth explicitly through a hereditarian understanding of reproduction.  
Bushnell’s work also reflects Turda’s notion of biologization in its assessment of non-
white populations’ reproductive influence upon national progress. Thus, for example, Bushnell 
evaluated the question of slavery by considering the propagative power of the “African race.” 
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Importantly, Bushnell opposed slavery on the grounds that it denied African men and women the 
human right to the “family state,” a point that underscores the intimacy between the 
nationalization of reproduction during the nineteenth century and the construction of slavery as a 
moral controversy. Although he opposed slavery, however, Bushnell believed that emancipation 
would ultimately result in the African race’s extinction on the continent (and perhaps eventually 
the globe). Bushnell maintained that it was impossible to propagate “an uncultivated and 
barbarous stock” incapable of sovereignty into a “cultivated and civilized” one. The hereditary 
taints within the African race were allegedly too deep to be propagated out. “It would not be 
strange,” he concluded, “if vices, which taint the blood and cut down life, should, within fifty 
years, penetrate the whole stock, and begin to hurry them off, in a process of premature 
extinction.”64  The point is not simply that Bushnell saw Africans as an inferior race, but that he 
viewed the consequences of their emancipation and socio-political enfranchisement almost 
exclusively in terms of their reproductive power, with Africans ultimately being eliminated as a 
reproductive unit or sub-population given their supposedly limited potential as such. Bushnell’s 
ideas regarding emancipation reflect Turda’s concept of biologisation because they underscore a 
normative correlation between biological identity, propagative potential, and national growth. 
Bushnell’s concept of sovereignty provided a theistic framework for understanding the 
allegedly disparate developmental potentials between the races. Sovereignty was not simply 
modern racism dressed in religious garb; its theistic import was central to popular constructions 
of race within Protestant America. Bushnell’s theistic construction of race, therefore, was not 
simply an iteration of modern racism, but an inflection of a new kind of power. By Saxon 
sovereignty, Bushnell did not simply mean political sovereignty; he meant reproductive or bio-																																																								
64 Horace Bushnell, A Discourse on the Slavery Question (Hartford: Case, Tiffany, and Co., 
1839), 11-12. 
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political sovereignty, which in this case refers to an assessment of power made explicitly in 
propagative terms. Bushnell’s theism thus supported a propagative sense of election in which 
slaves were disqualified from the national body because of their limited propagative potential. 
My point is that racial theism emerged as a discursive practice for defining the relationship 
between race, power, and providence in reproductive terms, with the notion of providence (here 
conceived as an inborn power) dividing between those who were qualified and disqualified with 
respect to their reproductivity. And this is how racial theism supported the rise of eugenic 
thought and practice, as a principle of inclusion/exclusion with respect to a biologised national 
community imagined explicitly in terms of its reproductive potential. 
Henry Ward Beecher’s preaching on evolution demonstrates that the discourse of racial 
theism continued to develop as a biopolitical mode of discrimination that allowed one to 
distinguish between which races or stocks’ were qualified for reproduction and which ones were 
not. Beecher did not use the term sovereignty, but his notion of unfolding worked in a way that 
paralleled Bushnell’s theism. Unfolding denoted a similar relationship of height whereby higher 
faculties subordinated the lower ones. It referred to a propagative process whereby spiritual 
faculties emerged over and above the baser impulses, setting the latter to higher purposes. 
Unfolding thus marked a category or spectrum of propagative fitness expressed in theistic terms.  
It is true that, like Bushnell, Beecher insisted that God and life were separate. Yet 
following Bushnell, Beecher also saw God realizing his purposes within and through life. As 
Beecher put it, “God is not matter; God is not in matter […] Yet all laws, all susceptibilities, 
issue from him. They are the result of his intelligence and of his will. Their power is the 
continuous power of God as the life of the world.”65 Such a formulation allowed Beecher to read 
																																																								
65 Beecher, Evolution and Religion, 64. 
		
	
101 
race propagation in theistic terms, since the “universality and power of God’s presence are the 
cause of all activity, both in the material globe and in the intellectual and moral development of 
human kind.”66 Theistically, Beecher’s notion of unfolding denoted a kind of inborn register of 
providence; it bespoke the immanence of God’s terrestrial kingdom on earth, thereby serving as 
a biopolitical mode of discerning between qualified and unqualified life. Hence, Beecher insisted 
that the kingdom of God did not refer to a specific place in time and space but the process 
whereby the “moral condition” was unfolding in the human race. “[A]nybody who reaches up to 
that moral condition is a member of that kingdom,” Beecher concluded, with the kingdom of 
God here referring simultaneously to an inwardly unfolding providential realm and an outwardly 
advancing political order. “All those who have their inward and nobler nature developed until 
they feel in themselves the inspiration of God’s presence and love are inhabitants of that 
kingdom; and none others are.”67 
Beecher’s notion of unfolding allowed him to distinguish between those who should and 
should not reproduce. Like Bushnell, he saw blacks as inherently inferior and thus deficient with 
respect to the higher faculties. Unlike Bushnell, however, who used his concept of sovereignty to 
support his belief in the hereditary superiority of Saxon stock, Beecher did not privilege New 
England whites in his theistic scheme to the same, nearly exclusive extent as Bushnell. Beecher, 
who delivered his sermons on evolutionism after the Civil War, seemed to imagine race 
propagation as an activity that allied working, middle-class, and upper-class whites from both 
Northern and Southern stocks. Such an interpretation is supported by the fact that Beecher never 
explicitly prioritized New England whites in his preaching on race perfectionism, even though he 
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clearly conceived them as a more or less distinct hereditary stock. Such an interpretation is also 
buttressed by Beecher’s public role after the Civil War as a leading voice in the promotion of 
national reconciliation.68 Indeed, it may be that Beecher envisioned race perfectionism as a 
religious undertaking that could reunite Northern and Southern whites under common 
providence, although it is unlikely that Southerners would have been receptive to his embrace of 
evolutionism. In any case, Beecher, like Bushnell, saw the propagation of the white racial body 
as providential in design and purpose, while he tied national stability and growth to the 
hereditary perfection of this body. 
In addition to the difference just described, there are two other significant departures 
between Bushnell and Beecher’s theisms. First, unlike Bushnell, Beecher emphasized the 
propagative harm caused by degenerate whites, with Beecher’s theism underscoring a concern 
over developmental disparities within the white race. Second, following his subscription to 
evolutionism, Beecher’s theism was preoccupied with a kind of root or base animality that 
circumscribed the unfolding of the divine nature. Both of these departures signal important 
adjustments within racial theism as it developed over the latter half of the nineteenth and early 
twentieth century.  
As previously mentioned, Beecher imagined a kind of propagative diversity within races, 
with different socio-economic classes representing discrete stocks within an intra-racial 
spectrum. Beecher conceived all human races as being stretched over a developmental 
continuum involving several stages. Taken as discrete units, races could be hierarchized, with 
one race (e.g., the white race) being supposedly more advanced in terms of its overall 
development than others. But considered individually, each race consisted of distinct stocks or 																																																								
68 Edward J. Blum, Reforging the White Republic: Race, Religion, and American Nationalism 
1865-1898 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2005), pp. 87-119. 
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kinship groups that were different with respect to their development. Beecher seemed especially 
concerned with degenerate white stocks whose supposed sinfulness marked their developmental 
inferiority and kept them from unfolding their higher potential. This is why Beecher insisted that 
the perfection of the race required that one “purge out vast amounts of the stock from which 
comes sin,”69 thereby suggesting that the white race could only be perfected if certain degenerate 
classes were eliminated from the racial stock. Thus, unlike Bushnell, Beecher’s theism supported 
a form of discrimination that targeted the deleterious influence of degenerate whites, who, by the 
hereditarian logic of his theism, had biologically forfeited their biopolitical right to participate in 
the ongoing perfection of the race and the advance of God’s kingdom on earth. 
In this aspect, Beecher’s theism presages the emergence of what one scholar of eugenics 
refers to as “eugenic racism,” which involves a “genetic understanding of race.” Rather then 
invoking “a fixed typology of qualitative differences,” Stefan Kühl argues that eugenic racism 
viewed human races as developmental continuums consisting of procreative “unities” or groups. 
These groups signal biological differences or even disparate stages of advancement within a 
specific race. For Kühl, eugenic racism helps to explain why twentieth century American 
eugenicists were so concerned about seeking out and eliminating degenerate white stocks. 
Eugenic racism, Kühl maintains, supported the development, promotion, and enactment of 
twentieth century eugenic procedures like sterilization, which targeted white degenerates in order 
to eliminate negative traits within the white racial body as a whole. As Kühl succinctly puts it, 
“Eugenic racism […] is the demarcation of certain elements within a particular race, followed by 
attempts to reduce these elements through discriminatory policies.”70 We see the kernel of this 
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kind of discrimination and violence in Beecher’s racial theism, which was premised upon the 
developmental concept of unfolding and which provided a theistic framework for explaining why 
certain whites should be encouraged to reproduce and why others should be kept from doing so. 
His work therefore augurs modernists in the early twentieth century who sought to publicly 
rationalize negative eugenic policies like compulsory sterilization on the grounds of racial 
theism. 
Beecher’s Impact on Protestant Modernism 
 
Beecher’s racial theism presaged the rise of the American eugenics movement by several 
decades, yet nucleated within it were ideas that would prove fundamental to eugenic thought and 
practice. Most important was the notion that degeneracy represented a moral and spiritual affront 
to God’s propagative designs for the race. In important ways, his theism provided the germ for 
the development of Anglo-American eugenics as a popular movement. 
In a sermon that he preached for the America Eugenics Society on May 17, 1926, for 
example, W.F. Butler, a Methodist minister from Chandler, Arizona, declared the following to 
the Salt River Valley Ministers Association: “God has revealed and experience shows that in the 
world of human kind Christlike qualities are the more lasting. It is the meek, rather than the 
cruel, the vicious and the immoral, who are to inherit the earth.”71 In making such a statement, 
Butler followed Beecher in insisting that meekness and evolutionary fitness were more or less 
the same thing. Like Beecher, Butler believed in a God who worked within and through 
evolution and who sought to build his kingdom on earth through the propagation of a righteous 
																																																																																																																																																																																		
70 Stefan Kühl, The Nazi Connection: Eugenics, American Racism, and German National 
Socialism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 71. 
 
71 “Butler, W.F.,” American Eugenics Society Papers, American Philosophical Society, 
Philadelphia, PA. 
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race. Following his nineteenth century predecessor, Butler maintained that evolution worked by 
advantaging the morally upright while disadvantaging (and even destroying) the immoral and 
corrupt. Evolution thereby ensured that the racial body developed upwardly, with Butler insisting 
that the race was heading toward the evolutionary perfection embodied by Christ.  
As it developed as a professional and popular movement in the early twentieth century 
United States, eugenics was understood as an evolutionary struggle against the human animal. It 
promised to eradicate the sources of degeneracy that impeded the upward process of evolution. 
Degeneracy itself was understood in animalistic terms. Scientific professionals and clergymen 
alike comprehended degeneracy as a matter of devolution, that is, as a hereditary condition in 
which baser instincts prevailed against the higher faculties or in which the higher faculties were 
too feeble to counteract instinctual impulses. Hence, degeneracy was nearly universally referred 
to as “feeblemindedness.” The term circulated widely in professional and popular circles as 
shorthand for the idea that the degenerate lacked what was properly human –namely, mental and 
moral faculties. As a struggle against degeneracy, Anglo-American eugenics promised a more 
righteous embodiment for the race, which testifies to the fact that evolutionary fitness was 
universally understood by affluent whites in terms of moral strength. Race uplift thus described a 
process of eliminating the hereditary condition of moral torpidity. 
 Just like Beecher had decades before, twentieth century modernist ministers like Butler 
viewed the elimination of degeneracy as part of a moral struggle for a higher moral comportment 
for the race. Believing that modern institutions like prisons, poorhouses, and asylums were 
breaking God’s evolutionary work by allowing degeneracy to increase, Butler argued that God 
was issuing modern civilization a warning, “written not upon a wall but in the germ plasm of 
human beings.” God, Butler cautioned his congregants, “is measuring your racial span and 
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bringing it to an end […] Your civilization will be divided and engulfed by a wave of 
barbarism.” Butler preached his sermon over forty years after Beecher’s discourses on 
evolutionism, but he drew upon one of the central promises propounded by Beecher’s racial 
theism. The great struggle of extrication worked by violent means, but its process was ultimately 
the work of a compassionate God who, through his infinite love, sought to unfold a higher 
spiritual nature within humanity. Butler supported the eugenic struggle against degeneracy 
because it assisted God’s loving work to evolve Christ-like qualities within the race. 
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CHAPTER 3: THE PROBLEM OF RACE DEGENERACY: NEWELL DWIGHT HILLIS 
AND RACIAL THEISM AT THE CENTURY’S TURN 
 
“For some reason the soul now has dust upon its wings. The din of the street, the roar and rattle of wagons, have 
drowned out the still small voice of God. Indeed, weary and disgusted, men run fussily about, sickened with life’s 
excitements, yet ever seeking new pleasures. Multitudes are overwrought and incapable of nobler joys.” 
 
-Newell Dwight Hills, How the Inner Light Failed, 1898 
 
Introduction 
In his welcoming address at the First National Conference on Race Betterment, John 
Harvey Kellogg opened by thanking the modernist Protestant clergyman, Newell Dwight Hillis, 
for first suggesting the event. “I wish to tell you that if you esteem it a privilege to gather here 
for the discussion of great questions which concern the welfare of the race,” Kellogg declared, 
“you are most of all indebted to our greatly esteemed friend, the eminent Doctor Hillis, of 
Plymouth Church, for it was he who last summer suggested to me and to other members of the 
Central Committee the idea of this Conference.”1 Convening at Kellogg’s Sanitarium in Battle 
Creek, Michigan, on January 8, 1914, the purpose of the Conference was to “assemble evidence 
as to the extent to which degenerative tendencies are actively at work in America, and, to 
promote agencies for race betterment.”2 With degeneracy broadly referring to hereditarily 
diminished moral, intellectual, or physical capacities, the Conference drew professionals from a 
variety of fields in which degeneracy had emerged as an important medico-political problem, 																																																								
1 John Harvey Kellogg, Address of Welcome to the Conference,” in Proceedings from the First 
National Conference on Race Betterment, ed. Emily F. Robbins (Battle Creek, MI: Race 
Betterment Foundation, 1914), 1. 
 
2 Stephen Smith, “President’s Address,” in Proceedings from the First National Conference on 
Race Betterment, ed. Emily F. Robbins (Battle Creek, MI: Race Betterment Foundation, 1914), 
5. 
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including social reform, medicine, public health, euthenics, and, most notably, eugenics. Hillis’ 
interest in the problem of degeneracy is confirmed not only by the fact that he first advocated for 
the Conference, but also by the leading role that he played in its organization and execution. 
Hillis served as a vice-president and, along with prominent figures in medicine and social reform 
like Kellogg, Irving Fisher, and Jacob Riis, as a member of the Conference’s Executive 
Committee.  
Hillis initiated and organized the Conference as part of his lifelong commitment to 
redefining and retooling Christianity for the fight against race degeneracy, which he understood 
as a propagative condition of evolutionary consequence, on the one hand, and as an issue of 
national significance, on the other. At a moment when the public debate about race degeneracy 
was increasingly dominated by the “hard” hereditarian framework of mainline eugenics, Hillis 
sought to keep the political problem of race betterment rooted in a Christian ontology of race 
propagation. Throughout his writings during the first and second decades of the twentieth 
century, Hillis sought to redefine Christianity as the “art of right living,” as a “science of man 
building,”3 and as a guide to the “higher spiritual life,”4 arguing that the solution to degeneracy 
and thus the road to national prosperity lay with individuals pledging themselves to what he once 
called the “hygienics of spiritual and mental nature.”5 Hillis’ attempt to transform Christianity 
into spiritual hygienics reflects his commitments as a modernist Protestant minister who sought 
to ontologically reconcile Christianity and evolution in the common purpose of race betterment. 																																																								
3 Newell Dwight Hillis, “Influence of the Invisible; Supreme Need of Man’s Life,” Chicago 
Daily Tribune, June 2, 1907. 
 
4 Newell Dwight Hillis, “The Reconciliation Between Science and Religion,” The Atlanta 
Constitution, Feb. 24, 1901. 
 
5 Newell Dwight Hillis, How the Inner Light Failed (New York: Fleming H. Revell Co., 1898), 
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At the time of the Conference, Hillis was minister of the nationally renowned Plymouth 
Church in Brooklyn, New York, where he had succeeded Henry Ward Beecher and Lyman 
Abbott as pastor. American religious historians identify Hillis as a progressive reformer and a 
modernist Protestant minister.6 As a theological modernist, Hillis sought to reconcile Christianity 
with social Darwinism and higher criticism. In modernizing Christianity, Hillis clearly saw 
himself as continuing a theological and professional tradition initiated by Beecher, one that 
turned to evolutionary thought in order to reimagine Christianity as a “system to make men.”7 
Hillis followed his towering nineteenth century predecessor in characterizing “natural man” as 
the product of a long, divinely ordained evolutionary process, while describing evolution as an 
inherently progressive movement “toward intelligence, genius, beauty, health, happiness, and 
universal culture and character.”8 Indeed, Hillis believed that evolution was “God’s way of doing 
things,”9 while, drawing conclusions much like Beecher’s, he argued that evolution transformed 
Christianity into “the science of man building.”10 In his capacity as minister at Plymouth Church, 
Hillis became a powerful and well-connected public figure who labored to elaborate and 
publicize this new mission for modern Christianity. 
																																																								
6  Martin E. Marty, Modern American Religion: The Irony of it All 1893-1919 (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1986), 36. 
 
7 In a speech in which Beecher argued that Christianity and evolution had the same purpose, 
Beecher insisted, “[r]eligion is the art of putting men on to an anvil and hammering them out into 
perfect manhood.” Beecher argued that there was no difference between this conceptualization of 
Christianity and the evolutionary theory expounded by Herbert Spencer. Newell Dwight Hillis, 
ed., Lectures and Orations by Henry Ward Beecher (New York: Fleming H. Revell, 1913), 316. 
 
8 Hillis, “Influence of the Invisible.” 	9	Hillis, “The Reconciliation Between Science and Religion.”	
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Like Beecher, Hillis was influenced by Hebert Spencer. Spencer’s ideas allowed Hillis to 
moralize evolutionary advancement as a matter of individual initiative and development, with the 
habits, or, in Hillis’ idiom, the “soul culture,” of one generation positively or negatively 
impacting the comportments of future generations.11 Spencer envisioned personal character as 
the vehicle of evolutionary uplift, a viewpoint that, as far as Hillis was concerned, left room for 
the influence of Christianity in both the transformation of individual lives and the regeneration of 
the race. In embracing the Spencerian evolutionism, Hillis was forced to square with Spencer’s 
notion of the “survival of the fittest” and thus the evolutionary value of death as a selective force. 
Yet while Hillis accepted the elimination of the unfit as a law of nature and, therefore, as 
something in accordance with God’s will,12 he was more often inclined to see the social burden 
of unfitness as a challenge to Christianity to transform the weak, sickly, and “ignorant” classes 
and thus make the social body a more efficient “organism.”13   
Anglo-American Protestants and the Problem of Race Degeneracy 
 
 At the turn of the twentieth century, a significant number of Protestant leaders in the 
United States and Britain began to define race degeneracy as a religious problem. The 
development testifies to the extent to which Protestant religiosity had become tangled up with 
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hereditarian questions related to evolutionism and race. It also underscores how much Protestant 
leaders had become committed to the idea that God sought to realize his redemptive purposes 
through race propagation. In the United States, race degeneracy challenged the heightening sense 
of racial election shared by Anglo-American racial theists at the century’s turn, especially their 
perceived providential role in the Christianization of the world. But race degeneracy was not 
exclusively tied to white Protestant imperialism. It more broadly challenged racial theists’ 
conceptions of social order and Christian progress, conceptions that could be just as concerned 
with domestic problems related to industrialization and urbanization as they were with imperial 
expansion. 
 An early treatment of race degeneracy as a religious problem appeared with Josiah 
Strong’s 1893 work, The New Era, a book that followed his incredibly popular 1885 nationalistic 
treatise, Our Country. In both works, Strong identified Christian progress with the march of 
Anglo-Saxon civilization, effectively arguing that Anglo-Saxons had a mandate from God to 
carry “its civilization, like a ring of Saturn –a girdle of light, -around the globe.”14 Subscribing to 
evolutionism, Strong imagined race propagation as a Christian method of progress, but he 
believed that Christian civilization often undermined this method. In The New Era, Strong 
argued that, through charity and eleemosynary institutions aimed at the moral and physical 
reform of individuals, Christian civilization perpetuated the “weak in body and mind.” The 
Christian impulse to protect the abject thwarted God’s evolutionary plan by allowing the “weak 
members of civilized society to perpetuate their kind.” “No one who has attended to the breeding 
of domestic animals,” Strong averred, “will doubt that this must be highly injurious to the 
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race.”15 In asserting that Christians had a duty to eliminate the weak, Strong was promoting 
social Darwinism. But he was also arguing that, as a divine method, race propagation must 
necessarily eliminate the sources of degeneracy that undermined it. The propagation of weakness 
vitiated the race, qualified its sovereignty, and thwarted its redemptive mission. Strong’s work 
has been cited to document the development of Anglo-American “muscular Christianity,”16 as 
his social Darwinism was animated by an aversion to weakness that he often expressed in 
gendered terms.17 Indeed, Strong’s work evinces important ways in which the struggle against 
race degeneracy mobilized Christian rhetorics and affectations of manhood. 
 For Strong, degeneracy preponderated within the lower strata of white society and within 
the ranks of immigrants who were coming to the United States in larger and larger numbers at 
the century’s turn. His racial theism, which supposed that the Anglo-Saxon represented a 
superior race both morally and spiritually and which tasked this race with the building of a global 
Christian civilization, supported the approaches that he recommended for eliminating 
degeneracy. In the first case, he believed that the “better elements of society,” which Strong 
associated with the “higher classes,” must in self-defense level up the lower.18 This entailed 
religious, educational, and economic strategies aimed at augmenting the mental, moral, and 
spiritual competencies of the poor. In the second case, he believed that the country ought to adapt 
a more exclusive immigration policy so as to ensure the “inferior blood” that is “now being 
injected into the veins of the nation […] every day of every year” does not corrupt the Anglo-																																																								
15 Ibid., 34-35. 
 
16 Beryl Satter, Each Mind a Kingdom: American Women, Sexual Purity, and the New Thought 
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Saxon racial body.19 Strong imagined these approaches as a necessary part of protecting the 
innate superiority of the Anglo-Saxon race and preserving its providential mission to build a 
global Christian civilization. 
 By the first decade of the twentieth century, the problem of race degeneracy had become 
an important component of the social gospel, which testifies to the fact that Protestant leaders 
were beginning to associate race degeneracy with a domestic agenda that was primarily focused 
on alleviating issues related to industrialization. Clergymen who identified with the social gospel 
were especially concerned about the deleterious affect that industrialized society was having 
upon racial development.  The issue of race propagation allowed social gospelers to frame 
industrial problems as religious concerns precisely because these problems threatened the 
normal, or Christian, development of the country.  
Social gospelers challenged Americans and their professional colleagues to eliminate the 
sources of degeneracy, which they associated with sinfulness. These sources included habits and 
behaviors exacerbated by industrial life, especially intemperance, sexual vice (e.g., prostitution), 
gambling, and criminality. Social gospelers associated all of these behaviors with moral 
weakness. Like Henry Ward Beecher a few decades earlier, those who embraced social 
Darwinism preached a natural law that assumed evolutionary progresses worked through the 
gradual elimination of moral torpidity. Indeed, evolutionary fitness was understood primarily in 
terms of moral fortitude, which demonstrates how Beecher provided a template for social 
gospelers for reconciling social Darwinism and degeneracy with Christian principles. When 
social gospelers maintained that the weak had to be eliminated in their work to advance God’s 
kingdom in industrialized America, they first and foremost meant the morally enfeebled. Moral 
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enfeeblement (popularly referred to as “feeblemindedness”), they argued, was propagated into 
the race through the reproduction and perpetuity of the criminal and pauper classes. Social 
gospelers often saw the struggle against race degeneracy as a fight against these classes as 
sources of immorality that vitiated the race from within and stymied the advance of God’s 
kingdom.   
 Samuel Z. Batten, for example, was a prominent Baptist minister from Lincoln, 
Nebraska, who made the struggle against race degeneracy an important part of his social gospel 
platform. Along with Walter Rauschenbush, Batten was one of the founding members of the 
social gospel movement.20 His 1909 social gospel treatise, The Christian State, attempted to 
think about statecraft as an apparatus through which one could achieve the “perfection of the 
collective life of humanity.”21 As part of its ministrations, Batten argued, the Christian state must 
necessarily eliminate the sources of degeneracy. The state is under “obligation to remove the 
causes which make the criminal,” Batten averred. The state must take “adequate precautions” to 
“prevent the continuous creation of such dependent and defective classes.” Batten advocated 
“prevention” over “reformation,” which meant that he believed that the state was bound to block 
the propagative cycle that produced degeneracy within the race. In a 1908 article published in 
The American Journal of Sociology, Batten argued that degeneracy was a propagative issue and 
that the struggle to eliminate it therefore necessitated a partnership between Christianity and 
science. “In fact as time goes by the Christian spirit will call to its aid scientific knowledge and 
medical skill,” Batten opined, so that “modern society, having an intelligent concern for its own 																																																								
20 In 1910, Batten and Mathews collaborated on the “Social Service Series,” a book projected 
attempting to define and outline the social mission of Christianity in modern times. Box 5, 
Folder 6. Shailer Mathews Papers, University of Chicago Library, Chicago, IL. 
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interests and striving for the progress and perfection of the race, will not be willing to allow the 
unfit and defective to survive and perpetuate their kind to the disadvantage and detriment of 
society.”22  
 Race degeneracy was often framed in overtly classist and racist terms. Its theorists often 
argued that race degeneracy was rooted in “differential fertility.” The race was in decline and 
perhaps even on the verge of extinction, the argument went, because those of the best American 
racial stock were being out-reproduced by poor whites and immigrants, people who, given their 
supposedly impoverished heredity, perpetuated degeneracy through reproduction. The argument 
testifies to the widespread assumption at the time that moral weakness, social abjectness, and bad 
heredity were all interrelated. The crisis of “race suicide,” which portended the decline of old 
stock Anglo-America and the extinction of the American way of life, was especially acute in the 
United States during the first three decades of the twentieth century. The issue of differential 
fertility led many Americans, Protestant clergy included, to speculate that the native stock would 
be overwhelmed and ultimately effaced by more fecund populations.  
The moral crisis of racial decline brought prominent ministers like Batten and Newell 
Dwight Hillis to mainline eugenics. Eugenics proposed practical measures to correct the problem 
of differential fertility and restore the rightful and “natural” relations of power that were 
supposed to exist between the morally strong and the morally weak. These measures included 
immigration restriction and the segregation –and even asexualization –of the unfit, measures that 
promised to end the propagation of degeneracy and to bring moral order to industrial society. 
Protestant clergymen in both the United States and England –two countries that had strong public 
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support for eugenics –began to see the churches and eugenics as partners in a modern struggle 
for moral purity against the hereditarian sources of human sinfulness. 
 The problem of race degeneracy compelled many Protestant leaders to think about how 
religion could become a racially regenerative force. Their focus often fell on the ways in which 
Christianity could normatively guide reproduction by strengthening the social significance 
marriage among the affluent classes. In 1912, F.B. Meyer, Chairman of the National Council of 
Public Morals for Great Britain and Greater Britain, published a small book entitled, Religion 
and Race Regeneration, with Cassell and Company in New York. The Council’s motto 
underscored the nationalistic dimensions of race betterment. “The foundations of National Glory 
[sic] are set in the homes of the people. They will only remain unshaken while the family life of 
our race and nation is strong, simple, and pure.”23  
Meyer argued that religion was uniquely suited to lead the work of race regeneration, as 
the natural purpose of religion was to guide the instinctual impulse for marriage and family. 
Religion alone, Meyer insisted, “gives ultimate authority, permanence, and driving power; she 
alone deals with aspects of human nature which are fundamental to man’s well-being and 
progress; and she alone has that note of universality which is characteristic of the race-instinct.” 
“The religious and racial instincts are alike universal,” Meyer reasoned. “They spring from the 
same source, move towards the same end, fulfill the same purposes.” Religion, therefore, should 
lead the fight against race degeneracy by guiding the “racial instinct” to the noble purpose of 
Christian marriage, where such an instinct would find its “final consummation and crown.”24  
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 Meyer proposed his theory as an answer to the problem of differential fertility, which 
was rooted in the general confusion that modern society introduced with respect to sex and 
family life. Christianity could normalize reproduction among the affluent classes by making the 
“symbol of mother and child” its most sacred sign.25 This made Christianity and eugenics 
partners in the propagation of a better race, Meyers suggested. Christianity would supply the 
emotive energy necessary for re-sanctifying marriage and family, while eugenics would supply 
scientific methods and knowledge of heredity in the great work of race regeneration.26 
 Meyer’s work testifies to the extent to which middle class Christianity in Britain and the 
United States had become tangled up with race propagation. For Meyer, the most sacred function 
of the church was the hallowing of marriage, a function that anchored religion in natural law and 
gave it an important role in the ministration of social life. “The Church,” he declared, “abdicates 
her function if she does not fulfill this ancient role.”27 The church was to adapt this ancient role 
to modern problems by correcting a sex desire gone awry. The seductive attractions of urbanized 
life, Meyers reasoned, confused the sex instinct and detached it from its sacred purpose –namely, 
marriage and family. In becoming detached from these divine ends, the sex instinct threatened 
the life of the race by introducing disease and corrupting the body. Desire, Meyer wrote, should 
first and foremost be directed towards love and “secondly [towards] the perpetuation of the 
race.”28 When it was directed toward these ends, desire served as the very foundation for social 
order and promised to restore social harmony. As a racially regenerative force, Christianity had 
																																																								
25 Ibid., 34. 
 
26 Ibid., 22. 
 
27 Ibid., 34. 
 
28 Ibid., 53. 
		
	
118 
to train this desire to seek its higher purpose: it “becomes the Church to bestir herself, and 
prepare a regenerated race to enter and possess the new era; and with the loftier conception of 
wedlock there shall come a statelier Eden back to men.”29  
 Protestant leaders defined race degeneracy as a religious problem because they had come 
to see propagation as the natural function of religion. Religious authority, which was an authority 
rooted in natural law, was a power directed towards racial development and national advance. It 
was a power that defined itself in terms of the propagation of bodies, especially the moral 
faculties. Race degeneracy brought many Anglo-American ministers to view the churches and 
eugenics as natural allies in the quest to eliminate moral weakness and to bring order to modern 
urban society. 
Hillis and Race Degeneracy 
  
By the time of the 1914 Conference, Newell Dwight Hillis had developed a theory of 
degeneracy that accorded both with his Lamarckian sensibilities and his ideological and 
professional commitments as a Protestant clergyman. Although Hillis accepted the idea that 
degeneracy resulted when the natural destruction of unfitness was thwarted, he preferred to see 
degeneracy as moral and spiritual unfitness that resulted from the disuse of specific faculties. In 
an 1898 work entitled, How the Inner Light Failed, for example, Hillis ventured an “analysis of 
the causes of religious atrophy.”30 Employing a Lamarckian understanding of heredity, Hillis 
advanced the following maxim: “With nature and God one law is inexorable –he who disuses or 
misuses a faculty must lose it.”31 Arguing that the “reality of the religious life [is] the logical 
																																																								
29 Ibid., 62.	
 
30 Hillis, How the Inner Light Failed, 25. 
 
31 Ibid., 9. 
		
	
119 
flower and fruitage of the great process of evolution, 32 Hillis believed that religious atrophy was 
a degenerative force: “Like the faculty of reason, of judgment, or of memory, the religious sense 
becomes strong through culture and exercise, or weak through neglect and want of 
nourishment.”33 The principal task of Christianity was, therefore, to reawaken and strengthen the 
spiritual sense, with Hillis declaring, “The problem of our day is the problem of the revival of the 
spiritual faculty in order to the bringing of the higher life and arts.”34  
In identifying a spiritual faculty apart from other faculties like reason, judgment, and 
memory, Hillis was trying to protect the authenticity of religious expression from rationalism, 
empiricism, and the threats of modern naturalism. But Hillis was also endeavoring to show that 
the spiritual sense was fundamental to the advance of American civilization. It is unclear what, 
precisely, Hillis had in mind by a spiritual faculty, but it definitely referred to the moral and 
aesthetic ability to know what “clean living” entailed, the capacity to appreciate the beauty and 
integrity of such living, and the potential to seek it for oneself. Most generally, spiritual faculty 
referred to the capacity to “subordinate things that are low to faculties that are high.”35 More 
specifically, however, the spiritual sense referred to the desire to seek God, which was not a 
dogmatic exercise but a meditative and contemplative one. Throughout his career, Hillis 
endorsed a Christianity that emphasized “soul-culture” and mental and moral activities that 
forced people to withdraw from the frenzy of trade and commerce and to enter a space in which 
they could reflect upon eternal things. Thus, for example, Hillis endorsed Bible reading, with 
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Hillis viewing the Bible as a “guidebook to right living” and the teacher of a “few great 
simplicities and eternal verities.”36  
Hillis’ 1898 work, How the Inner Light Failed, represents an extended study of 
degeneracy from the perspective of a clergyman. Hillis argued that the pastimes and 
preoccupations of modern life were to blame for the growing atrophy of the spiritual sense, 
which led to a breakdown in morality, especially at the lower levels of American society. “The 
tendency of modern life,” Hillis averred, “is to make men spiritual dwarfs, so that multitudes 
who are physically matured remain children in the spiritual realm.”37 Challenging the eugenic 
claim that national life was decreasing because old stock Americans were failing to reproduce 
themselves, Hillis asserted that the real issue with respect to degeneracy rested not with the 
decline of this stock per se, but with atrophy of the higher religious ideals that they had 
championed. The “hygienics of the spiritual and the mental nature” that were a part of Puritan 
life, Hillis wailed, were becoming “almost unknown in our land.” (27) For Hillis, the fight 
against degeneracy thus revolved around the inculcation of American religious ideals that could 
grow the spiritual faculties of the multitudes.  
Hillis followed Beecher in viewing human nature as a struggle against animality and in 
associating animality with human organismic existence. In How the Inner Light Failed, for 
example, Hillis described the fall of Samson as a failed struggle against his animal nature. 
Samson’s “passions,” Hillis wrote, “were fiends that lurked in ambush within his body. Once the 																																																								
36 It is worth noting what Hillis included among such verities: “God, and His all-loving 
providence; Christ as the revelation of the divinest and ideal elements in the soul, a master, a 
teacher, and savior; the peril of disobedience to the law; liberty through obedience, the 
supremacy of conscience, the law of love, service and self-sacrifice, and the hope of personal 
immorality as the recovery out of the mistakes and sins of the life that now is.” Hillis, “The 
Reconciliation Between Science and Religion.” 
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tension of his moral nature was loosened he plunged into sin.”38 “The essense of the wretched 
story,” Hillis concluded, “is that, sinning against his finer feelings, slowly the spiritual sense in 
the man had been destroyed until, in the pathetic words of the writer, it is said: ‘Samson wist 
[sic] not that God had departed from him.”39 As his interpretation of Samson’s fall suggests, 
Hillis believed that humans were a composite of spiritual and animal forces, with Hillis insisting 
that the decline of a culture led to the diminishment of the spiritual and the aggrandizement of 
the animal, or to the privileging of the primitive, instinctual, or baser components of human 
nature over its divine-like attributes. This evolutionary framework provided Hillis with a register 
for understanding racial differences. What distinguished one racial stock from another was its 
propensity to animality or, on the contrary, its ability to transcend its animal nature. This 
evolutionary framework also defined the purpose of religion, which was to strengthen the 
spiritual faculties and to grow them into maturity. Doing so had a positive propagative effect on 
the development of a race and facilitated the upward evolution of life. Developing the spiritual 
faculties over the course of several generations had an inborn influence on human nature in so far 
as it diminished the animal within. Stoking the “inner light,” in other words, would lift the 
human organism into a higher plane of existence. 
Hillis imagined that, as a guide to clean living, Christianity could not only reawaken 
spiritual faculties, but moreover, that Christianity was fundamental to race betterment as a 
project for ensuring the perpetuity and advance of Christian civilization. As a “science” dealing 
with the subjective space of moral ideals, Christianity was fundamental to civilizational advance 
because, as Hillis saw it, “The only way to develop the civilization on the outside is to develop 
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manhood on the inside.”40 As I discuss below, there were many at the 1914 Conference who 
would have joined Hillis in seeing a direct link between Christian righteousness, health, and 
national prosperity. 
Hillis’ participation at the first Race Betterment Conference has been cited to document 
the enthusiasm and support that many modernist Protestant ministers demonstrated for eugenics 
in the early twentieth century.41 It is important to keep in mind, however, that Hillis rejected the 
hard hereditarianism advanced by mainline eugenicists. In fact, that he initiated and helped 
organize the Conference indicates that he was more interested in setting the debate over race 
betterment on what he believed were its proper epistemological grounds than he was in heeding 
the rising orthodoxy in race betterment advanced by mainliners.  
During the same year as the Conference, for example, Hillis served on an expert advisory 
committee sponsored by the Eugenics Record Office, a mainline eugenics agency. With Hillis 
participating as an expert on “religion and morals,” the purpose of the committee was to “study 
and to report on the best practical means of cutting off the defective germ-plasm in the American 
population.”42 Led by the now notorious Harry H. Laughlin, one of the primary purposes of the 
committee was to explore and advocate the segregation and sterilization of the unfit as a practical 
measure for eliminating degeneracy.43 Hillis was drawn to the results promised by mainline 
eugenicists with respect to race betterment. He even clearly supported the segregation and 																																																								
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sterilization of the unfit as a means to ending the propagative cycle of degeneracy. Yet he 
ultimately refused to believe the eugenics’ tenet that Christian nurture was more or less 
powerless to transform human nature, with Hillis insisting that Christian institutions possessed 
the power to resolve the issue of racial decline. 
 This was the message of the paper that Hillis delivered for the 1914 Race Betterment 
Conference. Entitled, “Factory Degeneration,” Hillis opened his paper by declaring that the 
“[t]ime has gone by when we can say any longer that race degeneracy is simply a bugaboo 
created by pessimists and alarmists.” As Hillis exhorted his fellow Conference participants, “The 
simple fact that a tide of degeneracy is rolling in upon us, and the time has come to recognize the 
fact that unless drastic measures are taken, the whole standard of civilization will have to change 
in order to avoid race extinction.”44  While Hillis was supposed to talk specifically about how the 
factory classes propagated degeneracy, he instead reflected upon a “singular breakdown in and 
decay of morals” that affected all classes, rich and poor, native and immigrant,45 viewing the 
source of this “tide of degeneracy” as a failure of Americans at all social levels to live up to the 
higher ideals of Christianity. Observing the impact of this plague of degeneracy upon the 
evolution of the race, he stated, “One half of our people are God-fearing, law-loving, pure-living, 
and their children and descendants are growing taller, handsomer, healthier, happier. The other 
half is living for pleasure, the body and animalism, and their descendants are deteriorating in 
health, and will finally drop out of the world.”46 Hillis decided to close his paper with a 
cautionary word about degeneracy that waxed optimistic with respect to the prospects of the 
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race: “The people are waking up. There is to be an elect group, an aristocracy of health. Instead 
of the race breaking down, there is to be a new stock, taller, stronger, healthier, handsomer. [Yet] 
it is for the people of this nation to remember that he who sows to the flesh shall of the flesh reap 
corruption.” Hillis intended his conclusion to apply to all Americans, while, in contrast to 
mainline eugenicists, he trusted in the power of Christian institutions to eradicate degeneracy, 
uplift immigrants, and “reap health, happiness, peace and social prosperity.”47 
The Race Betterment Conference 
In helping to organize the First Conference on Race Betterment, Hillis endeavored to 
initiate an informed and inclusive debate about the nature of, and appropriate solutions to, race 
degeneracy,48 which he, like his colleagues, saw as one of the preeminent political problems of 
the day. Given its inclusivity, the Conference can be seen as a microcosm of a larger professional 
discussion within the religious, medical, and scientific communities about how to secure the 
moral, intellectual, and physical evolution of the population. Although the Conference sought to 
place the problem of race betterment on firm scientific footing,49 the construction of race 
betterment as a political problem included both an implicit and explicit commitment to 
Christianity as a set of spiritual ideals for guiding evolutionary work. In this respect, the 
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Conference underscores three important aspects with respect to the role that liberal Protestant 
Christianity played in early twentieth century biopolitics.  
First, professionals and progressive reformers (including ministers like Hillis) could 
hardly construct degeneracy as a political problem apart from a hereditarian framework that tied 
fitness to the perpetuity of the nation. Hence, one of the primary purposes of the Conference was 
to investigate degeneracy as the “loss or impairment of the qualities peculiar to the race,”50 
which involved treating the issue of degeneracy as a political issue of national consequence. In 
this way, race betterment was a way of conceptually and affectively constructing public health as 
a biopolitical exigency. In fact, it was a way of constructing public health as the political 
problem, par excellence. Yet as a political problem, degeneracy was understood as much as a 
breakdown in morality and idealism as it was a matter of the physical deterioration of the body 
politic. This meant that many professionals and progressive reformers like Hillis often saw race 
betterment as a religious issue of moral and spiritual decay just as much as a physiological one.  
Second, the Conference proceedings indicate that the appropriate epistemology for 
approaching degeneracy as a hereditarian issue was unsettled within the medical, scientific, and 
progressive reform communities, as advocates of “soft” heredity clashed with proponents of 
“hard” heredity over the best way to ensure the evolutionary development of the race. Indeed, 
representatives of “euthenics,” who subscribed to a Lamarckian understanding of heredity, 
cautioned Conference attendees by insisting that any lasting program for the evolutionary 
advance of the race had to be firmly rooted in a science dedicated to the “betterment of living 
conditions” in addition to direct eugenic interventions into human heredity.51 The palpable 
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defensiveness demonstrated by advocates of euthenics with respect to mainline eugenicists’ 
claims underscores the fact that professional eugenicists were beginning to dominate the race 
betterment debate. (By the 1920s, they would have all but vanquished Lamarckians from the 
conversation about race betterment.) Yet nearly all Conference attendees agreed that the 
promulgation of middle class Christian ideals of moral righteousness, self-sacrifice, and industry 
were important goals of race betterment.  
Finally, reconceived as a set of spiritual ideals that could inspire and direct human action, 
liberal Protestantism played an important role in the production of race betterment as a mode of 
“governmentality,” which involved not only the development of public health as the principal 
object of modern, scientific statecraft, but also the production of a citizenry who self-identified 
and self-regulated as subjects of health.52 Put differently, Protestant Christianity assisted in the 
promulgation of health as both a moral system and an ethics of political belonging and 
enfranchisement.  
For example, conceiving Christianity as a kind of hygienic piety, some Conference 
participants redefined religion through the subjective space of idealism and personal 
righteousness. Addressing the issue of sexual hygiene, the Secretary of the Iowa State Board of 
Health declared, “Christianity is the one plan ordained of God that will save, hence the inner life 
we live must be under the control of the teachings of the lowly Nazarene. [G]irls must be taught 																																																																																																																																																																																		
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the sacredness of their bodies, and men should learn that the honor of women is a God-given 
grace and not to be violated.”53 The participant’s remarks suggest that the Christian belief in a 
personal God as well as Christian ideals of purity and righteousness were important ways in 
which Conference attendees sought to moralize race betterment as a practice of self-culture, 
while the remarks also underscore how these “pioneers” of public health and medicine attempted 
to reconcile their scientific professionalism with their liberal Protestant faiths.54  The 
Conference’s organizers also saw the need for race betterment to be guided by spiritual ideals, 
with some justifying the moral and ethical aspects of race betterment by appealing to the 
production of a more spiritual race. Quoting the co-discoverer of natural selection and defender 
of spiritualism, Alfred Russell Wallace, Stephen Smith opened the Conference by asking, 
“[W]hat more pointed lesson can be taught as to the conduct of our own lives and our duties to 
the race than that this life is ‘in preparation for the enduring spiritual life to which [the race] is 
destined’[?]”55   
In light of these points, Hillis’ work reflects broader trends within the development of 
modernism to re-conceptualize Christianity as a relevant and potent force in race betterment. 
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Race betterment represented an opportunity for modernist ministers like Hillis to refashion and 
strengthen the power of Christianity in the fight against racial decline, making it possible to 
champion Christianity as the preeminent philosophy of self-government, or to use Hillis’ idiom, 
as the highest art of right living. 
Hillis and Racial Theism 
 Hillis’ views on racial theism played a decisive role in his engagement with eugenics. On 
the one hand, Hillis believed that the descendants of colonial Anglo-America represented an 
elect racial stock, ordained to lead God’s evolutionary work. On the other hand, Hillis believed 
that the real fruit of Anglo-American racial superiority lay not in its heredity but in its distinctive 
religious life, one that he believed persisted in American institutions and culture. In an article 
that he published in The Atlanta Constitution on February 14, 1901, and entitled, “The 
Reconciliation between Science and Religion,” Hillis asserted his faith in the “reality of the 
religious life as the logical flower and fruitage of the great process of evolution.”56 This article of 
faith allowed Hillis to remain relatively unfazed by predictions of race suicide as the higher 
ideals of American culture, he believed, were firmly set to lead the American population out of 
the clutches of degeneracy. The evolutionary work of God to propagate a better human race 
should proceed not first and foremost through racially hygienic measures that attempted to 
normalize the declining fecundity of America’s racially elect, but moreover, through the 
inculcation of the higher personal and social ideals of American religious life at all levels of 
society. Subscribing to a Lamarckian understanding of heredity that stressed the preeminence of 
culture over biology, Hillis believed that, over several generations and with careful effort, 
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American religious ideals would solve the problem of degeneracy by unfolding a higher spiritual 
comportment in all classes and groups. 
 On February 27, 1919, Hillis responded to a popular eugenic tract entitled, “The Coming 
Extinction of the Mayflower Descendants” in a short editorial that he wrote for The Atlanta 
Constitution. As its title suggests, the tract argued that, given their present rate of reproduction, 
the descendants of the Mayflower would soon be extinct. Published to mark the three hundredth 
anniversary of the voyage of the Mayflower Pilgrims, the tract also advanced the biologistic 
claim that American national life would die out along with the Mayflower descendants. The kind 
and quality of American national life, the tract maintained, depended upon the perpetuation of 
those bodies that had helped produce it. In the opening of his editorial, Hillis agreed with the 
conclusion of the eugenic tract. The “Mayflower carried a political and spiritual cargo,” he 
wrote, “the most precious in the history of the world.” Indeed, Hillis continued, “The mere 
thought of the extinction of the old Puritan stock stirs alarm in all lovers of liberty and their 
native land.”57 
 The hereditarian language that Hillis deployed to imagine the greatness of the Pilgrims as 
an elect stock testifies to the extent to which he maintained racially theistic ideas. “[O]ne drop of 
that blood,” Hillis insisted to his readers, “went further than any blood known to history.” Hillis 
believed that the Pilgrims (who he also referred to as “Puritans”) were hereditarily elect, 
representing the best religious minds that Europe had to offer. “All Europe was sifted for men of 
independent minds; then these original thinkers were sifted to obtain the Puritans, some of whom 
remained in England [...] and some of whom […] came to this country.” Hillis then attested to 
the definitive role that the Pilgrims had played in the development of American national life. “To 																																																								
57 Newell Dwight Hillis, “The Coming Extinction of the Mayflower Descendants,” The Atlanta 
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take the influence of these Puritans out of our history,” he maintained, “would be like taking 
Moses from the Jewish people, like taking Caesar out of Rome, or the Magna Charta out of 
England’s life.” After evincing the “influence of the Puritan blood” by listing all of the great men 
who had come out of a “single little town like Northampton, Massachusetts,” Hillis tersely 
concluded, “The extinction of this old Puritan stock would be a calamity to the world.”58  
 While testifying to the biological superiority of Puritan stock, however, Hillis insisted 
that, despite their declining numbers, descendants of this illustrious American pedigree 
continued to influence American national life through their cultural legacy. The argument 
contradicted the thesis maintained by the eugenic tract, which, in a biologistic idiom 
characteristic of mainline eugenics discourse, maintained that national life was disappearing 
along with the decline of old stock American pedigrees. “No one who has widely traveled in the 
forty-eight states of this country but realizes the immeasurable influence of the descendants of 
the Mayflower upon our education, our literature, our art, our science, our politics and our 
religion,” Hillis wrote, effectively arguing that the continued influence of the Pilgrims on 
national life should be measured not in terms of the biological perpetuity of their stock, but in 
terms of the impact that they continued to exert through the higher idealism of American culture. 
“In the United States,” Hillis reasoned, “the people are informed and trained by four things: 
conversation, the press and literature, political problems and religion. Now these are precisely 
the four realms in which the children of the Mayflower have wrought and made themselves 
immortal.”59 While the descendants of the Pilgrims represented a providentially elect stock that 
possessed prodigious moral, spiritual, and intellectual gifts, the true measure of their influence 
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was not their blood or germ plasm but the influence they now immortally exerted through 
American cultural institutions. 
 Hillis believed that degeneracy represented a hereditary threat to the development of the 
country, a fact attested to not only by his involvement in the Race Betterment Conference but 
also his aforementioned participation in the ERO expert advisory committee organized by Harry 
Laughlin. Hillis’ personal support for the eugenic initiatives recommended by the committee 
(e.g., sterilization of the unfit) was no doubt shaped by his racial theism and the idea that 
America needed to be protected from the hereditary threat of degeneracy. In the conclusion to its 
report (a report that we must believe Hillis himself endorsed), the committee made explicit the 
eugenic connection between national life and the protection of the white racial body: “If America 
is to escape the doom of nations generally, it must breed good Americans. The fall of every 
nation in history has been due to many causes, but always chiefest [sic] among these causes has 
been the decline of the national stock.”60 Yet while his racial theism justified his endorsement of 
eugenic interventions that sought to protect and preserve the national germ plasm, Hillis tended 
to champion a view of race uplift that located the source of American greatness in its culture and 
not, as eugenicists maintained, in its biology. As previously discussed, Hillis characteristically 
took a wider view of propagation, one that prioritized the inculcation of religious ideals as a 
means to uplifting degenerate bodies and for propagating national identity. 
 Hillis’ engagement with eugenics testifies to the important ways in which the question of 
race propagation imbricated modernist and eugenic agendas. Modernists did not simply endorse 
eugenic initiatives out of respect for the growing influence of science, but moreover, because 
they believed that Christian ideals (and Anglo-American Protestant religious life more generally) 																																																								
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had real consequences for the development of the national body. They assumed that heredity 
played an important role in the development of this body but many also continued to assume 
that, like Bushnell and Beecher, heredity was shaped by perpetual reciprocity between biology 
and culture. Thus, while physiology perpetuated innate differences between racial stocks, 
physiology was, for better or worse, always being reciprocally shaped by cultural influences. 
This meant that modernists like Hillis often embraced ideas that twenty-first century Americans 
would identify as racist. It also meant that they frequently insisted that the degenerative 
condition of a stock’s biology was too great to be overcome by culture, a position that no doubt 
played a part in Hillis’ endorsement of eugenic sterilization. But it is important to observe that, 
given their understanding of heredity as an inter-generationally open interplay between 
physiology and culture, modernists like Hillis were not committed to biological determinism in 
the same way mainline eugenicists were. Especially during the first two decades of the twentieth 
century, many modernists emphasized the importance of physiology while maintaining the 
preeminence of culture. This permitted modernists to read national identity and racial uplift as a 
relatively open nature-nurture dynamic. This is also what made it possible for religious leaders 
like Hillis to confidently assert that Anglo-American Christianity was a real and effective 
propagative power. 
 Modernist views on race overlapped with, but were ultimately separable from, their 
understanding of heredity. While mainline eugenics testifies to the fact that racism had become a 
scientifically respectable position during the early twentieth century, the varying sensibilities 
displayed by American clergymen with respect to race as a biological category underscore the 
fact that there were different kinds of racisms and, moreover, that these racisms corresponded 
with different scientific positions on the nature of heredity. Hillis, for example, dismissed 
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eugenicists’ claim that miscegenation produced unbalanced progeny. In fact, he argued that race 
mixture produced stronger stocks of men. He also argued that all races were responsive to the 
higher ideals of Christianity, which contradicted eugenicists’ claim that some races and stocks 
were beyond the pale of Christian civilization. As Hillis once avowed, “There are many 
pessimists who are alarmed at [increased immigration]. But let us take no counsel of crouching 
fear. If we do our duty, our free institutions will Americanize and Christianize them, and after 
the blood have been well mixed, there will stand forth in this republic the finest type of man, 
physical, that the world has ever seen.”61 Hence, while frequently espousing views that twenty-
first century Americans would identify as racist, Hillis’ views on race were decidedly different 
than those espoused by leading mainline eugenicists, who insisted that the different inborn 
capacities for civilization possessed by various races were far less pliable. Hillis’ biological 
perception of race coincided with his understanding of heredity and religion, with the former 
referring to something far more plastic than eugenic theories of race admitted and with the latter 
corresponding with a view of human nature that privileged the spiritual over the animal.   
 In 1906, Hillis published The Fortune of the Republic and Other Addresses: Upon the 
America of To-day and To-morrow. The book represents a series of reflections on degeneracy 
and its alleged impact upon American national life. Hillis consciously chose to write the book 
from an optimistic viewpoint and to counter prevailing pessimism regarding the inability of an 
industrializing American society to produce a better body politic. “Everywhere men are saying 
that the country is besotted, that men are sodden in materialism, that every man has his price, that 
graft is universal, and yet, at this very hour, the country is passing through the greatest moral and 
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intellectual awakening it has ever known.”62 Hillis countered many of eugenicists’ claims, but he 
was most forceful about challenging the impact that eugenicists claimed immigrants would have 
on American national life. While mainline eugenicists argued that immigrants represented the 
most depraved and degenerate elements of European stocks, Hillis averred, “These new peoples 
represent the best that the Old World has. Only the strong, the courageous, the self-reliant 
venture far from home, and dare.”63 
Hillis went so far as to insist that all of Europe and Asia could be dropped into the United 
States and successfully integrated into American life.64 If we bring the influence of Anglo-
American religious and cultural ideals to “bear upon men’s conduct,” Hillis declared, these new 
populations will lend strength to the arm and foot of the Republic, and its brain and mind and 
heart, but if we allow the people to go unchristianized and unamericanized [sic] we do so at our 
peril.”65 Hillis’ point was that it was Anglo-American institutions and not Anglo-American 
heredity that defined the essence of the country and perpetuated national life. Through its 
institutions and drawing upon its religious and cultural ideals, native whites could craft a 
righteous body politic out of newly arrived immigrant populations. Hillis admitted that primitive 
or un-American customs might be intractably habituated in the bodies of first generation 
immigrants. Yet he maintained that their children would be pliable and assimilable. “Death 
removes the first generation of foreigners, but the schoolhouse makes their children genuinely 
American, while all the races are becoming one race, because all are scholars as well as patriots 
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–intelligent, with hungry minds, alert, hospitable to every new truth and interest that concerns the 
people of the Republic.”66  
 Hillis’ arguments underscore the fact that modernists’ views on race were quite 
complicated. Clearly, Hillis subscribed to a biological concept of race. Hillis endorsed racial 
theism while at the same time arguing that the legacy of superior Anglo-American stock lay in its 
religio-cultural innovations and not in its heredity. He preached racial equality while at the same 
time praising some racial stocks as spiritually enlightened and denouncing others as depraved. 
During World War I, for example, he attempted to galvanize Americans against the “Huns” by 
describing the Germans as a degenerate people.67 If there is any consistency in Hillis’ arguments 
it rests on his understanding of race propagation itself, which for him described an open and fluid 
relationship between nurture and nature and an abiding faith in the power of Anglo-American 
culture to lift the human out of the animal. For Hillis, race propagation did not first and foremost 
refer to a biological practice of race hygiene as it did for mainline eugenicists. Rather, in the face 
of a racially diversifying United States, it represented an opportunity for the higher idealism of 
American culture to shape a new body politic in the spiritual likeness of its founders.  
Modernism in the Era of Mainline Eugenics 
As a Christian discourse of race propagation, modernism offered powerful tools for 
engaging eugenics and defining the problem of degeneracy during the early twentieth century. 
Viewing Christianity as a method for growing a better body politic, modernists like Hillis 
developed solutions to the problem of degeneracy out of a commitment to updating and adapting 
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Christianity to meet the unique conditions of modern life. As Hillis attests, in so doing they 
directly engaged eugenic arguments, ideas, and practices. Hillis also demonstrates that racial 
theism provided a powerful impetus for modernists to enter the American debate over race 
degeneracy. America, he maintained, was a religious ideal as much as it was a political, cultural, 
or biological entity. Hillis adapted racial theism for an era of increased immigration and rapid 
demographic shifts, attempting to turn it into a more racially inclusive concept that celebrated the 
spiritual superiority of native American stock while at the same time maintaining that this 
spiritual superiority could be propagated into an increasingly racially heterogeneous body politic. 
 Over the course of the first few decades of the twentieth century, modernists often 
sparred with mainline eugenicists over the sources of national identity and the proper bases of 
Christian civilization. Was national identity within the white racial body or was it without, in 
America’s religious, political, and cultural traditions? Was the capacity for civilization an innate 
faculty restricted to certain racial stocks or could it be inculcated through religious ideals? Was 
race betterment simply a matter of better breeding or did it require a broader commitment to 
resolving the inequalities exacerbated by modern society? These were the questions that would 
come to dominate modernist ministers’ engagements with eugenics in the teens and twenties. 
Hillis is somewhat exceptional in this regard, as many modernists sided with eugenicists in 
prioritizing the biological over the social, breeding over environmental initiatives. Many echoed 
eugenicists by insisting that true reform would only come with the better breed. “Put a pig in a 
parlor,” one pro-eugenics minister opined in 1926, “he will make it a sty. Put low human types in 
the best social structure you can picture and in brief time crime, war, industrial disorder, poverty 
and disease will be the result. All reforms –of morality, of government, of the nation, of the 
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social order –await the bettering of the race.”68 Such an argument obviously contrasts with 
Hillis’ own thesis that Anglo-American religious ideals could uplift people from without.  
The differences that emerged between modernists with respect to the power of biology in 
shaping human nature developed as part of an unresolved problem within modernism itself. 
Modernism defined human nature as a spiritual-animal composite, but it left open the question as 
to which side of the hyphen should be prioritized. This openness made modernism amenable to 
very different attitudes about race. Those who, like the minister above, argued that race 
propagation was an inside-out process overwhelmingly maintained that inferior racial stocks 
were inherently incapable of civilization. They also tended to emphasize that such people were 
beyond the pale of Christian influence. The same minister cited above declared to his 
congregants, “Just as the heavy smoke of the many chimnies [sic] settles on the city making a 
black fog which blots out the stars so the bad blood of man’s blackened heredity looks like a 
shroud on the surface of society.” For this minister, true reform was an inside-out process. “No 
better world without first better people!” he shouted to his congregation.69 The version of 
modernism that championed race propagation as an inside-out dynamic defined racial theism in 
explicitly biological terms. As another pro-eugenics minister declared to his congregation in 
1926, “Our pedigree is not merely an ornament that is hung like a necklace about our throats, it is 
something that is burned into our bone and sinew and stamped upon the roots of our being, blood 
of our blood, flesh of our flesh, soul of our soul.”70 
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Hillis, on the other hand, exemplifies those modernists who saw race propagation as an 
outward-in process. He prioritized social reforms and religious instruction as means to 
strengthening the spiritual faculties and uplifting human bodies. His brand of modernism was 
typically much more liberal when it came to racial attitudes precisely because it perceived 
national life as primarily a religious or cultural inheritance rather than a biological one. Race 
betterment was thus a more inclusive concept in so far as it described an uplifting process that 
transpired through social institutions and not through the enhancement of any one particular race 
over another. For Hillis, the concept of “race” as it applied to the issues of “race degeneracy” and 
“race betterment” more accurately referred to the human race and not the white race. This is not 
to say that Hillis eschewed views that would be considered racist by twenty first century 
Americans. He most certainly did not. Rather, it is to underscore the fact that, while he suggested 
native whites were superior, he located American identity within its religious ideals and not its 
blood. 
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CHAPTER 4: THE DIVINE PERSONALITY: SHAILER MATHEWS’ 
EVOLUTIONARY THEISM 
 
“There can be no no-God land between the opposing forces of naturalism and religion. Though we take the wings of 
the telescope and fly to the utmost reach of space, God must be there. Though we descend to the depths of atoms, 
there, too, He must sustain us. Though we trace the course of evolution and social transformation, there, too, must 
God be found. For He is nowhere if He is not there.” 
 
-Shailer Mathews, The Faith of Modernism, 1924  
 
Introduction 
On October 31, 1900, E.W. Hicks from Toulon, Illinois, wrote a letter to Shailer 
Mathews, Professor in the Divinity School at the University of Chicago and editor of the Biblical 
World. “How,” Hicks asked Mathews, “on the principles of natural development applied to the 
Mosaic religion in the Old Testament, are we to account for Jesus of Nazareth being an ethical 
finality? On what principle of natural development do we stop with Jesus?”1 Hicks posed these 
inquiries to Mathews because Mathews was then emerging as an authority on the topic of 
evolution and Christianity. Indeed, Mathews was on his way to becoming one of the great 
systematizers of Protestant modernism in the country. Over the course of the first three decades 
of the twentieth century, Mathews developed arguably the most systematic theological position 
on the theory of evolution as it applied to Christianity. Mathews’ championed a faith that 
envisioned a co-partnership between Christianity and science in the conscientious production of 
a better human race and in so doing he encouraged a generation of Protestant ministers to see 
eugenics as an ally in doing God’s evolutionary work. 
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As part of this theology, Mathews argued that God worked through evolution in order to 
create a being who approached him in spiritual likeness. Mathews attempted to harmonize 
evolution and Christianity through his concept of “personality.” Jesus Christ represented the 
perfect personality evolved by God in mankind, a perfect moral and spiritual nature who 
revealed the promise of evolution itself: a humanity transfigured in the likeness of God. In his 
response to Hicks, Mathews admitted that accepting Jesus as the ethical finality of evolution 
represented an article of faith and not a tenet of science. Such was the main principle of the 
“faith of modernism” that Mathews developed over the course of his career. Through evolution, 
God was unfolding a spiritual nature in humankind, a nature that was both subject to and apart 
from the mechanics of the material order. While it defied physical laws of nature, Mathews 
insisted to Hicks, the reality of human freedom required that one accept the notion of personality 
as a matter of fact. In this way, Jesus represented Mathews’ abiding, and perhaps impossible, 
hope in evolution as an ethical and spiritual process. 
 Mathews’ concept of personality bears remarkable similarity to Horace Bushnell’s notion 
of sovereignty, yet the two theistic tenets are ultimately quite different. Both refer to the idea that 
human nature is simultaneously within and without the organismic processes of life, bearing a 
relationship to physiology that is at once immanent and transcendent, a part of and apart from, 
the material order of cause and effect. Hence, Mathews wrote in his reply to Hicks, “So long as 
there is any personality, so long must we hold that the chain of cause and effect has been 
superceded by freedom. The limits of this freedom it is perhaps hard to state precisely, but that it 
exists anyone must admit who admits personality at all.”2 In other words, so long as one accepts 
free will, Mathews believed, one accepts the notion of personality.  
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Unlike Bushnell’s concept of sovereignty, however, personality did not denote racial 
superiority. Personality was not a principle of racial theism, but, one might say, evolutionary 
theism, since by it Mathews was not suggesting that some races were more transcendent with 
respect to material causality than others. As an evolutionary concept, personality was premised 
upon the idea of human animality. Humans had evolved like any other organism and human 
nature thus shared in animal life. Unlike animals, however, humans possessed personality, which 
referred to an immaterial or spiritual capacity to rise above the material chain of cause and effect 
and aspire to higher ideals revealed by God in Christ. Mathews believed that all racial stocks 
possessed personality, none more or less than others. This meant that all races were equally 
prone to animality and succumbing to a life dominated by animal impulses. Christianity was thus 
not the special providence of a particular “godly seed” as it was for Bushnell, but rather, a 
revelation for all humankind regarding God’s evolutionary designs. 
 The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate that not all modernists supported eugenics 
out of a commitment to racial theism. Eugenics received considerable support from modernists 
whose evolutionary commitments focused on the uplift of the human race and not on the 
protection of national identity through the enhancement of the white racial body. Mathews 
supported eugenic regulation of marriage as part of a theistic commitment to viewing redemption 
in evolutionary terms and not racial ones. For him, the eugenic control of reproductive relations 
represented a way of evolving a higher spiritual nature in humankind. He supported the 
prohibition of marriage among the morally degenerate. He also supported eugenics as a method 
for fostering higher ideals of parenthood. Yet Mathews eschewed racial thinking. In fact, he 
thought scientific racism was simply social prejudice projected onto human biology. The notion 
of white racial superiority was a habit of thought, he insisted, and not a scientific reality.  
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Mathews engaged eugenic thought and practice, therefore, not as a way of building or 
strengthening national life through the hereditary development of the white race but as a way of 
fighting against animality as a general human condition. For him, the fight against animality 
described a human struggle and not a racial one. Propagation denoted an outside-in process that 
uplifted the human race through the development of a higher spiritual nature, a humanity that 
would overcome its selfish animal impulses by aspiring to the spirit of cooperation and service 
that he believed was embodied by Christ. The evolutionary paradox of the human animal meant 
that biological interventions proposed by eugenicists were necessary. Animality imposed 
physical limitations on the development of the spiritual and this meant that some people were far 
too animalistic and thus beyond the pale of spiritual uplift. Mathews therefore endorsed eugenic 
initiatives as part of his evolutionary struggle to uplift the human animal.  
 Mathews understood eugenics as the application of hereditary knowledge to societal 
development. He did not think that eugenics was inherently racist, although he was certainly well 
aware of the fact that Americans supported eugenic initiatives out of racial prejudice. As simply 
the study and social application of hereditary knowledge, Mathews saw eugenics as a useful tool 
for Christianity in its evolutionary struggle against degeneracy. Staunchly opposing race 
nationalism and other dispositions of the personality that he would have seen as outmoded and 
regressive, Mathews rejected eugenics as both a practice of race hygiene and an ideology of 
racial theism. His belief that the social application of hereditary knowledge could benefit the 
creation of a Christian society, therefore, speaks to the fact that eugenics was adaptable to a 
number of modernist visions, some of which were explicitly anti-racist in orientation. His 
insistence that animality imposed material restraints on the development of personhood meant 
that modernists who stood against racial prejudice saw eugenics as potent tool or method for 
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eliminating impediments to a Christian society. Through his work, Mathews endorsed the 
eugenic restriction of marriage as part of his theistic commitments and helped to promote the 
sterilization of the unfit as a social exigency. Since negative eugenic measures like sterilization 
targeted poor whites in the early part of the twentieth century, Mathews had good reason to 
understand his support for marriage restriction and sterilization as part of a broader struggle 
against degeneracy and not as being racially motivated. 
A Religion of Life 
“The simple fact is that the center interest in religion is passing from theology to life,” 
Mathews declared in his most sustained and comprehensive statement of the central ideas 
involved in modernist Christianity.3 If there was an organizing tenet of Mathews’ faith it was that 
Christianity had to become a life-ordering force. In his 1924 treatise, The Faith of Modernism, 
Mathews made this a mantra. Modernism, he wrote, “is not aiming at a system of theology but at 
organizing life on a Christian basis.”4 Mathews argued that the notion that the purpose of religion 
was to sustain and improve human life was not a new idea. Christianity “always has been a way 
of ordering life and its institutions.”5 Modernism simply made explicit what had always been a 
central, albeit implicit part of Christianity. Mathews’ understood that this new emphasis for 
Christian faith had consequences, however. Most notably, it meant that any reflection about God 
or religion had to begin with life itself and work inductively to speculate about God’s purposes. 
Since Christianity was, first and foremost, “a community of life, not a system of philosophy or 
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theology,”6 it ought to be assessed primarily in terms of how well it ordered life and only 
secondarily in terms of how well it understood God. The premise was simple: God wanted 
human life to thrive and reach ever upward toward a more perfect form of social organization. 
To know how to make life thrive was, therefore, to know God and his purposes. 
 Mathews subscribed to two overlapping tenets that dominated the scientific study of 
religion during his day. First, he believed that religion was a natural phenomenon. Religions 
emerged organically to answer human needs, developing specifically as a way for human groups 
to make sense of their environments and to exert some degree of control over them. Religions, 
one might say, emerged at the intersection of a group and its environment, embedded within the 
immanent forces of life and offering cognitive (i.e., anthropomorphizing) tools and ritualistic 
methods for humans in their struggle to reconcile themselves with forces greater than they. “A 
religion,” Mathews wrote in a 1924 publication, “may be described as the complex of those 
social acts by means of which a group undertakes to ward off the anger and gain the help of 
those superhuman and not understood elements of its surroundings upon which it depends.” For 
Mathews, this meant that religion sprung from feelings of “helplessness” and “dependence.” 
Ritualized over time, Mathews wrote, “Religious practices of the whole group are the product of 
a desire of the members of that group for self-protection and advantage.”7 Any given religion, 
therefore, represented a “social inheritance” that allowed a group to succeed in a given 
environment.8 While one might assume that a Christian theologian would find such a 
functionalist view of religion trivializing, Mathews embraced naturalism as a framework for 
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understanding the importance of religion. Religion testified to the audacity and triumph of the 
human spirit in the face of overwhelming odds. But it also denoted order and purpose in the 
universe. Religion was thus not trivialized for being natural. On the contrary, Mathews imagined 
it ennobled. 
 If religion was natural, for Mathews, it was also evolutionary. Religion evolved from 
lower to higher forms, developing hand-in-hand with the social organization of human groups. 
As societies grew more complex, so did their religions, with socio-political life and religious life 
mirroring one another. Thus, the social complexity of any given human group corresponded with 
the complexity of its religious practice, and vice versa. Christianity was the most evolved 
religion in Mathews mind, allowing for a social organization of unparalleled complexity.  
 Mathews theorized that there were four stages in the evolution of religion. First, there 
was the “primitive” stage in which loosely organized bands of early humans attempted to directly 
influence their environments through religious and magical rites. In this stage, “man found 
himself face-to-face with the awfulness of Nature,” and developed rites that would make nature 
and “the heavens propitious.”9 After primitive religions, Mathews argued, came tribal religions, 
which denote the more complex social organization of tribal life. In this stage, natural forces are 
personified as deities and the relationship between humans and superhuman forces are 
understood in personal terms.10 This stage typically saw the elevation of a “chieftain” god over 
the others and revolved around the development of practices that allowed worshippers to 
gainfully influence their personal relationship with this chief deity (e.g., animal and even human 
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sacrifice).11 The next stage of religion Mathews described as monarchical, reflecting the more 
complex socio-political organization of feudal life. In this stage, religious thought and practice 
supported the socio-political ideal of hierarchy by electing one god to universal authority. 
Monarchical religion thus corresponded with the evolutionary advent of monotheistic traditions 
and their characteristic emphasis on moral behavior: one god becomes “king of creation” and a 
universal “standard of morality.”12 Religions in this stage were theological in orientation and 
often dogmatic with respect to defining the godhead. Mathews maintained that the world’s great 
religious traditions occupied this stage,13 but he clearly believed Christianity represented its most 
refined iteration. 
 Mathews discerned an incipient stage in the evolution of religion, one he detected in the 
increasing complexity of modern life and one that corresponded with the development of 
Protestant Christianity. Mathews believed that evangelical Protestantism facilitated the 
emergence of modern socio-political systems in the United States, which Mathews identified 
with the political form of democracy and the economic form of industrialization. Mathews’ work 
implied that evangelical Protestantism facilitated such by introducing new socio-political ideals 
of individual freedom and equality, which were effectively leveling the older ideal of hierarchy 
that dominated monarchical society. As he wrote in The Faith of Modernism, “For the first time 
in history there are being formed a morality and a social order where no man is recognized as 
having inherited right to claim authority.”14 And yet Mathews thought that Protestantism was 
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failing to see the evolutionary leap that it was inaugurating through. It anxiously clung to the 
monarchical stage, which championed theology, dogmatism, and church authority. Indeed, this 
was the nucleus of Mathews’ critique of Fundamentalism: it looked backwards for answers to 
socio-political shifts that were taking humans past the hierarchical stage of religion, shifts that 
Protestantism itself had initiated. As Mathews saw it, what was needed was neither greater 
theological clarity nor renewed commitment to doctrinal or scriptural inerrancy. What was 
exigent instead was a return to the natural purpose of religion, which was to successfully adapt 
humans to their environment. Mathews believed that evangelical Christianity was, from both an 
evolutionary and a religious viewpoint, uniquely suited to adapt humanity to the complexity of 
modern life. Indeed, Mathews’ work represents the most systematic attempt to rethink and retool 
evangelical Christianity as a force that would allow humans to flourish in modern conditions. 
 If religions had evolved, so too did humans. Evolution supplied Mathews not only with a 
framework for reconceiving religion as a force that allowed humans to adapt to increasingly 
complex forms of socio-political life but also with a paradigm for reimagining human nature. 
Mathews believed humans were organisms subject to biological laws of heredity. In The Faith of 
Modernism, Mathews wrote,  
We are increasingly coming to see that the individual can be best understood by 
searching his history. Ancestors are keys to an understanding of disease and genius alike. 
We know that any individual life cannot be separated from its ancestry and social 
environment and is, therefore, not wholly responsible for its bent and characteristics. This 
fact gives rise to a new sense of the complexity of any attempt to induce people to be 
good.15 
 
Mathews understood evolution as an interaction between environment and biology, and here he 
was admitting that the biological forces of heredity predisposed individuals to certain kinds of 
behaviors that complicated religious inducements to be good. If the aim of religion was to adapt 																																																								
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human organisms to their environment, Mathews’ argument went, then it had to take into 
consideration the hereditary “bent” of human nature that subtended environmental conditions by 
supplying a comportment or bearing to individual life.  
 Mathews conceived human evolution in both teleological and moralistic terms: the 
evolution of human socio-political life described an upward process whereby human nature was 
being slowly transformed from an animalistic to a more ennobled form. And this was precisely 
the “complexity” that heredity introduced with respect to the evolutionary work of religion. Bad 
heredity produced devolved natures that slowed the evolutionary process: “What is more, we are 
finding that inheritances have a backward pull. As it is easier to follow the instinct and passions 
which make our inheritance from our animal and social past than to go on from them to more 
personal ideals and cooperation with others.”16 
 Mathews understood the human being as a composite of “impersonal” and “personal” 
forces, which underscores the fact that, while he believed biological inheritance important, his 
comprehension of evolution was not biologically reductionistic. Impersonal forces included the 
chemical, biological, or physical energies that organized the material dimensions of life. Personal 
forces referred to extra- or super-material energies that organized the inter-subjective relations 
between humans and their environments. Heredity was an impersonal force that influenced 
human nature, while love and compassion were personal forces.  
 For Mathews, impersonal and personal forces both shaped what he called “personality,” 
an abstract and encompassing concept that referred to moral discernment and aspiration, among 
other things. “We cannot detach a personality from its inheritances,” Mathews wrote in a passage 
in which he insisted that heredity shaped human nature, “and goodness must therefore always be 
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relative. If we are to convert a person we have to convert an entire ancestry which he epitomizes 
in himself, as well as the influences of his social environment.”17 Importantly, however, heredity 
was not beyond the uplifting, personal influence of religion: it “is possible for an individual,” 
Mathews averred, “to be freed from the domination of his lower inheritances.” Such an assertion 
demonstrates two important things about Mathews’ modernist faith. First, Mathews imagined the 
relationship between impersonal and personal forces in evolutionary terms, with the former 
associated with the lower order of animality and the latter with the higher being of human life. 
Second, human nature was an open and malleable thing. Indeed, the function of religion as a life-
organizing force was to shape it into a nobler form. As Mathews tersely put it, “Human nature 
can be regenerated.”18 
Mathews’ Critique of Scientific Materialism 
 Through his writings and public lectures during the teens and twenties, Mathews 
launched one of the most sustained, informed, and reputable critiques of scientific materialism in 
the country up to that time. Mathews was, perhaps, better read than any other modernist leader in 
the science and philosophy of evolution. His comprehensive knowledge of evolutionary theory 
made him a respectable figure in both religious and scientific circles. He was best known for 
developing a view of evolution that, in contradistinction to the naturalism of his day, refused to 
reduce evolution to material processes. In this respect, he represented a large and influential 
contingency of earnest Protestants who saw evolution as a model for reinterpreting the work of 
Christianity and yet who perceived scientific materialism not merely as a threat to religion but as 
a danger to the human spirit itself. Thus, Mathews defined modernism as a halfway position 
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between the materialism of modern science and the supernaturalism of traditional religion. 
Unlike Fundamentalists, who, as Mathews insisted, clung to a supernatural/interventionist view 
of divine activity, modernism championed evolution as a framework for reconceiving God’s 
redemptive work in naturalistic terms. Unlike many naturalists, however, modernists like 
Mathews refused to “minimize the human activities we call personal” by reducing “all 
knowledge to sensation.”19 Indeed, Mathews could be just as condemning of naturalists as 
Fundamentalists. In insisting that “there is no form of existence other than those envisaged by 
physics and chemistry,” Mathews maintained, many modern naturalists fail to see that “life is 
more than any of its elements.”20 
 Mathews’ critique of scientific materialism revolved around his concept of personality, 
which introduced an ontological disjunction within evolution as a continuous development. In 
Mathews’ mind, humans were both evolutionarily continuous with lower forms of life and 
ontologically distinct from everything that had come before. In a public lecture entitled, “The 
Higher Materialism,” Mathews explained, “Somewhere in the long chain of experience which 
binds us as human beings with the animals, there has emerged the integrated, self-energized, new 
quality, but imponderable, -a plus quality that is unsusceptible to analysis. The plus quality […] 
we call ‘person’ and ‘personality’, the outstanding qualities of which belong to humanity itself.” 
Personality distinguished human existence –which was “reflective and purposeful” –from the 
lower organisms. In an illustrative passage, Mathews brought this line of thinking to a 
conclusion: “We may freely admit that human life is rooted in its physical side in the soil of 
animal inheritances, but in its really characteristic aspects it lifts its head and lives with self-
																																																								
19 Mathews, Contributions of Science to Religion, 5. 
 
20 Ibid., 5-6.	
		
	
151 
directive powers in the upper world of a spiritual order.”21 In insisting as much, Mathews was 
articulating an understanding of human evolution that dominated modernist circles since 
Beecher. Humans were ontologically liminal: half animal and half divine and hence strung 
between an animal past and spiritual future. While they shared their physical life with animals, 
they also possessed a higher, spiritual, personal life that was irreducible to their impersonal pre-
history. 
 One might be tempted to ask how Mathews imagined the impersonal and personal forces 
to connect within the human being. After all, he clearly saw these forces as interacting, 
especially within the moral decisions that humans made. Mathews thought that personal forces 
were folded into human nature during an individual’s development and that these forces 
counteracted baser impulses that were transmitted as part of humanity’s animal inheritances.22 
But to inquire as to how, precisely, the personal and impersonal connected within the human 
being would be to invoke materialist presuppositions, which Mathews consciously sought to 
challenge in his own work. Mathews was quite content to accept the idea that there was 
something more to humans than biology and chemistry as a matter of faith. And while Mathews 
knew that many naturalists would have found such a tenet of faith unsatisfying, he was also 
aware that his concept of personality had its merits. Personality, Mathews would have insisted, 
could account for the human spirit, which was always greater than the limits imposed by human 
physicality. As Mathews wrote, “We do not hesitate to say that the process of chemistry is 
impersonal, and that the mental, volitional, and intellectual life of the chemist is personal.”23 His 
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point was that, as evidenced by the chemist’s ambitions to understand and subdue nature, human 
aspiration outstripped its material constraints. It is the “mental, volitional, and intellectual life” of 
humans that “makes the mechanistic interpretation of life unsatisfactory,” Mathews explained. 
“Men deliberately undertake to be different from what they are. They judge the present state in 
the light of something more or better which they may apprehend.”24  
As a religion of life, the most important message preached by Mathews’ modernism was 
that humanity was an unfinished creation. The human personality had yet to be completely and 
perfectly unfolded. It would continue to evolve until the advent of that perfect socio-political 
order envisioned by Mathews and other modernists, the Kingdom of God on earth. While the 
eschatology of the Kingdom referred to a terrestrial event in so far as evolution constituted an 
earthly process, the modernist concept of the Kingdom did not denote a definite point in time. 
Like evolution, the Kingdom referred to the long and slow process through which the fullness of 
the human personality approached the divine. As the human personality slowly unfolded, so too 
would a more perfect socio-political order. The modernist concept of the kingdom was thus an 
event forever upon the evolutionary horizon of human nature, always approaching but never 
fully come. In this way, the Kingdom compelled Christians not to wait for a coming redemption 
but to actively participate with God in his creative endeavor. Human nature was, after all, an 
unfinished work.   
 If the Kingdom described a long-term commitment to uplifting human nature, modernism 
had an immediate goal. The immediate task of modernism was to adjust the human personality to 
the conditions of modern life, which principally involved cultivating a cooperative spirit of 
sacrifice and service. Modernism often functioned as a moral critique of modern American 
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culture, especially the outdated and hurtful values that modernists believed lay at the root of 
modern problems. Mathews himself often spoke out against the narrow-mindedness of 
nationalism and “racial prejudice,” which were rooted in sentiments once socially valuable in 
that they fostered group pride and preservation but which were unhelpful and even retrogressive 
during a time of increasing proximity between different human groups. Modernists like Mathews 
saw the First World War as stark evidence that these forms of prejudice could do nothing to 
advance a society that was increasingly global. Mathews also identified other seemingly 
intractable modern social problems, especially those related to urbanization and industrialization, 
like greed, intemperance, and criminality. The root of these problems was a human personality ill 
adapted for the conditions of modern life. The key, Mathews insisted, was to develop religious 
ideas and practices that could reconcile humans to this new environment and allow them to 
thrive. These ideas and practices should promote ideals like love, cooperation, service, mutual 
uplift, and universal brotherhood. Mathews insisted that Christianity –a religion that revolved 
around the compassionate figure of Christ –was uniquely disposed to shape the human 
personality according to these ideals. 
An Unfinished Creation: Mathews’ Engagements with Eugenics 
 If one ignores their divergent views on race, Mathews was a direct intellectual heir of 
Horace Bushnell. Natural processes were divine methods. God worked through the development 
of life, with the religious vision of an increasingly perfect creation converging with naturalist 
conceptions of life as a developing continuum. As Mathews declared in The Faith of Modernism, 
“As one looks into the abysmal depths of the universe, God cannot be pictured as a sovereign in 
some distant heaven. As one knows more of the mystery of matter and traces the processes by 
which worlds are made and life evolves, He cannot be thought of as having once and for all 
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created the world and all that is therein.”25 From Bushnell to Mathews, modernism had 
developed as a theological practice of imagining the natural world as an unfinished creation, 
which included a religious habit of viewing redemption in terms of the propagation of a more 
god-like humanity. 
  Clergymen and teachers from across the country recognized Mathews as an authoritative 
voice on the subject of religion and evolution. As Dean of Divinity School at the University of 
Chicago, Mathews responded to anyone who wrote to him seeking his advice on the topic of 
evolution. James Essex, a high school teacher from Camden, Missouri wrote to Mathews in 
1922. A self-described a “champion” of evolutionism, Essex felt isolated by his fellow faculty 
members, who were “opposed to the theory of evolution,” undoubtedly on religious grounds. 
Essex wanted his students “to take the affirmative in the debate” over evolution and solicited 
Mathews’ advice in teaching his students to look past the facile and overwrought rhetoric that 
cast religion and evolution as opposing forces. Essex regarded Mathews for the openness with 
which he treated the controversial topic and for his commitment to reconciling religious and 
scientific worldviews. Mathews responded in his characteristic way –namely, by distinguishing 
between the “facts” of evolution, on the one hand, and the materialist philosophy endorsed by 
many modern naturalists, on the other. To “deny spiritual value to humanity or to deny the 
existence of God as argued by such elements of the cosmic process,” Mathews averred, simply 
represented the “partisanship” of the materialist philosophy. For Mathews, evolution was simply 
a set of facts regarding human origin and development and thus irreducible to the materialist 
position. He encouraged Essex to see evolution in such a way. In so doing, he inspired 
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confidence in the schoolteacher, encouraging him to recognize that evolution was compatible 
with Christian perspectives on human embodiment and divine purpose.26  
In addition to this professional correspondence, Mathews helped to disseminate 
evolutionism in other important ways. During the early 1920s, he reviewed manuscripts for 
Macmillan Publishing Company in New York, either recommending or not recommending the 
books that he read for publication. As a publisher of religious books, Macmillan was especially 
interested in works on Christianity and modern science. Given Mathews’ authority on the topic, 
his reviews served an important role in Macmillan’s decisions regarding publication. Mathews 
recommended manuscripts that he believed would do the most to help elucidate his modernist 
cause to the American reading public.  
Mathews was especially sympathetic towards manuscripts that would help Americans 
differentiate the modernist from the materialist position with respect to human evolution. In his 
reviews, he characteristically invoked criteria that stressed rigorous treatment from both a 
religious and scientific perspective since, for Mathews, any fair treatment of evolution had to 
adequately consider the specific claims made by religious knowledge with respect to the value of 
human life. For example, in a review of a manuscript entitled, Evolution of Man, Mathews 
recommended publication while criticizing the author for describing the mind as a “function of 
living matter,” a reduction that Mathews believed conceded too much to the materialist position. 
Ultimately, however, Mathews deemed the work’s position on religion “satisfactory,” while 
describing its consideration of the “scientific approach” as “exceedingly well posted.”27 In a 
review of a more religious treatment of evolution entitled, Human Nature and Evolution, 
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Mathews discouraged publication because the manuscript represented a “rather amorphous 
handling of scientific problems.”28 In a review for yet another religious treatment, entitled, A 
New Theory of Human Evolution, Mathews reached the same verdict. While he liked the author’s 
evolutionary concept of “involution,” which referred to a spiritual process through which the 
“animals” in man were made “to lie down,” Mathews concluded that the manuscript was not 
sufficiently rigorous with respect to the scientific facts of evolution.29 
Encouraging clergymen and other professionals to reconcile Christian religiosity with an 
evolutionary perspective, however, also meant recommending eugenics. Responding to a letter 
from Walter Feser from Bible School Park, New York, Mathews suggested Horatio Newman’s 
encompassing volume, Evolution, Genetics, and Eugenics, and Edwin Conklin’s The Direction 
of Human Evolution.30 Mathews typically recommended the works of scientists and other 
professionals who supported the application of evolutionary principles to social planning and 
governance but who remained critical of the materialist vision of evolution espoused by mainline 
eugenicists. He often promoted the works of scientific professionals who consciously sought to 
give Christianity a prominent place within eugenics.  
H.H. McNeill, for example, pastor of the Methodist Episcopal Church in Marianna, 
Florida, wrote to Mathews on October 16, 1920. “Will you please advise me,” McNeill queried, 
“if your Divinity School considers, and so teaches, the faith in Jesus the Christ as the Son of God 
and the Savior of men is consistent with the facts of the universe?” Mathews responded in the 
affirmative, suggesting that McNeill read Henry Fairfield Osborn’s 1916 The Origin and 
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Evolution of Life, a work that Mathews characterized as the “best presentation of the facts of 
evolution.”31 Osborn, a famous American paleontologist and president of the American Museum 
of Natural History in New York City, collaborated with mainline eugenicists like Davenport in 
organizing the Second International Congress of Eugenics in 1921.32 A proponent of eugenics, 
however, Osborn was suspicious of scientific materialism, while he published books that 
encouraged Americans to see evolution as reconcilable with Christian principles. He dedicated 
one of his volumes, Evolution and Religion in Education, to John Thomas Scopes and “other 
courageous teachers of the United States,” who “taught the truth of evolution and the fact that 
this great law of living nature is consistent with the highest ideals of religion and conduct.”33 
Mathews held works on eugenics to the same standards that he held works on evolution. 
This is especially clear in a manuscript review that Mathews wrote for H.H. Horne’s Christ in 
Man Making. Horne was professor of the philosophy of education at New York University, a 
man whose religious identity and professional commitments as an educator allowed him to see 
eugenics as method ordained “by the Creator in bringing mankind into his image.” In the 
introduction to his work, Horne iterated the central tenets of modernism by insisting that “man is 
not yet fully made; that each new generation is a step forward in the process, that personal and 
social life are unfinished, that the world of life is not a spent force, that growth is still going on, 
that God as the creative principle of existence is still active.”34 In a statement that could have 
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been made by Mathews himself, Horne declared, “The natural man is becoming spiritual. The 
human race is being made, developed, and redeemed.”35 Horne’s declaration illustrates how 
influential modernism had become. For Horne, eugenics provided an opportunity for Christians 
to “show our need of Christ in race-building.”36 In his review of the manuscript that Horne 
submitted to Macmillan, Mathews sympathized with Horne’s project, deeming it a “very 
valuable service” in so far as it would introduce its readership to a Christian view of eugenics.37  
Mathews, however, ultimately recommended that Macmillan not publish Horne’s volume 
on the grounds that its treatment of Christianity and eugenics was “superficial as a whole.” 
Mathews was evidently aware of Horne’s professional achievements and intellectual capabilities 
as an educator, as he described the volume as an underachievement for the author. Mathews 
thought the volume superficial because Horne defended eugenics by quoting scripture instead of 
advancing a Christian perspective of eugenics from a more philosophical position, as Mathews 
thought he should have. Thus, while Mathews agreed with Horne’s argument that the “man 
making” envisioned by eugenics could and should be Christian in scope and practice, he found 
Horne’s treatment to be insufficiently rigorous.38 It is worth noting that the book was ultimately 
published not by Macmillan, but by the Methodist publishing affiliate, Abingdon Press.  
Mathews helped to disseminate eugenic thought and practice in his own publications. In 
The Faith of Modernism, Mathews maintained that Christians should support a more restrictive 
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view of marriage by endeavoring to keep those who were overly animalistic from having 
children. Mathews believed that family life represented the most important vector with respect to 
the intergenerational transmission of degeneracy. His reputation as a respected theologian 
suggests that many like him viewed eugenic restrictions on marriage as Christian practices, 
which helps to explain why negative eugenic initiatives were successfully enacted as social 
policies in the United States. Modernism contributed to the socialization of eugenics by 
translating eugenic ideas and initiatives into a Christian idiom that associated evolutionary 
fitness with godliness and unfitness with animality. In fact, in differentiating between the 
personal and the impersonal, the immaterial and the material, or the god-like and the animal, 
modernism provided the circuitry for eugenics as a discourse of embodiment to circulate within 
white Christian communities. Through his evolutionary theism, Mathews encouraged a 
generation of Americans to associate sinfulness with devolution and middle class Christian ideals 
with evolutionary fitness, especially cooperation, service, and civility. In this way, his 
modernism provided a framework for Americans to rationalize their support for negative 
eugenics through a Christian discourse of embodiment. 
And yet, in so far as it saw the human race as an unfinished creation strung between a 
Christ-like future and an animal past, Mathews’ version of modernism would have also provided 
Americans with important resources for challenging the materialist claims made by mainline 
eugenicists. Mathews Contributions of Science to Religion, for example, was published as a 
sourcebook for those who wanted to view evolution, eugenics, and other scientific topics from a 
theistic perspective. In fact, Mathews intended the volume as a “general textbook for science in 
Christian colleges.”39 The volume included chapters authored by thirteen scientific professionals 
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on topics related to their fields, including a chapter on eugenics written by Charles Davenport, 
who represented the materialist perspective on to the topic of race betterment. An important 
takeaway from the book was that the betterment of the human race could and should be a 
Christian enterprise, one that was dedicated to unfolding the personal powers of humanity and, 
thereby, to carrying on the evolutionary work initiated by God. Christians should feel 
empowered to engage scientific programs like eugenics, Mathews suggested, because science 
itself was simply the record of God calling humanity to help him in his creative work. “One 
cannot read even superficially the history of science” Mathews wrote, “without seeing the 
continuous disclosure of this better understanding of a universe composed of that which is ever 
becoming.”40  
For Mathews, there was just as much controversy in disseminating eugenic ideas and 
practice as there was in promoting evolution. So long as it prioritized the human race’s spiritual 
development by emphasizing the immaterial aspects of the person, Mathews believed that 
eugenics constituted a vital part of the modernist program. As a religion of life, modernism 
represented the Christian application of evolution to human society, which meant that 
modernism offered a way of living evolution, that is, a way of working with evolution in order to 
make human life approximate the divine personality. So long as one held a Christian view of 
evolution, Mathews’ work and correspondence maintained, eugenic ideas, practices, and policies 
served to make society better. This helps to explain why Mathews openly engaged and promoted 
eugenic ideas and practices through his professional labors. But it also helps to explain how 
modernism, while helping to disseminate eugenic knowledge, often functioned as a critique of 
eugenics, especially its overly materialistic iterations. 
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Mathews on Eugenics and Race 
An important part of Mathews’ critique of materialism included materialists’ arguments 
regarding racial differences. Mainline eugenicists, for example, argued that there were 
substantive genetic inequalities between races that manifested phenotypically through different 
physical, mental, and moral traits. These differences made races suited to different social 
positions, justifying the dominance of some races over others. Mainline eugenicists also argued 
that race mixing, especially miscegenation between blacks and whites, produced offspring of 
unbalanced nature. Such racial theories supported mainline eugenics as a program of white racial 
hygiene. Mathews, however, adamantly rejected scientific theories of race, arguing that, unlike 
mainline eugenicists, “real biologists deny the existence of any such biological fact.” Scientific 
racism was simply “racial prejudice” masquerading as science. In truth, there was no biological 
reality to race and racial prejudice was itself a survival of social evolution that Mathews 
associated with a “tribal” or “primitive” mindset. This mindset, a holdout of an earlier stage of 
human personality, saw the “stranger” as “a wolf” and simply confused “social divisions with 
physical divisions.” Racial prejudice, in short, mistook political hostilities for biological 
differences.41  
Mainline eugenics was premised upon the notion of white superiority. It sought to 
preserve and protect white socio-political power and in so doing it stoked antipathies between 
racial groups. For these reasons, mainline eugenics was, for Mathews, both unscientific and 
unchristian. Mathews dismissed the mainline eugenic precept that there were qualitative 
differences between races with respect to their natures and the notion that miscegenation 
produced unbalanced offspring. Mathews, however, dismissed the idea that “children born of 
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marriages or irregular relations between members of different races” were biologically 
unbalanced and, in so doing, he rejected scientific precepts and social policies endorsed by 
mainline eugenics. Additionally, he argued that mainline eugenicists’ assumptions regarding the 
biological bases of race were unchristian. In an essay entitled, “On Racial Prejudice,” Mathews 
wrote, “To the Christian with the belief that God has made of one blood all nations of the earth 
such a position is untenable. In Christ there are no racial distinctions any more than there are 
racial distinctions in human cells.”42  
It is important to see Mathews’ views on racial prejudice as a part of his critique of 
materialism because these views were an intrinsic part of his theory of evolution, which was 
social and which prioritized personality over biology. For Mathews, if there were differences of 
mental, physical, and moral comportment between and within races, these differences were not 
rooted in biology but in socio-economic stratification, political hostilities, and devolved 
personalities. This meant that racial antipathies were simply “creatures of history.” Thus, in his 
critique of the racial prejudice fomented by whites against African Americans, Mathews argued 
that such racial prejudice represented “the confusion of biological with social situations.” 
Observing a “sense of inferiority of the negro” that was “common among the Anglican people,” 
Mathews insisted that this “sense” was rooted not in biological fact but in the social conditions 
produced by slavery and in a more general refusal to accept blacks “into the social organism.” In 
viewing blacks as inferior, Mathews argued, whites were simply projecting social inequality onto 
biology: “It is far from definite facts to describe the conditions of the negro in the United States 
as one of social equality as it is to find the basis of an actual social inequality in biology.”43 
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Biology was always a superficial and shallow medium for understanding the perpetuation of 
human differences for Mathews. The personality was the true vector for understanding 
differences between human groups and the antagonisms and ideologies to which these 
differences gave rise. 
Mathews would have assumed that all races suffered from animality. Animality was a 
real condition that described humanity in its entirety and not any one race more than others. He 
also would have assumed that the transfiguration of animality principally described a social 
process and not a biological one. Drawing upon Lamarckism, Mathews argued that biology –
which denoted the innate and instinctual –could be uplifted through social interventions. Hence, 
while degeneracy persisted through biological forces, the real sources of degeneracy were 
always social. Degeneracy referred to a condition of the personality, which if left to wallow in 
impoverished conditions, would lack the power to rise above animal propensities. If the 
personality were nurtured by wholesome Christian principles, however, it would acquire the 
power to rise above animality. In this way, Mathews imagined Christianity as leading humankind 
in an evolutionary struggle against the impersonal forces of organismic life. This religious 
understanding of evolution had two consequences with respect to the question of eugenics. First, 
it essentially nullified the importance of race as a eugenic category. Second, it located eugenics 
within a larger cooperative Christian endeavor to unite all races in the common labor of bringing 
God’s kingdom to earth.  
Mathews’ critique of racial prejudice allows us to differentiate his views on eugenics 
from those who supported eugenics out of a commitment to racial theism. Racial theism tended 
to privilege biology over environment, as racial theism itself was premised upon the hereditary 
superiority of whites, especially old stock Americans. Its vision of eugenics promised to 
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strengthen national life by preserving and enhancing the white racial body. Those who supported 
eugenics out of a commitment to racial theism, therefore, were likely to view eugenics as a 
practice of race hygiene, with negative eugenic initiatives like immigration restriction, anti-
miscegenation laws, and the sterilization of the unfit viewed as a means of protecting the 
“natural” superiority of whites and of thereby preserving the moral order of American society. 
Yet Mathews rejected racial theism and the eugenic ideas and policies it supported. In this way, 
his advocacy of eugenics demonstrates that eugenics was amenable to modernist platforms that 
eschewed the presumptions of racial prejudice. Mathews, who endorsed the eugenic regulation of 
marriage, especially the restriction of reproductive relations among the degenerate classes, did so 
not as part of an effort to preserve white racial power but as part of a broader struggle against 
human animality.  
Certain eugenic measures were always racially charged. Immigration restriction and anti-
miscegenation laws, for example, would have been difficult for Protestant leaders to support 
apart from the more materialist discourse of racial theism. This was because so much of the 
rhetoric of health that supported these initiatives was steeped in the logic of white racial hygiene. 
These initiatives were defended as part of a broader initiative to protect the white racial body 
from deleterious heredities. But Mathews’ modernist commitments help to demonstrate that, for 
Americans at the time, there was nothing intrinsically racist about positive eugenic measures that 
encouraged people to find fit marriage partners and to have more and better children for the sake 
of societal posterity. His modernism also suggests that there was nothing intrinsically racist 
about negative eugenic measures that sought to keep the unfit from reproductive relations. While 
Mathews’ support for eugenics was not racially motivated, however, it was classist. Those who, 
like him, endorsed eugenic sterilization laws, for example, were overwhelmingly middle class 
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whites who felt scandalized by the wanton reproductivity of the poor and who wanted marriage 
and family to be regulated by middle class norms and ideals.  
Simply put, Mathews supported the eugenic regulation of marriage out of hereditarianism 
and not racism. While Mathews would have denied mainline eugenicists’ claim that hereditary 
advancement could proceed solely through the material production of germ plasm, he 
nonetheless maintained that heredity imposed physical constraints on the development of 
personality. He endorsed eugenic initiatives out of a concern for improving heredity and the in-
born comportments of future generations. He thought it was societally beneficial for fit people to 
choose fit marriage partners in order to propagate fitter children. He also believed that society 
would be improved by limiting reproduction among those who were sure to propagate their 
degeneracy into their children. He had little use, however, for eugenic initiatives that sowed 
racial antipathy and that were premised upon the false principles of scientific racism. 
It is worth noting that Mathews’ belief that the eugenic regulation of reproductive sex did 
not foment racial antipathy is supported by the enforcement of sterilization laws in the country, 
which primarily targeted poor whites during the early twentieth century. As the history of 
sterilization in North Carolina attests, sterilizations of poor African Americans (especially poor 
African American women) did not come to predominate until about mid-century, when 
sterilization became an important part of North Carolina social welfare policy.44 Before World 
War II, however, sterilization policies principally targeted the hereditarian issue of white 
degeneracy. Therefore, and as I discuss at greater length in the following sections, Mathews’ 
support for sterilization –and for the eugenic regulation of reproductive sex more broadly –
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should be read as part of a commitment to viewing human sinfulness in the classist terms of 
hereditarianism and not racial ones. 
Sin, Animality, and Redemption 
 In The Faith of Modernism, Mathews categorized modernists as “a class of evangelical 
Christians. That is, they accept Jesus Christ as the revelation of a Savior God.”45 Mathews 
distinguished modernism from liberalism, which tends “toward the emphasis of intellectual 
belief and the criticism and repudiation of doctrines per se.”46 Mathews also distinguished 
modernism from Fundamentalism (or what he referred to as “Confessionalism”): modernists are 
“evangelical Christians who use modern methods to meet modern needs. Confessionalism is the 
evangelicalism of the dogmatic mind. Modernism is the evangelicalism of the scientific mind.”47 
But how, one might reasonably ask, did modernism constitute a form of evangelical Christianity 
when modernists made evolutionary theory an intrinsic part of their understanding of 
redemption? For Mathews, the answer had to do with modernism’s evolutionary adaptation of 
the evangelical message of salvation through personal experience of Christ. To understand how 
modernism adapted such a message, however, we must first comprehend the modernist concept 
of sin and its relation to God’s evolutionary plan for humanity. 
 Mathews described sinfulness as an evolutionary condition. As such, the origins of 
sinfulness were simultaneously social and biological, with sinfulness having immediate 
implications for the development of both the individual and the evolution of society. On the one 
hand, sin circulated through social currents, stunting the development of human personalities. On 
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the other, sin passed through hereditary transmission as animalistic impulses. In both cases, sin 
was not conceived as a deontological matter. In other words, sin did not refer to disobedience to 
absolute moral law. Nor did it refer to a permanent human state rooted in a primordial act of 
disobedience. Rather, sin referred to the persistence of outmoded, unadapted, or unevolved 
dispositions and behaviors that survived despite their evolutionary obsolescence. The 
evolutionary condition of sinfulness kept humans from thriving in their environments by stunting 
the development of personality, with sinfulness more generally denoting “maladjustment to 
immanent purpose that brings suffering.”48 Sinfulness was thus not simply a question of right 
and wrong; it referred to the “urge of life” itself,49 marking a distortion or perversion in both the 
proper comportment of the individual and the bearing of human socio-political life.50 
 In Contributions of Science to Religion, Mathews argued that biology supplied religion 
with a new framework for understanding sin. “Biology and the newly developed medical 
sciences give more realistic meaning to the conception of sin as the violation of the divine will.” 
The divine will, Mathews argued, was that “men shall grow less animal, less mechanistic, more 
personal, more regardful of others’ personality, more possessed of good-will.”51 While Mathews 
believed that the personality of any individual transcended his or her hereditary endowments, the 
individual’s personality nonetheless shared “a genetic relationship with animal instinct and 
behavior.”52 For Mathews, heredity represented the continuity between humankind and its 
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animal past, with Mathews understanding human biology as a mechanistic substrate that denoted 
the common origins of –and the shared life between –humans and animals. Mathews thus 
associated heredity with animality, viewing it as a continuum through which animalistic 
behaviors were perpetuated in human society and a check on the development of the human 
personality. The biological sciences therefore had much to teach religion about the origins and 
perpetuation of sinfulness. While the biology of the body was not evil per se, its instinctiveness 
represented a moral challenge for the individual. The innate predispositions of the body could 
even adversely affect the propagation of a particular race. “By faulty matings,” Mathews bluntly 
averred, “a race may become degenerate.”53 By “degenerate,” Mathews primarily meant 
proneness to animalistic –and hence immoral –behavior. 
 The relationship that Mathews’ imagined between heredity, animality, and sinfulness 
deserves a closer look. In Contributions of Science to Religion, Mathews wrote, “We inherit 
instincts, reflexes and mental habits from our animal forbears. Many of them are characteristics 
which we hold in common with the animals and the more primitive man.” In themselves, 
Mathews insisted, animal inheritances were “neither good nor bad.” Animal inheritances had 
their proper place and, so long as they were subordinate to higher ideals, these inheritances could 
be set to moral purposes. As Mathews explained, “When there is added to them an element of 
responsibility set by the demands of our own developing personality for going on to higher moral 
values, moral character attaches to their use.” But Mathews warned that animal inheritances 
could dominate the personality, resulting in degeneracy. “When these inheritances of the 
development through which humanity has passed become dominant and check the forward-
looking personal elements, degeneration follows.” Allowing animal predispositions to dominate 
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the personality resulted not only in degeneracy, however. It also thwarted God’s redemptive 
purposes by allowing suffering to proliferate: “When a man yields to the backward pull of 
outgrown goods he is running counter to the immanent law of the universe to progress. Suffering 
and loss are bound to ensue from such maladjustment and one aspect of the tragedy is that such 
maladjustment may bring suffering to others than its author.”54  
 But what did Mathews mean by animalistic propensities? Two examples will suffice 
here.  
Mathews would have assumed that there was evolutionary value to human instincts like 
aggressiveness and competitiveness. These predispositions served humankind well in the 
primitive struggle to survive hostile environments and they no doubt led to human increase 
during times of severity. Mathews would have even maintained that aggressiveness and 
competitiveness continued to hold value for human society, especially as a way of engaging in 
“play and recreation.”55 He would have seen these evolutionarily useful instincts as having 
healthy outlets in modern life. The healthful channeling of aggressiveness and competition was 
especially important for the proper development of pre-adolescent boys, who, according to 
psychological theory at the time, capitulated a “savage” or “tribal” stage of racial evolution.56 
Modern outlets for these instincts included sports and other strenuous activities that productively 
channeled the negativity of these dispositions into the healthful development of young male 
bodies, while the development of bodies, Mathews assumed, was integral for the development of 
personality. Aggressiveness and competitiveness: these baser instincts –or these “outgrown 
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goods” –simply needed to find an expression that served the development of a personality that 
had the strength and comportment to rise to the higher order of cooperation and service.  
Mathews’ would have viewed human sexual desire in a similar way, although he 
certainly would not have described it as an “outgrown good.” Sex represented an animal instinct 
that allowed for the perpetuation of the species.57 But, as an especially powerful instinct, sex also 
threatened health and social stability. In this way, sex was both good and bad. When sex was 
practiced through the monogamous, patriarchal institution of marriage, sex had a higher, even 
divine purpose. When sex was practiced outside the confines of marriage or when it was 
practiced in any way that abased its higher purpose, sex was unhealthful, perverted, or as 
Mathews would describe it, sinful. Mathews understanding of sinfulness thus rested upon an 
understanding of natural law in so far as the moral value of sex was determined by its “natural” 
reproductive function. It is important to keep in mind, however, that Mathews’ understanding of 
natural law supported his evolutionary concept of personality. To submit animal or primitive 
instincts to higher purposes was to act in accordance with the divine will, which promised the 
evolution of a higher nature within human life. 
 Mathews was suspicious of heredity. It represented the principal way in which animality 
persisted in modern society. And yet Mathews believed that animal instincts could be 
subordinated to nobler purposes through the strength of personality. In contradistinction to 
mainline eugenicists and other scientific professionals who he categorized as materialists, 
Mathews did not argue that the only way to social advancement was through better breeding, 
although he did admit that, in cases where the hereditary transmission of degeneracy was sure, 
society should prevent marriages between the unfit. Arguing that modernists needed to look to 
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biology for a better understanding of sinfulness and its perpetuation, Mathews wrote, we must 
“study the human condition of a family and endeavor to prevent the marriage of those whose 
children are certain to be subnormal and criminal.”58 But, unlike materialists, Mathews averred 
that, except in extreme cases, human nature was responsive to the higher idealism of religion. In 
fact, Mathews went so far as to assert that the materialist view of human nature was inconsistent 
with Christianity. “Scientific interpretations of nature which deny all freedom of choice and 
reduce the intellectual life to chemical and physical activity are not consistent with religion, and 
religion is not consistent with them.”59 By implication, this meant that eugenic approaches to 
human uplift that viewed human nature solely in terms of the play of physical forces were 
unchristian, as they refused to acknowledge the transcendent aspect of the person. Eugenic 
approaches were also unchristian if they denied the power of religion to transform human nature. 
Sinfulness, Mathews avowed, could be overcome through the inculcation of religious ideals, 
which strengthened the personality over and against animal impulses. 
 While he condemned materialism as unchristian, however, Mathews’ modernism 
concurred with mainline eugenics’ assumptions about human nature. His faith also shared 
mainline eugenicists’ presumptions about the purpose of evolution, which was to evolve the race 
into a more human, less animalistic embodiment. He even openly collaborated with mainline 
eugenicists in works that he published on modernism, viewing this collaboration as a necessary 
part of developing a confident theological position with respect to human evolution. In engaging 
mainline eugenicists, Mathews attempted to strengthen his own understanding of human nature 
and the evolutionary process through which, he hoped, it would be gradually perfected. 
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A prominent mainline eugenicist with whom Mathews collaborated was Charles 
Davenport, America’s leading eugenicist during the 1910s and ‘20s and an exemplar of scientific 
materialism. Davenport wrote a chapter on eugenic science for Mathews’ 1924 edited volume, 
Contributions of Science to Religion, a book in which Mathews devoted a great deal of energy to 
criticizing the materialist position. Mathews, who wrote the book’s introduction and concluding 
chapters, fundamentally disagreed with Davenport’s central claim that the whole of human 
nature had an instinctual basis. Davenport argued that human mental characteristics were 
transmitted in the same way as physical traits. Mental and physical characteristics were 
determined by chemical processes within the germ plasm, which referred to the protoplasmic 
material created by the union of gametes. Davenport thus insisted that the complexity of human 
mental life was reducible to chemical substances located in the germ plasm, a claim with which 
Mathews’ objected on religious grounds. In fact, Davenport’s science of the germ plasm allowed 
him to make all kinds of eugenic claims with which Mathews disagreed. In Heredity in Relation 
to Eugenics, Davenport wrote, “Man is an organism –an animal, and the laws of improvement of 
corn and race horses hold true for him also.” Since human nature was reducible to the chemical 
substances of the germ plasm, Davenport averred, better humans could simply be bred, which 
represented an argument that left very little room for religion within the eugenic project of 
remaking human nature. And yet, in spite of their disagreements, Mathews and Davenport shared 
a basic assumption –namely, that evolution represented an upward struggle against human 
animality. 
 As already mentioned, Davenport believed that all human traits –including mental and 
physical characteristics –were produced by chemical processes initiated by the germ plasm in 
sexual reproduction. In this way, the germ plasm provided the biological medium through which 
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permanent race progress could be achieved. To make better humans, eugenicists argued, one 
simply needed to control the production of germ plasm by regulating sexual intercourse. If 
Davenport was idealistic about the possibility of breeding better people, however, he was deeply 
ambivalent about the human organism. This was because the germ plasm preserved and even 
perpetuated humanity’s animal past. The germ plasm was at once the source of evolution and 
devolution. It was a medium of progress but it also threatened to plunge the human race back 
into primitivism. The germ plasm, it seems, was only partly human. 
 For example, in Heredity in Relation to Eugenics, Davenport wrote, 
Just as certain adult persons show ancestral organs that most of us have lost –such as a 
heavy coat of hair, an elongated coccyx (tail), an unusually large appendix, a third set of 
teeth, -so some adult persons retain certain ancestral mental traits that the rest of us have 
got rid of. And just as the heavy coat of body hair can be traced back generation after 
generation until we cannot avoid the conclusion that […] hairy people represent a human 
strain that has never gained the naked skin of most people, so imbecility and 
‘criminalistic’ tendency can be traced back to the darkness of remote generations in a 
way that forces us to conclude that these traits have come directly to us from our animal 
ancestry and have never been gotten rid of.60 
 
As the passage suggests, an animal past haunted the germ plasm, a past that continued to reveal 
itself through the persistence of criminality, imbecility, and other forms of mental and moral 
degeneracy. Strung between a bright future of increasing mental, physical, and moral perfection 
and a dark primordial beginning, the human organism was ontologically liminal. The task of 
eugenics consisted in folding, grafting, or cultivating a higher nature into the germ plasm through 
better breeding. Ignoble characteristics and impulses would be bred out of the organism; noble 
ones would be bred into it. Of course, it is not that humanity would ever be divested of its 
organismic existence. In a very real sense, humans would always be animals. But the imagery 
Davenport mustered in warning Americans about the primordial “darkness” of the germ plasm 
																																																								
60 Ibid., 263. 
		
	
174 
tells us that he was deeply anxious about the human organism’s biological past, especially the 
animalistic propensities that allegedly lurked within the germ plasm. Defending eugenic policies 
like the eugenic segregation of the unfit, Davenport wrote, “Society must protect itself; as it 
claims the right to deprive the murderer of his life so also it may annihilate the hideous serpent 
of hopelessly vicious protoplasm.”61 The point is that while materialists like Davenport 
championed the idea that humans were merely evolved organisms, mainline eugenics was always 
understood as an evolutionary struggle against the human animal. 
 In this way, the human animal represented an important point of convergence and 
divergence between mainline eugenic thought and practice, on the one hand, and theological 
modernism, on the other. For both, the human animal was an ontological problem in so far as it 
impeded evolutionary progress, although mainline eugenicists like Davenport and modernists 
like Mathews proposed very different ontologies for understanding the evolutionary redemption 
of humanity. For Davenport, the human animal was completely biological. Human nature would 
be uplifted through interventions within the material production of germ plasm. For Mathews, 
the human animal was at once biological and spiritual, with the ennobling of human nature 
entailing the development of non- or super-material faculties that Mathews identified with 
personality and that he believed would subordinate animal instincts to higher ends.  
But even more consequential with respect to the divergence of modernism and eugenics 
was Mathews’ insistence that human animality was responsive to the regenerative influence of 
religion. In contradistinction, Davenport believed that human animality could only be diminished 
by manipulating the production of germ plasm, which described a strictly material process of 
regulating the passage of hereditary traits from one generation to the next. As I discuss in the 																																																								
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next chapter, Davenport assailed the idea that environmental forces had any direct influence on 
protoplasmic material. In fact, his attempt to disabuse Americans of the false premises of 
Lamarckism represents one of the most sustained efforts of his professional career. Mathews, 
however, argued that the materialist tenets of mainline eugenic science had yet to be proven, 
while he clung to Lamarckism as a way of imagining an important role for religion in what was 
for him a Christian quest to redeem the human animal. Davenport and Mathews’ respective 
positions thus denoted two competing conceptions of directing human evolution, or two different 
ways of resolving the evolutionary issue of human animality, with Mathews identifying 
Davenport’s method with atheistic materialism and with Mathews associating his own approach 
with Christian theism. 
In The Faith of Modernism, Mathews argued that the principles of Lamarckism were both 
more Christian and more scientific than materialism. Materialists like Davenport argued that 
humans were more or less powerless to transform the natures that they received as biological 
endowments, which Mathews believed made evolution an utterly impersonal process. “The 
Modernist is as emphatic […] in his denial that evolution is a Godless impersonal process,” 
Mathews averred. “An evolution in which an organism did not take in from its own environment 
elements of personality,” he continued, “would be contrary to the process which science actually 
gives us.”62 In Mathews’ evolutionary idiom, the personality had an upward influence on the 
development of the human organism. The evolution of the personality allowed humans to thrive 
in a social life of increasing complexity and ascending morality while also exerting an upward 
influence upon the human organism. In insisting as much, Mathews had sufficient reason to 
believe that he was on scientific grounds, as Lamarckism had and even continued to hold sway in 
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scientific circles. Indeed, there were important scientific minds during the 1920s that were 
opposed to evolutionary materialism.63 But he also had sufficient reason to insist that evolution 
described a Christian process. His concept of personality represented only the latest formulation 
within a Protestant theological tradition of attempting to think about evolution as God’s creative 
method. Making an argument that would no doubt have stirred the sympathy of Henry Ward 
Beecher and Newell Dwight Hillis, Mathews wrote, “The evolutionary process is, so to speak, a 
moving picture of an infinite number of acts of God immanent in the universe and gradually 
imparting personality to that which, already in existence, grows more capable of personal action 
as its structure grows more complicated.”64 
The main reason why Lamarckism was so important for Mathews was that it allowed him 
to conceive salvation as both an individual experience and an evolutionary process. For 
Mathews, human sinfulness described a propensity to animality; it denoted the condition of being 
dominated by impersonal forces. Salvation, therefore, referred to the victory of the personal over 
the impersonal, the subordination of the lower propensities of the human organism to the nobler 
faculties of the human personality, or as Mathews’ once described it, the emancipation of the 
soul from the material plane of existence. “The gospel,” Mathews declared in a 1914 public 
lecture, “is a message of deliverance from the natural order, from the relentless production of 
effect by material cause, the splendid emancipation of the soul from the physical-chemical 
order.”65 Such a gospel applied to individual and species development, with Lamarckism 
providing Mathews with a way of linking the deliverance of the individual with the emancipation 
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of the race. As the individual grew in personality over the course of his or her lifetime, rising 
above the animalistic stage of existence represented by childhood, he or she cultivated a personal 
transcendence with respect to his or her organismic existence. The effects of this cultivation, 
Mathews believed, positively influenced the evolutionary development of the human race, with 
the structure of the organism growing more complex and refined through the hereditary influence 
of personality. This in turn made it possible for future generations to develop even more refined 
personalities. “If life has grown more personal while organisms have grown more complicated,” 
Mathews asserted, “this must be due in part to the influence of an environment within which 
there must be that which can evoke personality in the progressive series of organisms.”66 
Unlike materialists who argued that evolutionary development occurred solely by 
adaptions transmitted through the germ plasm, Lamarckism allowed non-materialists like 
Mathews to emphasize the evolutionary value of individual initiative. Since a person’s lifestyle 
had an effect on his or her heredity, it was absolutely important to get people to live virtuous 
lives. Lamarckism thus not only left ample room for individual initiative within the work to 
evolve a better human race, it also furnished an important space for Christianity within race 
uplift. In this way, Mathews’ vested interest in Lamarckism issued from an earnest desire to 
defend the evangelical idea that Christianity played an important part in the transformation of 
human nature. In fact, Mathews’ identification of Lamarckism with evangelical commitments 
was so strong that his work conflated the two to the point non-distinction: “As members of the 
Christian movement we are committed to the conviction that it is possible for an individual with 
God’s help to be freed from the domination of his lower inheritances, that is, to be saved.”67  
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Despite defining evolution as a redemptive process, Mathews never relinquished an 
individual understanding of salvation. Mathews did not believe that the effort of a virtuous life 
should be defined solely in terms of the contributions that it made to the development of the 
human race. In fact, Mathews argued that any Christian conception of salvation that envisioned 
redemption solely as an evolutionary process was, by itself, deficient. Salvation, Mathews 
insisted, must continue to speak to the exigencies and concerns of individual mortality. Hence, 
Mathews defended the Christian doctrine of the immortality of the soul because he believed it 
empowered the human spirit in the face of exigencies that individuals faced alone. In fact, he 
upheld this doctrine against materialistic frameworks that defined human immortality solely in 
terms of the perpetuation of the race. “Our interests in life are something vastly bigger than the 
maintenance of the race,” Mathews averred in his 1914 lecture. “To think of immortality as 
merely our individual participation in the race development is merely to substantiate [sic] social 
longevity for a real conception of immortality.”68  
If salvation was always evolutionary and individual, however, Mathews’ work 
characteristically emphasized the former. The defeat of human sinfulness typically described a 
collective process that enjoined humans in a cosmic struggle to free the human race from its 
animal nature. Comparing Fundamentalist and Modernist conceptions of the divine, Mathews 
wrote, “One says that God shaped the dust of the earth and breathed into it His spirit, and the 
other says that in the gradual process of shaping up of material organisms there came a stage in 
which cosmic personality –or Spirit –found new expression in some life more akin to itself.”69 
For modernists, belief in God necessitated commitment to the idea that God was working to 
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create a being that approximated him in likeness. Evolutionary theism thus shaped modernists’ 
conception of salvation, with Mathews arguing that God called upon humans to join him in his 
redemptive work. Religion, Mathews declared, “is a creative experiment carried on in 
cooperation with the God of that which is ever becoming.”70 Modernist theology was, therefore, 
characteristically evolutionary in scope, invoking a vision of God that defined evolution as an 
ongoing act of creation. “We do not believe that God has made His complete contribution to 
human evolution,” Mathews avowed.71 Indeed, defining God as the “infinite Person,” Mathews 
insisted that evolution represented “the history of an ever more complete revelation of how the 
infinite Person produces finite personalities.”72 “This, in fact, is the religious reading of 
evolution,” Mathews explained. “Our heavenly Father still is working personally in his 
universe.”73  
As Mathews saw it, evolution described a creative process whereby God was gradually 
educing a personal being like his own from an impersonal one, which meant that, as Mathews 
put it, God “shares with us our own becoming.”74 Mathews’ God was thus an evolutionarily 
immanent God, a God who was redemptively unfolding his own nature within the universe 
through the process of evolution. But if evolution described God’s creative work, then what was 
unique about Christianity as a religion? How, in other words, did Christianity facilitate God’s 
evolutionary labor? While Mathews maintained that all religions played a part in advancing 
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human evolution, he distinguished Christianity as a religion that revolved around the divine 
character revealed in the personality of Christ, a personality that, Mathews averred, singularly 
offered the means to redeeming the human animal by uniquely capturing the evolutionary 
perfection desired by God.  
In Mathews’ Christology, Jesus represented the perfect incarnation of the divine 
personality. As such, Christ was both an ideal for individual piety and an evolutionary paragon. 
He was an example for individuals to follow in developing their own personalities, but his 
perfect embodiment of the divine personality also made him the telos of human evolution. 
Referring to the cosmological process by which God was growing humanity beyond its animal 
nature, Mathews wrote, “As long as God operates in human life this process must continue 
toward the ideals of Jesus. To no other consummation do we dare look forward.”75 God enjoined 
humans to work with him in producing a human race that embodied the ideals of Christ, ideals 
that Mathews identified as love, cooperation, service, and sacrifice. “God cooperates with efforts 
to reproduce the way of Jesus,” Mathews averred, offering a tenet of faith that allowed him to 
postulate a modernist creed: “I believe in God, immanent in the forces and process of nature, 
revealed in Jesus Christ and human history as Love.”76  
It is here that we arrive at an answer to our question regarding how Mathews imagined 
modernism to be an updated form of evangelical Christianity. Mathews saw evolution as a 
redemptive process that would transform humanity in the likeness of Christ. The personality of 
Christ was thus a fundamental part of Mathews’ evolutionary gospel. “Jesus Christ,” Mathews 
wrote in The Faith of Modernism, “is the revelation in human experience of God’s effecting 
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salvation. His life, death, resurrection and words offer the practicable way of fellowship with and 
consequent aid from God, as well as ideals for human conduct.”77 Of course, in insisting as 
much, Mathews radically redefined the cosmological import of Christ’s life, death, and 
resurrection. With his life serving as an evolutionary ideal, his death and resurrection symbolized 
humanity’s triumph over its animal nature through the enlargement of a personality that was 
increasingly Christ-like. In this way, Christ offered individuals and the race alike a chance to be 
“reborn,” so to speak, in the image of God, holding out the promise of a redeemed nature through 
evolutionary advance. 
The notion that evolution represented a creative process through which God was 
developing a Christ-like human race represents the first of two important contributions made by 
Mathews to modernism in the early twentieth century. The second was the idea that God called 
upon humans to assist him in his evolutionary work. This idea provided modernist leaders like 
Mathews with an evangelical framework for engaging eugenic thought and practice. What 
allowed Mathews to engage eugenic thought and practice, therefore, was an evangelicalism re-
wrought in evolutionary terms –a religious vision that saw evolution as a process through which 
God was forging human nature in the likeness of Christ and thus creating a humanity 
increasingly receptive to Christ’s ideals. 
The Paradox of the Human Animal: Mathews and Negative Eugenics 
Mathews rejected many of the scientific and racial precepts of mainline eugenics. In its 
materialist iterations, Mathews believed, eugenics encouraged too much focus on the impersonal 
forces of biology and not enough on individual aspiration to Christian ideals. Steadfastly 
dedicated to Lamarckism, Mathews insisted that evolution was driven not by biological forces 
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but by personal ones like religious nurture, which uplifted biology through the infolding of 
God’s spirit within evolutionary processes.  
And yet, Mathews’ concept of personality, which always denoted a composite of the 
material and immaterial, impersonal and personal, speaks to the difficulty that modernists had in 
keeping their faith at a critical distance from eugenic thought and practice. If modernists 
persistently found themselves supporting eugenic initiatives, it is because, no matter how much it 
prioritized the personal, modernism had no way of conceiving itself or its objectives apart from 
resolving the evolutionary paradox of the human animal. Mathews wanted to embrace the 
spiritual as the driving force of evolution but in rooting the more intransigent dimensions of 
human nature in the animal part of the person his modernist faith could not help but insist that 
bad heredity imposed real constraints on the development of personality. This is why modernists 
like Mathews found themselves supporting mainline eugenic measures like the segregation and 
sterilization of the unfit.  
To elucidate this point, consider William Byron Forbush’s 1912 work, The Coming 
Generation. Forbush was a social worker who had worked with young men for twenty years. He 
published his book as part of The Social Betterment Series edited by Mathews. While Forbush’s 
arguments were his own, Mathews endorsed the vision of social uplift outlined in his book, 
which included Christian cooperation with eugenics. As Mathews observed in his general 
introduction to the book, The Coming Generation was intended to encourage greater 
commitment among Christians to “social evolution.”  
In his work, Forbush argued that the godly evolution of human society depended upon 
the proper development of children, viewing evolution as a method whereby God sought to 
incarnate his spirit into future generations. The “secret of a great parenthood,” Forbush insisted, 
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“is the habit of incarnation,” which made parenthood a heavenly labor through which Christian 
parents “put [themselves] into [their] own child.”78 Forbush’s volume focused on the importance 
of the moral and intellectual nurture provided by homes, churches, and schools for the proper 
development of young people. Indeed, for Forbush the struggle to evolve a more righteous 
humanity necessitated cooperation between these institutions in order to address all spheres of 
children’s life –emotional, moral, and intellectual. Through their cooperation, these institutions 
would propagate higher ideals within future generations, accomplishing the godly work of 
gradually unfolding a nobler nature within the human race.  
To combat degeneracy, Forbush recommended a “higher nurture” that would rear boys 
and girls in health and virtue and inculcate in them ideals of love, cooperation, and social 
service. In this labor, Forbush advocated a coordinated effort between homes, Sunday schools, 
YMCAs and YWCAs, public schools, universities, civic movements, reform and social 
organizations, and, of course, churches. But while Forbush remained principally concerned with 
coordinating an expansive web of Christian nurture, he also recognized the necessity of eugenics. 
Defining the latter as the “science of the Well Born,” Forbush dedicated an entire chapter to 
explicating the virtues of this “newest of the sciences.” In this chapter, Forbush urged his readers 
to view the propagation of healthy, virtuous children as both a religious calling and social duty. 
As a Christian professional who was clearly attuned to the advances of modern science, Forbush 
believed eugenics harmonized with Christian principles of health and nurture. “Eugenics,” 
Forbush wrote,  
has to do with the instruction of future fathers and mothers in the laws of parenthood, in 
the purity of sex relations, and the consequent abolition of the transmissible diseases 
produced by sexual vice, in the prohibition of marriage and marriage relations between 
the unfit, and in the encouragement of those who are most fit for parenthood to seek its 																																																								
78 Forbush, The Coming Generation, 3. 
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opportunities and duties. In short, it desires that better people shall become better parents 
of better children. It would renew the world by the propagation of its strongest and best 
stocks.79  
 
 As Forbush saw it, eugenics represented an important part of Christian parenthood, as it 
stressed clean and virtuous living on the part of the parents and a commitment to rearing clean 
and virtuous children. Eugenics promised progress through the propagation of a healthier, more 
righteous race, which harmonized with the modernist commitment to cooperating with God in 
his evolutionary work. But as the above passage indicates, Forbush also envisioned negative 
eugenic procedures as a necessary part of this commitment. Since human nature had a hereditary 
basis, eugenic procedures that could end the transmission of degeneracy held great promise to 
the modernist mission of transforming human nature. Thus, Forbush saw “asexualization” and 
other scientific methods as effective tools for dealing with the morally inept, criminal, and 
sexually perverse: “The asexualizing of the feeble-minded [sic] and of habitual criminals, 
especially those guilty of sexual sins, will probably be legitimized generally, as it is already in a 
few states. Science will give further suggestions as to the possibility of magnifying the good and 
minimizing the evil heritages.”80 
For Forbush, targets of asexualization included wards of the state who were beyond the 
repair of religious nurture. Of special concern was the “moral imbecile,” who Forbush described 
as “tricky and untrustworthy, capable of profuse professions and feelings but devoid of 
conscience. He may according to his grade, be beastial, a plotter of mischief, or possessed of 
genius for evil.”81 Forbush recommended segregation or sterilization for this class of 
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degenerates: “For these, if for any, is the method of asexualization justifiable, although the fact 
that they are known to be dangerous if at large, makes their parents, as well as the authorities, 
content that their sequestration from society shall be permanent.”82 Forbush was also concerned 
with feebleminded persons in state institutions, who had the “bodies and passion of adults, but 
[who were] always immature in mind,”83 recommending the segregation and asexualization of 
“congenitally abnormal children who deviated “from the standard of human nature.”84 These 
eugenic practices would keep feebleminded and otherwise unfit persons from reproducing, 
thereby blocking the hereditary transmission of degeneracy and halting the production of a 
permanent underclass comprised of people who were unable to control their baser instincts.  
Forbush’s arguments testify to the appeal of negative eugenics for modernists. 
Modernists were concerned about heredity as a vehicle of sinfulness even if they often prioritized 
interventions that sought redemption chiefly through nurture. Indeed, in this way Forbush 
reminds us that proponents of soft heredity were often just as vociferous as hard hereditarians in 
their support for negative eugenic policies. Forbush saw asexualization as a viable way of ending 
the intergenerational cycle of degeneracy in extreme cases. More generally, however, Forbush’s 
theses underscore how easily eugenics could fit within modernism as a religion of life. Eugenics 
represented a viable part of a broader modernist initiative to cooperate with God’s evolutionary 
work in uplifting human nature. And this is precisely the way in which eugenics fit within the 
modernist agenda: as part of an extensive program of Christian nurture that joined homes, 
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churches, and other important social institutions within the evolutionary redemption of human 
nature. 
Mathews would have agreed with many of Forbush’s recommendations, including 
Forbush’s endorsement of negative eugenics. After all, Mathews believed there was a “genetic 
relationship” between biological inheritances and the personality, with the former sometimes 
perverting or stymying the development of the latter. The ontological paradox of the human 
animal made hereditarian solutions to human sinfulness an important part of modernist 
platforms. No matter how much Mathews preferred to emphasize the spiritual over the biological 
and no matter how much he criticized eugenic science for its materialism, the paradox of the 
human animal pushed modernists like Mathews to support eugenic interventions as part of their 
Christian labor to do God’s evolutionary work.  
Mathews’ Impact on Modernist Engagements with Eugenics 
 Mathews’ evolutionary theology provided a framework for modernist engagements with 
eugenics during the 1920s. Ministers followed Mathews in viewing Christ as the ethical finality 
of evolution and in advocating eugenic interventions within human heredity as a way of 
advancing God’s redemptive work. In an anonymous sermon preached for the American 
Eugenics Society in 1926, for example, a minister opened by reflecting upon significance of 
Christ. Abridging Ephesians 4:13 to read, “Till we come unto a perfect man,” the minister asked, 
“‘A perfect man’ –what does that mean?” The minister replied, “It means an ideal humanity; it 
means the fulfillment of the great Creator’s plan Who said, ‘Let us make man in our own 
image’.” In a declaration that could have come from Mathews himself, the minister avowed, 
“Man is not yet made. The process of creation is not yet complete. It is a slow process, all 
creation is.” The minister cited the ethical finality of Christ, a central component of the 
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Mathews’ modernist platform, as his primary motivation for endorsing the creative work of 
eugenics. In a passage that underscores his modernist convictions, the minister explained his 
enthusiasm for eugenics, 
It is the high function of science to ascertain how God works, how He creates. It is the 
equally high function of religion to implant in human hearts the passion of cooperation 
with God in his creative processes, His creative processes, which are, ultimately, 
redemptive processes […] He calls upon us to be the agents and promoters of every 
process by which we may diminish the distance between what humanity is today, and that 
perfect humanity, the norm and type of which we have in Christ.85  
 
One of the most important contributions made by Mathews’ evolutionary theism to the 
socialization of eugenics in the United States was the promotion of the idea that eugenics would 
create a more moral and spiritual human race. As a measure of transcendence with respect to 
human animality, the spiritual ideal of Christ sanctified eugenic discrimination. In fact, the 
spiritual ideal of Christ allowed evolutionary theists to imagine that they were acting out of 
meekness and Christ-like virtue in supporting eugenic initiatives. The inhabitants of the kingdom 
of God, Rev. Adams opined, “will be the MORALLY and SPIRITUALLY fit. The meek shall 
inherit the earth.” W.F. Butler, a Methodist minister from Chandler, Arizona, agreed. “God has 
revealed and experience shows that in the world of human kind Christlike [sic] qualities are the 
more lasting. It is the meek, rather than the cruel, the vicious and the immoral, who are to inherit 
the earth.” Statements like these demonstrate how the ethical ideal of Christ allowed contest 
participants to transfigure the classist face of eugenics into the genteel visage of a humble and 
loving servant of humanity. Frederick F. Adams, a minister from Hinesburg, Vermont, earnestly 
insisted to his congregants that eugenics represented the “conquest of the world by love and 
cooperation.” The statement appears as a bold faced lie given that eugenics was inherently 
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discriminatory, working through heavy-handed procedures that targeted the livelihood of the 
poor and socially abject. And yet the idea that eugenics was laboring for a more Christian 
embodiment for the human race could make eugenics seem to its supporters as something that 
was not mired by class or racial prejudice but, quite oppositely, as an enterprise that transcended 
such prejudices. 
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CHAPTER 5: THE GERM PLASM: CHARLES DAVENPORT AND THE SCIENCE OF 
RACIAL THEISM 
 
 “I believe that to secure to the next generation the smallest burden of defective development, of physical stigmata, 
of mental defect, of weak inhibitions, and the largest proportion of physical, mental and moral fitness, it is necessary 
to make careful marriage selection –not on the ground of the qualities of the individual, merely, but of his or her 
family traits; and I believe that I can never realized the ideals I have for my children without this basis of appropriate 
germinal factors.” 
 
-Charles B. Davenport, “Eugenics as Religion,” 1916 
 
Introduction 
In 1916, America’s leading eugenicist, Charles Benedict Davenport published a eugenic 
analysis of Lyman Abbott in Eugenical News, the mouthpiece for the Eugenics Record Office in 
Cold Springs Harbor, New York. Davenport often published eugenic analyses of prominent 
Americans and used them to evince the preeminence of heredity in shaping human character and 
abilities. Abbott was a famous liberal Protestant intellectual, writer, and, at one time, pastor of 
Plymouth Church in Brooklyn, New York. This was the same Plymouth Church in which Henry 
Ward Beecher delivered his sermons on evolution in the 1880s. It was also the church then 
pastored by Newell Dwight Hillis. Most importantly, it was a church that Davenport’s famously 
pious father, Amzi Davenport, helped to found and that Charles attended as a child. Davenport 
based his eugenic analysis on Abbott’s Reminisces, which had just been published the previous 
year. Reminisces provided an autobiographical account of the religious liberalism for which 
Abbott was famous. Davenport was driven to write his eugenic analysis of Abbott out of the 
tremendous respect he held for this towering turn-of-the-twentieth century religious figure. 
Davenport even wrote Abbott before the publication of his eugenic assessment, assuming a 
decidedly humble posture in his correspondence. “Probably you will not remember me,” 
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Davenport began his letter, “but you will remember my father and his family at Plymouth 
Church.” After deferentially asking Abbott to “strike out” in his eugenic assessment anything 
that appeared “unjust, untrue, or prejudicial” to Abbott or his family’s “good name,” Davenport 
closed his short letter by emoting his high regard for Abbott. “Let me express the great pleasure 
that I have had in reading your ‘Reminisces’ during the past two or three days. It is one of the 
pleasures of my life that I can say I have known you and often listened to your sermons and 
addresses.”1 
 Davenport respected Abbott’s religious liberalism, which claimed inspiration from Henry 
Ward Beecher and which, as Abbott himself insisted, reimagined the Christian concept of 
salvation as an evolutionary process of “ascent from a previous animal order.”2 But if his eugenic 
assessment is any indication of things, Davenport’s respect had as much to do with Abbott’s 
heredity as it did with his evolutionary theism. The source of Abbott’s greatness as a religious 
innovator, Davenport’s eugenic analysis argued, was his germ plasm, which was also the thing 
that Davenport most chiefly revered about Abbott. In the biologistic idiom of mainline eugenics, 
Davenport traced Abbott’s greatness to his New England pedigree. “With his New England 
blood,” Davenport wrote, Abbott “has always been strongly inhibited, unemotional, 
unsuggestible [sic], reserved, inaccessible to ‘temptations’.” Abbott, in other words, possessed 
salubrious and socially useful traits that were inherent to his New England breeding. “His 
personality, his reactions, his achievements” were, Davenport concluded, “the natural product of 
the parental determiners.”3 For these hereditary reasons Davenport counted Abbott among the 
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PA. 
 
2 Lyman Abbott, Reminisces (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1915), vii-viii. 
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elite of American society and for these reasons as well eugenicists ought to celebrate him and 
applaud his work. 
 The purpose of this chapter is to use the writing and professional labors of Charles 
Davenport to demonstrate that mainline eugenics functioned as a discourse of racial theism. 
Unlike Horace Bushnell or Henry Ward Beecher, two discoursers of racial theism already 
considered, Davenport seldom explicitly invoked the theological idea that God sought to 
propagate an elect national body out of a chosen racial stock. And yet his eugenic science both 
presupposed and developed racial theism. Mainline eugenics was secularized racial theism. It 
was a racial theism that presumed inborn Anglo-American providence without ever explicitly 
invoking it. In fact, eugenic science represents the culmination of racial theism as a theological 
tradition: the final collapse of any and all distinction between the natural and supernatural within 
the hereditary superiority of the white racial body. Davenport did not need to invoke God in 
declaring Abbott’s hereditary election. His readership would have presupposed a theistic 
connection between Abbott’s unique spiritual comportment, prodigious intellect, and New 
England pedigree. Indeed, to invoke such a pedigree was to imply providence. Bushnell’s divine 
mandate had become completely biologized. 
 Davenport repudiated Lamarckism, arguing that heredity was closed off to the influence 
of environment. To account for racial development, Davenport insisted that hereditary changes 
were introduced by chemical determiners within the germ plasm. The germ plasm referred to the 
combined creative substance of the gametes, or sex cells, which together housed all of the 
hereditary determiners. Largely shut off from the influence of environment, Davenport argued, 
these determiners were solely responsible for the moral, mental, and physical traits of 
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individuals. Davenport thus promoted a biologistic account of human nature, insisting that the 
propagation of a better race was principally a matter of breeding and not nurture. While 
biologistic in scope and practice, however, mainline eugenics promoted –and was itself premised 
upon –a discourse of racial theism. Davenport was the direct descendent of John Davenport, the 
Puritan founder of New Haven, Connecticut, and a New England patriarch venerated by Charles’ 
father, Amzi. Charles’ work in eugenics was influenced by the New England filial piety in which 
he was reared. Mainline eugenics biologized the special providence associated with Puritan 
identity. In Davenport’s rendering, to be Puritan was to be, as Abbott was, hereditarily elect, 
which underscores the fact that, in becoming a completely biological category, Puritan identity 
retained the racial connotations of providence that it had acquired during the days of Bushnell 
and Beecher. 
 Davenport imagined eugenics as a science that could ensure the development of a 
superior white race. He read national history as an unrealized opportunity to develop a superior 
white stock and he encouraged Americans to think of eugenics as an opportunity to become 
“trustees” of the racial germ plasm. While Davenport never fully developed his concept of 
“trusteeship,” he supported the work of someone who did –namely, Albert E. Wiggam. Wiggam 
was incredibly important for the popularization of eugenics as a science of white racial hygiene 
within modernist circles. Himself a modernist, Wiggam argued that eugenics represented the 
fulfillment of the Christian mandate to propagate a righteous race. Wiggam’s work supplied 
mainline eugenics with a theological framework that helped popularize its message and 
initiatives. In this capacity, he did more than any other American to socialize mainline eugenics 
in modernist circles. 
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Davenport’s Rejection of Propagative Religion  
Throughout his public career as a eugenicist, Davenport insisted that religion was 
incapable of propagating a more righteous race. Indeed, Davenport’s entire career was premised 
upon the idea that only the modern science of genetics could ensure as much. For Davenport, the 
propagative power of religion was sharply limited by nature. In one of the most important texts 
for the development of mainline eugenics in the United States, for example, Davenport wrote, 
“Religious teachers do grand work and the value to the state of properly developed and 
controlled emotions is incalculable. Yet how dependent, after all, are religious or moral teachings 
upon the nature of those who receive them.”4 While none of this meant that religion was 
obsolete, it did mean that the focus of race propagation should fall on nature first and nurture 
second, with Davenport insisting that the only sure and lasting way to propagate a better race 
was through scientific cultivation of the germ plasm.5 The gist of such a message was that the 
path to race progress was not moral nurture but procreative sex. 
 Davenport understood the social value of religion primarily in propagative terms. But he 
also believed that religion’s propagative potential was sharply limited by heredity. In a 1916 
lecture that he delivered at John Harvey Kellogg’s Battle Creek Sanitarium, for example, 
Davenport reflected on the practical value of religion for the race. “What is religion good for?” 
Davenport asked. He replied by arguing the “function of religion” was to “train the inhibitions in 
so far as they can be trained” and to thereby “secure emotional control.” Inhibitions, Davenport 
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5 In an unpublished manuscript for a biology textbook, Davenport reflected upon the 
overwhelming power of nature. Speaking of the germ plasm’s chromosomes, he wrote, 
“[N]othing passes from generation to generation except through them. So fateful, indeed, are the 
chromosomes that had they been known 2 [sic] millennia ago the Greeks would probably have 
created a temple to them.” “From Generation to Generation,” Charles Davenport Papers, 
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explained, “require direction and training during development in childhood” and the task of 
religion was to introduce “special motives” that could properly guide said development. 
Christianity worked by training children to subordinate their instinctual drives to their love for 
Christ, who Davenport described as a “wholly good, gentle and self-sacrificing hero” who 
represented a religious idealization of the human “instinct of love.” Arguing from a eugenic 
standpoint, however, Davenport claimed that the propagative power of Christianity was 
circumscribed by heredity. This was because not everyone possessed a capacity for the self-
sacrificing love represented by Christ. One simply could not cultivate the ruling inhibition of 
selfless love when the trait for such was lacking in a particular individual, stock, or even race. 
This alleged genetic fact prompted Davenport to convey an important lesson to his Battle Creek 
audience about the uniqueness of eugenics as a new paradigm for race betterment. Contrasting 
mainline eugenics with established ideas about Christian nurture, Davenport declared, eugenics 
“is based on the principle that nothing can take the place of innate qualities. While it recognizes 
the value of [religion] it insists that culture of a trait is futile, where the germs of the trait are 
absent.”6  
 Davenport’s biologically reductionistic view of heredity undermined prevailing ideas 
regarding the power of Christian nurture, even ideas that had held sway in Davenport’s 
childhood home. Davenport’s mother, Jane Joralemon Dimon, professed a faith that revolved 
around her maternal obligation to rear godly children. One of Jane’s most trusted references was 
Gorham D. Abbott’s 1843 guidebook, The Mother’s Friend: Or Familiar Directions for Forming 
the Mental and Moral Habits of Young Children.7 Like Horace Bushnell’s more famous 
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Christian Nurture, Abbott’s book propounded an organic view of human nature, enjoining 
mothers to embrace their roles as shapers of their children’s character. From Abbott’s book, Jane 
learned to understand her love for her children as something “instinctive,” to think of childhood 
in the naturalistic framework of “seed-time,” and to sanctify motherhood as part of God’s “great 
moral purpose” for propagating love and goodness.8 Through his training as an evolutionary 
biologist, however, Charles came to believe that the propagative power of maternal virtue was 
much more limited than his mother had assumed. The moral nurture of Christian mothers could 
only bring out what latent potentialities preexisted in the germ plasm. As Davenport put it in his 
textbook on eugenic science, “Religion would be a much more effective thing if everybody had a 
healthy emotional nature; and it can do nothing at all with natures that have not the elements of 
love, loyalty, and devotion.”9  
Mainline eugenics undermined two ideas that were fundamental for New England 
propagative piety. The first was that nurture corrected for bad heredity. The second was that 
nurture directly influenced racial development. Both of these ideas were firmly embedded in 
middle class New England culture during the early part of Davenport’s career. Indeed, common 
sense about heredity during the rise of mainline eugenics was pretty much the same as it had 
been during the late nineteenth century. The widespread view in white middle class culture 
assumed a fluid and open reciprocity between nurture and nature: the prevailing atmosphere of 
the home –which could be spiritually regenerative, degenerative or somewhere in between –was 
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literally suffused into the physiological development of children, a suffusion that, for better or 
worse, had a hereditary influence on future generations. In this Lamarckian understanding of 
heredity, nurture and nature folded together to the point of being indistinct from one another, but 
the emphasis was always on nurture as a means of affecting both individual and racial 
development. Indeed, since moral influence mediated the effects of heredity, cultures of white 
degeneracy that allegedly prevailed in impoverished homes and that impeded racial development 
could be corrected over the long term through environmental reforms. This popular 
understanding of heredity, as previous chapters attest, was immensely important for the 
racialization and domestication of middle class New England piety, the same brand of piety that 
Abbott’s book on maternal nurture helped to institutionalize within the Davenport household. 
And yet Davenport’s science of eugenics undermined prevailing ideas about heredity. Most 
importantly, mainline eugenics rejected the notion that Christian nurture functioned as a 
regenerative force. Instead, it argued that nature provided –or did not provide –the materials 
upon which nurture worked. The difference with respect to religion and race propagation was 
anything but trivial. 
The Science of Mainline Eugenics 
Mainline eugenics was made possible by two late nineteenth century developments in the 
study of heredity. The first was August Weismann’s theory of the germ plasm. A German 
evolutionary biologist who embodied the waxing spirit of scientific materialism, Weismann 
strove to uncover those discernible, mechanistic, and “actual processes upon which the 
phenomenon of heredity depend.”10 As part of his biologistic framework, Weismann defined the 
germ plasm as the “hereditary substance contained in the [nuclei of the] germ cells” or 																																																								
10 August Weismann, The Germ Plasm: A Theory of Heredity, trans. W. Newton Parker (New 
York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1893), ix. 
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gametes.11 It was the germ plasm, Weismann argued, that contained “all primary constituents 
which are necessary for the formation of the organism.”12 
Weismann saw his work as an important corrective to theories of heredity that advocated 
“pangenesis,” or the idea that the cells of the body participated in the production of hereditary 
materials.13 The notion of pangenesis supported Lamarckian models of heredity that dominated 
the nineteenth century. Pangenesis also supported popular understandings of heredity that 
underwrote the propagative view of Christianity developed by Bushnell and others, allowing one 
to imagine that the regenerative power of nurture influenced hereditary substances through the 
development of the body. Weismann, however, rejected the idea that the “soma” (or cells of the 
body) played a part in the production of hereditary materials. The germinal substances were 
closed off from the soma, with the germ plasm representing a kind of hereditary vector that 
transcended the generational influence of nurture. This meant that any change affected by 
heredity happened through changes introduced by the germ plasm itself and not through the 
regenerative or degenerative influence of environment. In this way, Weismann’s theory of the 
germ plasm imagined a unidirectional relationship between genotype and phenotype and thus 
undermined the “usually accepted view” that acquired characteristics were transmitted from one 
generation to the next.14 
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13 Weismann stated, “I believe that all parts of the body do not contribute to produce germ from 
which the new individual arises, but that, on the contrary, the offspring owes it origin to a 
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Mainline eugenics combined Weismann’s theory with another nineteenth century 
development in hereditary knowledge: Mendel’s work on the transmission of traits. Davenport 
synthesized Weismann and Mendel’s research through his experimental work in animal 
breeding, through which Davenport was able to study Mendelian laws of inheritance and theorize 
about the genotypic functioning of the germ plasm. Davenport’s early efforts to organize a 
eugenics program grew out of his involvement with the American Breeders Association, one of 
the earliest organizations in the country to promote research in Mendelism.15 Bringing 
Weismann and Mendel together, Davenport speculated that the germ plasm housed hereditary 
“determiners,” chemical substances that, either directly or in combination with one another, 
produced all of a person’s physical and mental characteristics. Determiners, Davenport theorized, 
followed Mendelian patterns of inheritance, with dominant traits being associated with the 
presence of a determiner and recessive traits being associated with its lack.16 Transmitted inter-
generationally through the germ plasm, these determiners represented discrete, quantifiable 
objects of scientific analysis, holding out the possibility that the complexity of human life could 
be reduced to the relatively closed interplay of these biological substances. In this respect, 
Davenport was especially optimistic. Indeed, the good news of eugenic science was that traits 
“are inheritable, they are independent of each other, and they may be combined in any desirable 
mosaic.”17 
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It would be hard to overemphasize the importance of the trait for the vision of social 
reform promised by eugenic science. Davenport insisted that all human mental and emotional 
characteristics could be identified and mapped according to Mendelian laws of inheritance as 
simply as physical traits like eye and hair color. In fact, the bulk of Davenport’s prestige as 
America’s leading eugenicist was staked upon the idea that this was the case. In 1912, for 
example, he published The Trait Book, which attempted a full inventory of genetically isolatable 
human characteristics. Listing hundreds of physical traits, the little book also catalogued mental 
traits like “curiosity,” “imagination,” “logicalness,” “boldness,” “conceit,” and “love of power.” 
It even listed “special abilities” like “mathematics,” “musical composition,” and “mechanics.”18 
Davenport went so far as to suggest that a person’s propensity to a particular career followed 
Mendelian patterns of inheritance, while intimating that, given adequate research, all human 
traits would be identified and inventoried in terms of their social value.19 In some ways, the book 
is a testament to the audacity of eugenic science. As one contemporary geneticist reminds us, 
mainline eugenicists like Davenport outstripped their comprehension of genetics when they 
supposed that human behavior, like eye color, was so easily quantifiable.20 But the book is also a 
record of the appeal of the trait as a hereditary paradigm. Isolatable and material, the trait made 
race propagation a quantifiable thing, foretelling a day when eugenics would literally engineer a 
better body politic.  																																																																																																																																																																																		
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Mainline eugenics had consequences for the problem of race degeneracy. Most 
importantly, it decreed that the fight against degeneracy ought to revolve around better breeding 
and not environmental interventions that sought race betterment by introducing higher moral 
standards to lower class cultures. For Davenport, degeneracy was not transmitted through culture 
but through the germ plasm, which meant that rehabilitative efforts aimed at inculcating higher 
hygienic ideals within cultures of poverty would ultimately fail. Hence, one of the primary 
contribution of mainline eugenics toward the problem of race degeneracy was that it redefined 
the concept of feeblemindedness which had, since the late nineteenth century, been a term used 
in professional circles to refer to the moral weakness allegedly propagated into the race through 
poor white cultures. Feeblemindedness referred to low intelligence but also to the hereditary 
disposition of being “feebly inhibited” when it came to suppressing baser instincts.21 Davenport 
and other eugenicists argued that feeblemindedness was not a cultural force but the result of a 
trait whose determiners followed Mendelian patterns of inheritance.22 Eugenicists argued that 
such a trait could be blocked by segregating or sterilizing people who supposedly possessed it, 
thereby neutralizing a preeminent source of race degeneracy.  
In Davenport’s vision, eugenic science made it possible to identify traits that were useful 
and deleterious to the race and map their transmission across the country. The idea that traits 
could be identified, tracked, and eliminated helped popularize eugenic studies of white 
degeneracy during the teens and twenties. These influential studies sought to explain the 
propagation of poverty, criminality, and sexual licentiousness in rural white America by tracking 
the hereditary transmission of feeblemindedness. Earlier studies in race degeneracy explained 
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feeblemindedness in terms of both nature and nurture and prioritized interventions that 
championed environmental reforms. By the 1910s and ‘20s, however, eugenic science provided 
these family studies with a new biological language for codifying feeblemindedness. With 
mainline eugenicists arguing that feeblemindedness followed Mendelian patterns of 
transmission, eugenics held out the possibility that one could track and then eliminate hereditary 
determiners associated with white pauperism. By reducing complex social phenomena to 
discrete, quantifiable, and hereditable chemical substances, mainline eugenicists successfully 
convinced privileged white Americans that modern science could locate and eliminate the 
sources of race degeneracy.23 Indeed, at least some of the appeal of such a message had to do 
with the easy and efficient contrast it offered when compared to solutions to degeneracy that 
revolved around environmental interventions. Sterilization, for example, could seem a far easier 
answer to the intransigence of white pauperism than moral reform. 
By the 1920s, the idea that feeblemindedness represented a genetically transmitted 
condition that nurture was powerless to correct became widely accepted in large part thanks to 
mainline eugenics organizations like the ERO and the AES. The eugenic view of degeneracy 
became so influential in fact that it played a direct role in the US Supreme Court’s 1927 decision 
in Buck v. Bell, which established the constitutionality of eugenic sterilization and provided the 
legal groundwork for the enactment and enforcement of sterilization laws across the country. The 
Court’s decision in this landmark case upheld the eugenic sterilization of Carrie Buck, an inmate 
of a feebleminded institution in Virginia whose reproductivity posed a social threat in so far as 
she allegedly bore the trait for feeblemindedness. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes captured the 
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eugenic understanding of feeblemindedness in the Court’s decision, when, appraising Buck’s 
condition, he famously declared, “Three generations of imbeciles are enough.”24 As far as both 
eugenic science and Holmes were concerned, Buck’s “condition” had nothing to do with class, 
culture, or nurture. She was feebleminded because her germ plasm made her that way and she 
needed to be kept from passing on her tainted germinal material to future generations.   
Mainline eugenicists like Davenport justified negative eugenic policies like immigration 
restriction, eugenic sterilization, and anti-miscegenation laws as policies that were of immediate 
value to the protection and enhancement of the racial germ plasm. In professional eugenicists’ 
minds, traits did not belong to the individual. Traits were national resources. And this meant that 
traits had to be identified, assessed, and regulated with respect to their impact on the race’s 
biological potential. Immigration restriction, for example, was a policy that Davenport justified 
explicitly in terms of protecting the racial germ plasm against degenerate traits. “[I]t is not too 
much to say,” Davenport wrote, “that the future of our nation depends on the perpetuation by 
reproduction of our best protoplasm in proper matings and we cannot have proper matings unless 
our best protoplasm is located and known.”25 This eugenic will to knowledge included a 
proposal to eugenically screen all immigrants who entered the country in order to identify and 
assess the determiners that they would be introducing to the racial germ plasm.26 
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The Mainline Eugenic Way to Race Betterment 
The solution to race degeneracy offered by mainline eugenics was quite different than 
those that claimed religious inspiration. As discussed in preceding chapters, modernists like 
Hillis and Mathews believed that Christian principles and ideals supplied critical resources for 
fighting race degeneracy, especially in educating young men and women about the virtues of 
righteous living. In these and other religiously inspired visions of race betterment, the fight 
against degeneracy often revolved around building Christian homes. Thus, for example, in The 
Coming Generation William Forbush imagined the struggle against race degeneracy as a matter 
of training young men and women in Christian ideals of parenthood, which involved teaching 
them the importance of sexual purity and training them in both religious and scientific principles 
of childrearing. Forbush’s vision of race betterment contrasted sharply with Davenport’s. Instead 
of envisioning a eugenics program that revolved around the deployment of hygienic culture, 
Davenport saw the fight against degeneracy as matter of trait selection. Of course, this did not 
obviate hygienic culture. Nor did it render superfluous the need for racially wholesome homes. 
But it did drastically alter how one should understand the social office of parenthood.   
Davenport encouraged parents to think of themselves not, first and foremost, as nurturers 
of their children’s development, but rather, as transmitters of germ plasm. Thus, Davenport 
called upon present and future parents to conceive their marital duty in the following terms: “I 
believe that I am the trustee of the germ plasm that I carry, that this has been passed on to me 
through thousands of generations before me; and that I betray the trust if, (the germ plasm being 
good) I so act as to jeopardize it, with its excellent possibilities, or, from motives of personal 
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convenience, to unduly limit offspring.”27 While still revolving around the sacred office of 
parenthood, Davenport described the fight against degeneracy not in terms of hygienic culture 
but in terms of trusteeship of germ plasm. Again, this is not to say that hygienic culture was 
unimportant for him. It most certainly was. It is to say, however, that Davenport made the 
struggle against degeneracy less about calibrating the moral economy of the home and more 
about controlling the production of bad germ plasm through reproductive sex.  
 By the teens, Davenport’s genetic approach to fighting race degeneracy was gaining 
prominence while also consolidating scientific authority over the question of race betterment. 
This is evidenced by the reaction that mainline eugenics provoked among those who belonged to 
other professional fields, especially education, domestic economy, and public hygiene. At the 
First National Conference on Race Betterment in 1914, for example, Mrs. Melvil Dewey, an 
advocate of euthenics, argued that eugenics overreached its knowledge. The only tried and true 
way of ensuring race progress, she insisted, involved scientific collaboration between all the 
professional fields involved in public health. Race betterment, in other words, could not be 
reduced to trait selection, as Davenport maintained, but necessitated interventions that improved 
all aspects of human life, including “pure food and water, fresh air, sound sleep, safe exercise, 
cleanliness and sanitary conditions.”28 Dewey was an acolyte of Ellen H. Richards, the scientist 
and social reformer who first coined the term “euthenics” in 1905 and who published a book 
defining euthenics’ scope and aims in 1910. Dewey represented Richards, who died three years 
before the conference and who, like many other reformers, argued that the struggle against 
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degeneracy was as complex as life itself, necessitating a multidisciplinary approach that worked 
through social, medical, scientific, and even religious organizations. Eugenics challenged the 
wisdom of euthenics, however, by insisting that the issue of degeneracy was reducible to the 
interaction of chemical substances in the germ plasm. And in this way eugenics claimed the issue 
of race betterment nearly exclusively for itself. 
 That mainline eugenics encroached on the domain of public health professionals is 
evidenced by Dewey’s paper at the 1914 conference. Dewey argued that eugenic science was 
still largely unproven and that its applications for race betterment were yet to be determined. In 
crafting her argument, Dewey separated eugenics and euthenics into distinct fields of inquiry and 
application, providing a point-by-point contrast between the two:  
Eugenics deals with race improvement through heredity. Euthenics deals with race 
improvement through environment. Eugenics is hygiene for future generations. Euthenics 
is hygiene for the present generation. Eugenics must await careful investigation. 
Euthenics has immediate opportunity. Euthenics precedes eugenics, developing better 
men now, and thus inevitably creating a better race of men in the future.29 
 
Dewey’s argument against the immediate uses of eugenic knowledge represents an attempt to 
protect educators and public hygiene workers’ professional authority over the question of race 
betterment. Her paper, which so defensively drew lines between sciences that focused on human 
environments and those that focused on human heredity, can be understood as a response to 
Davenport’s success in convincing Americans that the germ plasm represented the only correct 
way of understanding the perpetuation of degeneracy. At the 1914 conference, Davenport did not 
directly respond to Dewey, but he did confidently assert that race betterment entailed “bringing 
home to the American people the importance of heredity.” “Above all,” Davenport asserted, this 
meant teaching Americans “the importance of marrying, marrying well and having healthy, 
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effective children –and plenty of them.”30 It was this vision of race betterment –one rooted in the 
genetic concept of germ plasm and anchored in the eugenic practice of better breeding –that was 
rapidly coming to predominate in professional circles during the teens.  
 By the late teens, mainline eugenics was having an impact on modernist Protestant 
thought. Those who wanted to craft working alliances between religion and science in the pursuit 
of race betterment could no longer ignore the claims that Davenport made with respect to the 
germ plasm. The most significant consequence of this shift in American eugenics discourse was 
that, if they wanted to stay relevant in professional circles, modernists had to give up 
Lamarckism and concede a much more limited role for nurture. Elliot Rowland Downing’s short 
introduction to heredity, The Third and Fourth Generation, is revealing in this respect. Downing 
was Professor of Natural Science at the University of Chicago at the time of the book’s 
publication. Written for The University of Chicago Publications in Religious Education, a series 
edited by Shailer Mathews, Downing’s book attempted to “consider frankly and seriously the 
scientific facts regarding the problem commonly called ‘eugenics’.” Espousing a modernist faith, 
Downing argued that, while the religious import of eugenics was not immediately apparent, it 
nonetheless posed important questions for the Christianization of society. As Downing wrote in 
his preface, “The religious significance of a reverent and thoughtful understanding of this highly 
interesting subject is at once apparent when one thinks of the perfecting of human society as the 
goal of the divine plan.” Christians, Downing insisted, could supply “the spiritual significance of 
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the evolutionary goal” sought by mainline eugenicists, which would be the perfection of the 
human race.31  
Yet while Downing believed that Christians should accept and even sanctify the work of 
eugenics, he also demonstrated how doing as much necessitated relinquishing outdated ideas, 
especially the idea that acquired characteristics were inheritable. Dutifully conveying the 
scientific principles of eugenics, Downing averred, “It is the germ plasm that gives rise to the 
soma plasm, not the reverse.”32 “[A]cquired characters, which are modifications that impress the 
body plasm only,” he concluded, “can not be transmitted.”33 The Third and Fourth Generation 
proved popular. It went through four editions by 1926. It is worth noting that Davenport 
reviewed Downing’s little book favorably: “We have traveled far in the past 50 years since the 
time when the name of evolutionist had the same sort of connotation as infidel or profligate, to 
the present when a series in Religious Education publishes the book of a modern biologist on 
heredity and eugenics prepared for classes in the Sunday school and for the reading of 
ministers.”34 
Was Downing confused? The idea that the germ plasm was closed off from the influence 
of nurture would seem to undermine religious interest in race betterment. After all, how could 
religious leaders imagine an important role in the fight against degeneracy when degeneracy 
itself issued through biological materials and thus so clearly constituted an object for genetic 
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interventions alone? As we will see in the final section of this chapter, however, the rising 
orthodoxy of eugenic science did not necessarily oppose evolutionary biologists like Davenport 
against innovators like Downing who wanted to maintain an important place for Christianity in 
race betterment. In fact, Downing turns out to be prophetic. Led by the efforts of innovating 
modernists, many religious writers and clergymen during the 1920s adapted to the waxing 
orthodoxy of eugenic science by attempting to deify the germ plasm as a sacred creative vessel. 
Before we explore this fascinating aspect of American eugenics, however, we must first 
investigate the origins of Davenport’s racial theism. 
Mainline Eugenics as Racial Theism 
 Davenport’s eugenic assessment of Abbott underscores the way in which eugenicists 
regarded New England as an exemplary stock. Davenport praised Abbott’s New England 
“blood.” As Davenport and others used it, blood referred to the concept of consanguinity.  Not a 
scientific term like germ plasm, trait, or determiner, blood was eugenic shorthand for the idea 
that certain mental and physical dispositions were propagated into stocks. “Blood will tell,” for 
example, was a popular eugenic refrain. The adage was used as a way of conveying the alleged 
fact that a person’s stock, for better or worse, determined a person’s potential. The notion that 
Abbott possessed New England blood thus denotes the eugenic understanding of New England 
as consanguineous group, or as an extended network of intermarrying families that had 
supposedly bred a unique stock, with a peculiar mental and moral bearing. In this way, it 
highlights the fact that eugenicists looked to New England as a model of hereditary fitness. 
Eugenicists like Davenport idealized early New England settlers as especially hearty people who 
possessed traits of ingenuity and industry. These were, after all, people who had the courage, 
fortitude, and intellect to traverse an entire ocean and flourish in the harsh conditions of the 
American frontier. Abbott was a descendant of these hearty people, a bearer of New England 
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blood, which was a way of saying that Abbott belonged to an elect racial stock. Abbott’s 
inhibition, impassiveness, intellectualism, and peculiar religiosity: these were the distinctive 
marks of his New England pedigree.  
Davenport’s eugenic portrait of Abbott helps us to clarify the relationship between 
mainline eugenics, on the one hand, and the concept of race, on the other. Modern biological 
science allowed eugenicists like Davenport to recodify the concept of race in the genetic 
language of Mendelism. It also provided an idiom for advancing three specific ideas with respect 
to race as a biological category. First, mainline eugenicists believed that there were constitutional 
differences between races. Races possessed different germinal determiners that registered 
through specific somatic traits. Thus, Davenport was especially concerned with identifying traits 
that were particular to races. In his influential introduction to eugenic science, Heredity in 
Relation to Eugenics, for example, Davenport theorized that the Irish were genetically disposed 
to “alcoholism” but that they also tended to possess traits of “sympathy,” “chastity,” and 
“leadership of men.” Southern Italians lacked “self-sufficing individualism” but they frequently 
demonstrated “patience,” “unflagging industry,” and “capacity for hard monotonous labor.” 
Davenport believed that reading racial differences in terms of the presence and transmission of 
distinct germinal substances had direct consequences for the way in which Americans ought to 
conceive race betterment. As he wrote, “The fact is that no race per se […] is dangerous and 
none undesirable; but only those individuals whose somatic traits or germinal determiners are, 
from the standpoint of social life, bad.35  
Second, eugenicists argued that a race’s somatic traits determined its social use and 
position: some races possessed traits that disposed them to lead, others possessed traits that 
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disposed them to follow; some possessed traits that made them natural laborers, others bore traits 
that inclined them to innovation. Lastly, and this is where Lyman Abbott comes back into the 
picture, all races were comprised of superior and inferior stocks. Abbott was not just white. He 
was old stock New England, which specified the superior somatic comportment of his whiteness. 
 It is not incidental to the story of American eugenics that Davenport was himself of New 
England stock. Charles was a direct descendent of John Davenport, the famous puritan leader 
and founder of New Haven, Connecticut, who arrived along with five hundred settlers on New 
England shores in 1638. Davenport’s puritan ancestry helps to explain his career in eugenics. In 
fact, studies of Anglo-American eugenics suggest that it played as important a role in his 
professional career as his training in evolutionary biology.  
Davenport argued that the goal of eugenics was to build a perfect society, or as he also 
once put it, a “united, altruistic, God-serving, law-abiding, effective and productive nation.”36 
The idea that eugenics could produce a more “God-serving” nation is an interesting claim, 
especially coming from a man who had little use for traditional religion. But it helps to confirm 
an argument made by journalist Harry Bruinius, who argues that, in ideological scope and 
promise, eugenics was inspired by the theocratic visions of social perfection espoused by early 
puritans like John Davenport. Charles Davenport was not only a direct descendant of John 
Davenport, Bruinius, suggests. He was also an inheritor of his famous forebear’s quest to “raise 
up a new social order, holy and pure.” Indeed, in Bruinius’ estimation, one cannot fully 
understand Charles’ career without apprehending how, in significant ways, his work represented 
a scientistic version of the puritan quest to construct “A City Upon a Hill.”37 In this way, 
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Bruinius helps us to see how Davenport’s career as a professional eugenicist was in no small part 
influenced by a uniquely American millennialist pathos that he had come to embody as part of 
his puritan identity.  
Davenport’s puritan identity also helps to explain why he often imagined old stock New 
England as a eugenically elect people who would build an ideal society. Davenport, for example, 
viewed Abbott as hereditarily special, even if Abbott did not identify himself in such a way. In 
significant ways, therefore, mainline eugenics reimagined puritan concepts of election and 
predestination in hereditarian terms. No matter how biologistic Davenport’s science was, it 
retained the racialized sense of election that Bushnell ascribed to New England. Just as Bushnell 
had re-envisioned New England as a “seed” and encouraged this elect race to conquer the world 
through its propagative power, Davenport reconceived old stock New England as a eugenic ideal 
whose hereditary fitness served as a model for a perfect society. Thus, while Davenport’s 
eugenics program pursued societal perfection through breeding, revolving around the 
reproduction of a better race instead of the propagation of religious ideals, his work nonetheless 
inflected a Calvinist concept of election through its hereditarianism.  
Of course, Davenport did not fancy himself a modern day puritan, at least not in the 
traditional religious sense of the term. Yet Davenport certainly understood himself as racially 
puritan, and this self-understanding shaped his career profoundly. That this is the case is 
evidenced by the kind of religious piety in which Davenport was reared.  
Davenport’s Filial Piety 
Amzi, Charles’ father, taught his son to view himself as a member of a providentially 
elect family. Amzi was so proud of his puritan ancestry, in fact, that he wrote, A History and 																																																																																																																																																																																		
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Genealogy of the Davenport Family. Published in 1851, fifteen years before Charles was born, 
the book traced twenty-five generations of Davenports, beginning with the founding of the 
Davenport title and estate in England in 1086 and proceeding through John Davenport and his 
New England descendants. At the time, the book was considered to be a major accomplishment 
of genealogical study, with one reviewer calling it the “most elaborate book of that sort ever 
published in the country.”38 Amzi dedicated his volume to all of John Davenport’s descendants, 
“who cherish the principles, emulate the virtues, and illustrate the example of their distinguished 
ancestor.”39 The book, as Bruinius argues, should be understood as a fundamental part of Amzi’s 
piety.40 But it also marks a shift from understanding the puritans as an elect community bound by 
a distinct religious vision to comprehending them as a special racial stock. In this way, the book 
can be understood as the germ for Charles’ eugenic comprehension of puritans as New England 
blood. 
The societal and familial dimensions of Amzi’s piety had the biggest impact on his son’s 
career in eugenics. Amzi’s faith revolved around personal acceptance of Christ as one’s “all 
sufficient Savior and Redeemer.” Salvation brought about changes within the person that were 
necessary for the foundation of a more god-like society, and Amzi was especially concerned with 
producing such. Amzi participated in the founding of new churches in New York, including 
Beecher’s in Brooklyn, while also agitating for social causes like abolition.41 The real fruits of 
																																																								
38 The Stamford Historical Society, Inc., “Portrait of a Family: Stamford through the Legacy of 
the Davenports: Amzi Benedict Davenport, 1817-1894,” Stamford Historical Society, 2009. 
Available online at http://www.stamfordhistory.org/dav_amzi.htm. Accessed 1/28/16. 
 
39 Amzi Davenport, A History and Genealogy of the Davenport Family (New York: W. Benedict, 
1851), iii. 
 
40 Bruinius, Better for All the World, 109. 
 
		
	
213 
religion for Amzi were thus socio-political, an idea that he had no doubt embraced as part of his 
proud puritan ancestry. As Francis J. Bremer observes, John Davenport had a “historical 
reputation as the most puritan of New England puritan leaders,” having founded New Haven 
with the purpose of invoking in “its citizens the responsibilities involved in striving for biblical 
perfection.”42 Like his distinguished forbear, Amzi’s piety stressed the reformation of the world, 
viewing personal piety as the foundation of a model Christian society. In his introduction, Amzi 
referred to “the Puritan Fathers of New England” as “constructors of society,” whose integrity 
and faith “laid the foundations of that mighty edifice which they were about to build, upon a 
broad and imperishable basis.”43 Amzi believed that present day New Englanders were 
responsible for preserving their righteous ancestors’ faith in a Christian polity. 
 But if Amzi’s faith was societal, it was also familial. Altogether, Amzi fathered 12 
children with two wives, a fact that Bruinius uses to support the idea that “foremost among” 
Amzi’s religious sensibilities was his dutiful obedience to “God’s command in Genesis to be 
fruitful and multiply.”44 As Bruinius and others observe, Amzi was often exacting when it came 
to his children’s discipline and moral integrity.45 In this respect, his domestic piety contrasted 
sharply with Jane’s, Charles’ mother and Amzi’s second wife, who was a much warmer, more 
nurturing figure. Importantly, scholars have understood Charles’ turn toward science during his 
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adolescence as a part of his rebellion against his father’s austere love. One scholar also sees 
Charles’ unyielding scientism as a reproduction of Amzi’s own unflinching religiosity.46  
 But A History and Genealogy of the Davenport Family reveals a more profound 
dimension of Amzi’s piety. Amzi imagined his book as a guide for New England families, 
especially fathers. In his preface, he wrote, “After much labor bestowed, in collecting and 
preparing materials, the work is sent forth as a vade mecum to the Family, with the hope that it 
may stimulate the present and future generations, to emulate the piety, the love of civil and 
religious liberty, and that devotion to ‘the common welfare of all’, which characterized the 
Puritan fathers of New England.”47 Central to Amzi’s work was the figure of John Davenport. 
The book celebrated the famous puritan not only as a model of piety but also as a New England 
patriarch. The narrative of the book thus revolved around Davenport’s life and labors, especially 
his founding of New Haven, Connecticut. The book’s appendices even included a selection of 
Davenport’s sermons and letters and a catalogue of his works. In this respect, John Davenport’s 
life, work, and ideals presented a model for contemporary New England fathers to emulate as 
patriarchs of their own families. As part of their piety, Amzi’s book suggested, they were to 
imagine themselves as progenitors of New England’s “future generations” just as Davenport 
himself had fathered New England. 
 Amzi’s book demonstrates the rising importance of genealogy during the nineteenth 
century as a method or concept for understanding the importance of family and familial identity. 
While the book revolved around the biography of John Davenport, it also narrated the patrilineal 
descent of the Davenport family through twenty-five generations. It began with the founding of 
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the Davenport title and estate by Ormus de Dauneporte in 1086 and ended with the birth of 
Thomas Davenport, born on September 3, 1849. Thomas, Amzi documented, was the five-
hundredth descendant of Ormus. The entire genealogical narrative, which spanned over seven 
hundred and fifty years, revolved around two organizing concepts: “marriage” and “issue.” Amzi 
defined marriage solely in terms of its genealogical function. It denoted not a relationship of 
property or the passing of an estate but a procreative relationship. Marriage produced issues, a 
term that meant something similar to “descendants” but that should be distinguished from “heir,” 
if by the latter one means the inheritor of property or an estate. Issue was a reproductive concept. 
It redefined inheritance strictly in terms of genealogy itself. Amzi, for example, was the three 
hundred and forty sixth issue of Ormus de Dauneporte, which meant that his inheritance was 
defined not in terms of patrimonial transmission of an estate (the original Davenport estate was 
in England) but in terms of his status as both descendent and propagator of a godly patrilineal 
line that reached back to the founding of the family name. 
 A History and Genealogy of the Davenport Family evinces a reconceptualization of 
patriarchy in propagative terms. The familial and social authority of early puritan fathers, as 
Steven Mintz and Susan Kellogg argue, rested on their “control of landed property or craft 
skills.”48 Paternal authority was tied to a father’s land, which a father divided between his sons 
and deeded to them, or to his trade, which a father also passed along to his male heirs. Mintz and 
Kellogg maintain that this basis for paternal power in puritan New England began to erode over 
the course of the eighteenth century due to a number of reasons, especially the “breakdown of 
the conception of marriage as a property settlement involving the division of family land.”49 A 
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new model of marriage emerged in the nineteenth century that reconceived parental authority in 
terms of the “care and proper nurture of children.”50 Amzi’s book represents an early attempt to 
reconceive paternal authority in terms of a propagative model of marriage. In place of land, 
Amzi substituted genealogy, attempting to achieve what one might describe as a re-
territorialization of paternal power. A father’s authority was no longer rooted in his property, 
Amzi’s book suggested, but in the genealogy or ancestry that he bequeathed to his children. His 
authority would be measured by his ability to propagate future generations that measured up to 
the family name. It should be emphasized that Amzi did not conceive such a responsibility apart 
from religious duty but as a fundamental part of piety itself. To be a both the issue and 
perpetuator of a godly familial line was to submit oneself to God’s purposes for New England.  
Following Ava Chamberlain, one might describe Amzi’s religiosity as “filiopietistic” and 
historicize his book as part of the “colonial revival period of the latter nineteenth century.”51 This 
period, as Chamberlain argues following the work of Joseph A. Conforti, witnessed the 
transformation of New England into “an ethnic identity” and the valorization of colonial New 
England figures as embodiments of American ideals.52 The filial turn to the past that 
characterizes the colonial revival period occurred in the face of increasing immigration and 
industrialization and thus accompanied New Englanders’ growing concern over cultural change. 
Jonathan Edwards, as Chamberlain shows, was resurrected at this time as an icon of American 																																																																																																																																																																																		
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virtue: “In contrast to the ethnic immigrants rapidly filling the squalid tenements of urban 
slums,” Chamberlain writes, “Edwards embodied the manly, morally earnest, strenuous life that 
Victorians imagined their puritan ancestors had pursued in their orderly villages.” Importantly, 
the “ancestor worship” that became common at this time was enabled by the increasing 
availability of colonial records, which New Englanders like Amzi used to construct genealogies 
in order to make “contact with their colonial pasts.”53 Indeed, the ethnic idealization of puritan 
patriarchs witnessed the rise of genealogy as a method for understanding the peculiar history of 
New England as a people.  
Not only does Chamberlain argue that eugenics further developed the filial piety of the 
colonial revival era, she also maintains that Charles Davenport’s work represents a development 
of his own father’s religiosity. “Charles Davenport inherited his father’s passion for the family’s 
colonial ancestors and imported into his scientific research the conviction that the roots of New 
England’s regional superiority lay in its puritan past.”54  
Drawing from Chamberlain’s conclusions, one might say that Charles biologized his 
father’s filial piety by transmuting puritan identity into the hereditary idiom of the germ plasm. 
If, as his eugenic assessment of Lyman Abbott indicates, Charles understood Puritan identity as a 
racial category, then the germ of this category appears in Amzi’s genealogy. Amzi’s book 
attempted to track the persistence of Davenport identity through time and space, that is, inter-
generationally, using the ideas of “marriage” and “issue” to chart the history of his family. His 
work therefore evidences a conception of providence that was becoming propagative in scope 
and practice. The emphasis here is important because his understanding of genealogy had no 
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comprehension of the biological body as the source of New England’s special identity. And yet 
the filial piety demonstrated through his genealogy might be described as proto-racial, 
representing an early attempt to think about the significance of a founding American family not 
solely in terms of its unique religious convictions but as a distinct propagative line. Amzi offered 
a new way of thinking about what it meant to be puritan by suggesting that, through the offices 
of marriage and family, religious ideals were something that one could be born into. His son 
developed this idea by arguing that puritans constituted a special stock, insisting that the peculiar 
qualities of puritans were innate to their germ plasms. In biologizing puritan identity, eugenic 
science obscured some of its overt religious significances, while at the same time transmuting its 
core characteristic of election into the biologistic idiom of the germ plasm. 
Davenport’s puritan identity shaped his career in profound ways. Most significantly, his 
sense of hereditary election authorized his role as the cultivator of the national germ plasm. 
Mainline eugenic policies like immigration restriction, compulsory sterilization, and anti-
miscegenation laws were all predicated upon the idea that society possessed the authority to 
occlude the hereditary impact of allegedly unfit bodies. Mainline eugenicists like Davenport 
exuded profound elitism in believing that their heredity allowed them to demand the eugenic 
control of others’ bodies, especially those of immigrants, poor whites, and blacks. The hereditary 
elitism that enabled Davenport to claim authority over these bodies was in no small degree 
derived from the alleged superiority of his puritan ancestry.  
While Davenport never overtly invoked his puritan ancestry during his public career, his 
racial pedigree nonetheless undergirded his professional authority. As Chamberlain argues, 
mainline eugenics received its greatest support from old stock New Englanders.55 Matthew Frye 
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Jacobson observes a similar connection between New England identity and support for eugenics 
when he argues that eugenics tapped into a prevailing “Anglo-Saxon complex,” which deployed 
a nativist ideology that fused whiteness, political fitness, and national character in order to justify 
the state’s obligation in “tending to the biological make-up of its population.” Jacobson’s classic 
work locates the nucleus of eugenics’ support within an elite cadre of Harvard-educated Anglo-
American nativists who founded the Immigration Restriction League in 1893.56 Both 
Chamberlain and Jacobson’s analyses indicate that eugenic thought and practice preceded the 
actual rise of mainline eugenics in the early twentieth century, developing through the 
racialization of New England identity during the latter half of the nineteenth. As Chamberlain’s 
work specifically attests, packed into this racialized identity were assumptions about New 
England that were distinctly religious in origin. Notions of providential election, of a special and 
divine mandate, suffused the mainline eugenic concept of New England as a racial stock, even as 
this concept often lost its explicitly religious connotations through the process of biologization. 
Amzi’s proto-racial piety marks an early moment in this process; his son’s career in eugenics 
marks its culmination. In this way, it is important to observe that no matter how much Davenport 
made a career out of scientific professionalism, the success of mainline eugenics intimately 
depended upon a racial formation in which mainline eugenics was only the final chapter. 
Eugenic science did not invent the idea that New England constituted an elect racial 
body. Such an idea had emerged as early as Bushnell and had been popularized through his 
work. In his vision, New England would Christianize the world through the “out-populating 
power” of its seed. He made it possible to think about New England not as a model Christian 
society but as an elect race. His work thus provided the first step in a longer process whereby the 																																																								
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racial body of New England became sacrosanct. After Bushnell, the racial body would 
increasingly become an object of religious veneration, the medium through which God was 
working to Christianize the world. Eugenic science built upon this tradition of venerating New 
England as a racial body, yet it departed from racialized discourses of Christian nurture by re-
codifying this racial body in the scientistic terms of germ plasms and determiners. In so doing, 
eugenic science claimed this racial body as an exclusive object of scientific control and 
development, secularizing this racial body by closing it off to religious influence and rendering it 
seemingly mundane by insisting that this body could be bred like cattle and racehorses. But no 
matter how much it profaned the uniqueness of this body through its biologistic idiom, eugenic 
science never completely diminished its sacredness. In fact, eugenics amplified it. Portending the 
disappearance of old stock New England and the impact this would have upon the country, 
Davenport opined at the First National Conference on Race Betterment: “In this very matter of 
our great stock must we depend upon the persistence of them. How we regret to see the 
testimony that the best of that grand old New England stock is dying out through failure to 
reproduce.”57  
Davenport regarded the puritans very differently than his father had. What made the 
puritans patriarchs of American society for Amzi were their religious ideals. What made them 
patriarchs of American society for his son were their germ plasms. The contrast between these 
two viewpoints is striking. Charles measured New England strictly in terms of its genetic 
potential. In the eugenic view of things, for example, Lyman Abbott was a man of peculiar 
religious vision. But more importantly, he was the bearer of New England germ plasm. He was 
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the propagator of a racial body that Davenport esteemed as a national resource, a racial body that 
had to be preserved, protected, and made to increase through enticements to reproduce. To put it 
frankly, Davenport regarded Abbott as something to be bred and not as a religious icon to be 
emulated. But how could Davenport get old stock New Englanders to think of themselves in such 
a way? For that matter, how could he get all white Americans to recognize their racial duty not 
in terms of Christian nurture but as producers of racial protoplasm?  
Trustees of the Germ Plasm 
As a eugenicist, Davenport viewed the country in terms of its genetic potential. He believed that 
America represented the unrealized evolutionary possibility of producing an exceptional white 
race. In a paper in which he argued that the United States needed to adopt a more selective 
immigration policy, Davenport outlined this perspective:  
Three hundred years ago the Americas were a clean slate upon which was to be written 
the history of the upbuilding [sic] of a civilized population from the beginning. There was 
an opportunity for developing a population freed from the burden of the persisting 
remnant of Paleolithic man with its limited intelligence and self-control. Even at the time 
many saw in this situation the opportunity for realizing in some measure utopian ideals. If 
we look back over these centuries we can see what has actually occurred and we note 
with regret how far have these ideal possibilities failed realization. 
 
As Davenport saw it, the opportunity for developing a white race that embodied superior 
morality and intelligence had been jeopardized from the very beginning. While there were 
puritans who constituted a virtuous stock, there were also explorers, traders, and convicts who 
were either “lured to the New World” out of self-aggrandizing interests or who were sent there as 
part of their punishment for lack of self-control. “Even at the outset,” Davenport argued, “all 
kinds, good, bad, and indifferent, represented in the Old World, were established in the New.”58 
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 If there were good and bad varieties of white stock in America and if this undermined the 
evolutionary possibilities that the New World had to offer the white race, this was not the worst 
part for Davenport. After the colonization of the New World by various white stocks, there came 
what Davenport called, “the greatest tragedy of all,” –namely, the “introduction into this white 
population of hundreds and thousands of the negroes from the banana zone of Africa which 
many regard as the lowest in the scale of intelligence and self-control of all the races of men, 
excepting perhaps the native Australians.” The economic demand for cheap labor made by the 
institution of slavery, Davenport insisted “was blind to the consequences of the introduction of a 
germ plasm inferior in the determiners for intellectual development and moral control.” 
Davenport argued that the importation of slaves had dire consequences for the development of 
American populations, as it had precipitated hybrid stocks in Central and South America who 
represented a “restless, dissatisfied, unadjusted, unharmonious people, ill adapted to developing 
an ideal civilization.”59 In asserting as much, Davenport was invoking a widely accepted theory 
that reproduction between races (especially white and black) produced mentally and morally 
unbalanced offspring, a theory that Davenport himself had helped to promote.60  
Davenport offered these supposed facts regarding the consequences of race mixing to 
insist upon more selective immigration policies: “Every breeder of animals knows that he must 
not import domesticated races which have no satisfactory pedigree.” Selective immigration 
would protect the racial germ plasm from the hereditary influence of inferior whites and non-
whites alike, which for him necessitated that all potential immigrants to the country undergo 
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eugenic screening to verify their heredity.61 While Davenport painted a somewhat dire picture of 
the impact that the history of race crossing had had upon the possibility of evolving a better 
white race, he nonetheless insisted that this did not mean that all hope should be abandoned. 
“Can anything yet be done to save a continent so sorely damaged? […] The possibilities that 
existed 300 years ago are forever lost but because things are bad is no reason for making them 
worse.”62  
 Davenport’s understanding of national history as a kind of genetic experiment 
rationalized his support for sterilization and anti-miscegenation laws, which, during the first few 
decades of the twentieth century, targeted poor feebleminded whites. White paupers, criminals, 
and deviants, eugenicists argued, possessed poor hereditary endowments. They were also prone 
to crime and sexual immorality given their diminished capacity for self-control and disposed to 
having “unnatural” relations with non-white races. The sexuality of poor whites represented a 
dysgenic threat to the race, since their phenotypic whiteness made it much more likely for them 
to introduce degeneracy into the racial germ plasm. Immigration restriction, eugenic sterilization, 
and eugenic-inspired anti-miscegenation laws: these were justified by mainline eugenicists as 
practices that would protect, preserve, and enhance the white racial body. 
 Equally important for mainline eugenics as a science for protecting and enhancing the 
white racial body, however, were positive eugenic strategies. The evolutionary potential of the 
white race could only be augmented if “fit” whites were encouraged to reproduce. As one 
historian argues, during the 1910s and early ‘20s mainline eugenicists focused on enacting 
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negative eugenic legislation.63 After the successful passage of the eugenics-inspired Immigration 
Act of 1924 and the Supreme Court’s decision in Buck v. Bell in 1927, however, eugenicists 
began to focus on developing a substantive positive eugenics program that would socialize 
eugenics not primarily as an ideology that justified racially hygienic proscriptions, but, 
moreover, as a positive ideal that could shape the reproductive lives of fit whites. This included 
getting fit whites to select eugenically fit marriage partners, to marry younger so as to have more 
time for family, and to have more children. Positive eugenics also included getting those who 
possessed deleterious traits to forego marriage and family out of racial responsibility. Most 
generally, positive eugenics revolved around socializing reproductive responsibility to the race, 
which included naturalizing the idea that all reproductive decisions should consider the potential 
impact upon the race’s germ plasm.  
Positive eugenics had several objectives. Most importantly, positive eugenic initiatives 
presented a solution to the quagmire of differential fertility. Native whites of superior stock, so 
the argument went, tended to have fewer children, while those from unfit stocks tended to have 
many children. The reproductive disparity between good and bad white stocks was increased by 
social factors. Those who supposedly descended from good stocks were socially and 
economically successful, having less time for family, while those from poor stocks were 
dependent on social institutions, which allegedly provided them with the resources to reproduce 
exponentially. Non-white immigrants also tended to have a lot of children and their unrestrained 
reproductivity, mainline eugenicists insisted, threatened to overwhelm the less prolific native 
white stocks.  
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Mainline eugenicists listed various reasons for differential fertility. They excoriated 
social welfare policies that allegedly encouraged the “undeserving” poor to proliferate in 
numbers. They also frequently blamed the career-mindedness and individualism that they saw 
increasing in middle class white culture. In this respect, young, career-minded women received a 
great deal of critical attention, but eugenicists were also concerned about the ambitions and vices 
of young men as well. Other important factors for differential fertility identified by eugenics 
included a rising divorce rate in the white middle class, which for them more generally 
underscored the declining sanctity of marriage.  
 Mainline eugenicists cautioned fit whites about the dangers of differential fertility as 
early as the 1910s. A prominent eugenic example includes a 1918 article published by two 
eugenicists in The Journal of Heredity. Entitled, “The Approaching Extinction of the Mayflower 
Pilgrims,” the article attempted to warn Americans about the immanent danger of race suicide. 
This was the same eugenics article to which Newell Dwight Hillis had responded in 1919. The 
article was incredibly important for raising awareness about the issue of differential fertility and 
is worth revisiting here.  
Drawing from data obtained through a “biographical study of the Mayflower families,” 
the authors demonstrated that the scions of the Mayflower had slackened their reproductivity 
over the course of the nineteenth century. The result, the authors declared, was that superior old 
stock American families were being out-reproduced by inferior white and non-white stocks. 
Citing differential birthrate as a cause of national decline, the authors portended, “A society in 
which those with superior inheritance do not perpetuate their stock will eventually suffer racial 
decay.” The authors argued that the problem of race extinction could only be solved by 
“effective dissemination of a sense of racial obligation” among old stock American families. In 
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other words, Mayflower descendants had to be taught their reproductive duty to the race. If they 
refused this duty and allowed their “present birth rate to continue for another 300 years,” the 
authors prophesied, “it will be possible to put all their surviving descendants back again into the 
Mayflower [with] no overcrowding.”64 The article served as a mainline eugenics enjoinder to 
America’s old stock families to reproduce more for the sake of the race. Implicit in this enjoinder 
was the mainline eugenic notion that the very character and identity of the country depended 
upon the fertility of these families.  
 Mainline eugenicists recognized that a successful positive eugenics program was a much 
more difficult thing to bring to fruition than negative eugenic measures. Most were committed to 
making positive eugenics a voluntary enterprise, which necessitated getting fit whites to 
reproduce not through the threat of sanction or even the encouragement of law but through their 
own desire to advance the evolution of the race. Mainline eugenicists fervently believed that 
eugenics would only be truly successful in developing the race’s genetic potential if white 
Americans were personally committed to its objectives and morally, emotionally, and 
intellectually motivated by its ideals. This is why eugenicists frequently spoke of their hope that 
eugenics would become a religion. In a lecture that he delivered at the Battle Creek Sanitarium’s 
Golden Jubilee celebration in 1916, Davenport himself imagined eugenics as a religion. “Every 
religion,” Davenport asserted, “should have a creed. So I suggest a creed for the religion of 
eugenics.” The first part of Davenport’s creed went as follows: “I believe in striving to raise the 
human race, and more particularly our nation and community to the highest plane of social 
organization, of cooperative work and of effective endeavor.” Davenport hoped that eugenics 
would function as a heartfelt conviction, with the advancement of the race being perceived as a 																																																								
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moral imperative and not as an external injunction. Davenport enjoined his audience to see 
themselves as “trustee[s] of the germ plasm,”65 presenting eugenics as a kind of reproductive 
love for the race.  
 Promoting eugenics as a positive ideal presented a major difficulty for mainline 
eugenicists, however, because their genetic science of the germ plasm radically reconceived the 
foundation of marriage and family. During the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, white 
middle class Americans were inclined to locate the foundation of the home as a social institution 
within the sentimental economy of the household. In locating racial development exclusively 
within the production of germ plasm, however, eugenics offered a different way of defining the 
social importance of the family. Mainline eugenics located race betterment within the procreative 
act itself, which, in effect, moralized parental sex as the foundation of the home and the vehicle 
of race uplift. This shift proved quite scandalous for some.66 As already discussed, it also 
represented a departure from models of race betterment that imagined a central role for religion. 
Importantly, however, this shift did not occur apart from religion, but within and through 
important intellectual currents promoted by Protestant leaders and churches. Racial theism was 
one such current, providing an important discursive vehicle for helping Davenport to socialize 
eugenics as a positive ideal and allowing him and his supporters to redefine marriage as a sacred 
trusteeship of the racial germ plasm. 
To help promote positive eugenics, Davenport publicly allied himself and his science 
with Protestant modernists. Davenport even joined them in their public fight against 
fundamentalists like William Jennings Bryan. In a response that he wrote to an open editorial 																																																								
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penned by Bryan and published by The New York Times on February 26, 1922, Davenport wrote 
about the challenge that evolutionary biology posed to fundamentalist sensibilities. “It would 
probably bring a shock and a feeling that a blasphemy was done to tell the sentimental American 
that he is himself a living being, just like a dog or a cat. He would preserve his self-esteem, 
however, by the repartee –‘Yes! but something more!’” Davenport wrote the Times article in 
response Bryan’s haranguing of “theistic evolutionists,” who, in Bryan’s estimation, dared to see 
evolution as part of God’s plan. In responding to Bryan, Davenport separated the issues of 
cosmogony and Biblical inerrancy from the question of authentic religion. One could still believe 
in God and in the importance of the Bible, Davenport maintained, while believing in evolution. 
Allying himself with the evolutionary theists that Bryan attacked, Davenport averred, “If Mr. 
Bryan will read the ‘good book’ he will find that pure religion has nothing to do with 
cosmogony.” “Evolution and God,” Davenport continued, “are two names for the same thing. He 
who denies the one denies the other also.”67   
Scholars have characterized Davenport’s work as atheistic and no doubt it appeared that 
way to many of Davenport’s contemporaries, especially fundamentalists like Bryan and 
modernists like Mathews. But Davenport was not opposed to religion per se, only those 
religiosities that refused to follow biological science in locating the truth of life within biological 
processes. Davenport argued that the biologist’s “faith” –and he himself used the term faith –did 
not look to scripture for testimony of God’s plan for the world. In contradistinction to the 
fundamentalist, Davenport averred, “The biologist has his own idea of what is the word of God. 
He believes it to be the testimony of nature. This testimony has to be wrung, as it were, out of 
nature but in this way evidence can be secured and has been secured that is incontrovertible.” 
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The testimony of nature, Davenport maintained, was that life was a subsisting and generative 
force that produced constant change through species differentiation. This testimony contrasted 
sharply with the fundamentalists’ belief in creationism, which posited a fixed natural order 
fashioned by God with humans at the top. Speaking as an evolutionary biologist, Davenport 
wrote, “The conception of a world that does not change is one that may have seemed possible to 
monks shut in their cells; but everyone who has travelled and observed widely knows that the 
face of the earth is changing; and everyone who has lived with and bred animals and plants 
knows that they are too changing.”68 In insisting that the dynamic vision of the world offered by 
evolution contradicted the stable one supplied by creationism, Davenport was not rejecting belief 
in God. He was, however, rejecting any conception of the absolute that did not identify divine 
agency with nature as a creative, dynamic, and evolving power. He was also insisting that 
evolutionary biology, and not theology, was the queen science, and that any speculation about 
God had to begin with evolutionary mechanisms themselves. 
Davenport practiced a disciplined scientific naturalism aimed at uncovering and 
explaining the biological mechanisms of evolution. For him, there was nothing remotely mystical 
or mysterious about life. It would yield all of its secrets to human knowledge and eventually be 
understood in its smallest details. And yet Davenport’s work might be understood as racial 
theism taken to its logical conclusion: the final collapse of any and all distinctions between 
divine agency and the biological perpetuity of the white racial body. Put differently, Davenport’s 
work was theistic in the sense that he divinized the white racial body itself. In an unpublished 
manuscript for a biology textbook, for example, Davenport argued that the chromosomes were 
the most important mechanisms for human evolution: “[N]othing passes from generation to 
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generation except through them. So fateful, indeed, are the chromosomes that had they been 
known 2 millennia ago the Greeks would probably have created a temple to them.”69 Davenport 
was not simply exaggerating to make a point. One of his great desires for eugenics was to 
transform the racial body into something sacred, even an object of worship. He wanted trustees 
of the racial germ plasm who could help Anglo-America finally realize its genetic potential. 
Albert E. Wiggam and Trusteeship 
Davenport never attempted to fully develop his concept of trusteeship, but he endorsed 
the work of someone who did. Albert E. Wiggam was one of the most famous promoters of 
eugenics during the 1920s.70  Wiggam was a best-selling author on eugenics who argued that, far 
from obsolescing religion, eugenics fulfilled God’s redemptive plan for the race. While Wiggam 
saw eugenics as a “new religion,” he believed that it fulfilled the “ethical essence of the Bible,” 
furnishing “the final program for the completed Christianization of mankind.”71 Partnered with 
eugenics, Christianity would supply the ideals necessary for transforming young Americans into 
trustees of the racial germ plasm. Wiggam was perhaps most famous for formulating a 
“biological Golden Rule” that supported his concept of trusteeship: “Do unto the born and 
unborn as you would have the born and unborn do unto you.” Scholarship on American eugenics 
often dismisses Wiggam’s work as popular eugenics.72 Davenport, however, took Wiggam quite 
seriously. He nurtured the development of Wiggam’s ideas during the 1920s through 																																																								
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professional correspondence, praising Wiggam’s books as a “powerful appeal for eugenics” and 
insisting that his work “will do much good.” Davenport valued the assistance that Wiggam’s 
publications provided in transforming eugenics into popular gospel. He even gave copies of 
Wiggam’s The Fruit of Family Tree as Christmas gifts in 1924.73 
Wiggam’s work can be read as the most comprehensive attempt to promote the eugenic 
concept of trusteeship and it came with Davenport’s approval. In fact, trusteeship served as the 
founding tenet of Wiggam’s eugenic religion, although he further developed the concept by 
combining it with Christian motifs. In Wiggam’s best-selling work, The New Decalogue of 
Science, he wrote, “Eugenics is simply the Golden Rule down the stream of the protoplasm. The 
men of the future will be born from that stream and its quality depends solely on us.”74 It is 
difficult to take Wiggam seriously unless one understands that he was trying to develop a 
discourse that divinized the racial body. The racial germ plasm was, in Wiggam’s narrative, 
immortal and sacred, representing an evolving substrate of life that persisted beyond all of the 
individual bodies through which it passed. “‘A boy is not a chip off the old block,” Wiggam 
wrote, “but a boy and his father are chips off the same block’. They are both born from this 
stream of germ plasm from which has been flowing toward us, always varying, from the 
beginning of life, and will flow on until it empties into the see of eternity.”75 Wiggam developed 
Davenport’s concept of trusteeship by reframing it as an overtly Christian enterprise, one with 
immediate consequences for the establishment of God’s will on earth. Eugenics, Wiggam 
argued, was the “only thing that can fulfill” the redemption promised by Christianity, but it 																																																								
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needed people to help it realize its redemptive promise.76 Wiggam admonished his readers to 
cooperate with natural law, which he also referred to as “the will of God,” imploring them to see 
trusteeship of the racial germ plasm as a sacred undertaking by which they could become a 
“coworker with God.”77 
If he did not agree with every line, Davenport sympathized with Wiggam’s project as a 
whole. He certainly found the broad strokes of Wiggam’s work compelling, especially since so 
much of Wiggam’s books attempted to dutifully convey the truths of eugenics. In synthesizing 
eugenics and Christianity, Wiggam began with eugenic ideas and worked backwards. He stressed 
the main tenet of eugenic orthodoxy when it came to race betterment –namely, that religio-
cultural forces “will not directly improve the inborn righteousness, educability, artistic and 
religious capacities or tendencies of the human breed.”78 He dismissed supernaturalism as 
religious superstition, arguing for biological materialism as the only lens for understanding 
God’s redemptive purposes. Indeed, God revealed his will for the race only through the 
“instrumentalities of science,”79 Wiggam maintained. “[I]nstead of using tables of stone, burning 
bushes, prophecies and dreams to reveal His will, He has given men the microscope, the 
spectroscope, the telescope, the chemist’s test tube and the statistician’s curve in order to enable 
men to make their own revelations.”80 In Wiggam’s account, eugenics revealed God’s will by 
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studying the racial germ plasm and uncovering the mechanisms behind evolutionary change. 
Davenport would have wholeheartedly agreed: race redemption was utterly biological.   
Wiggam’s concept of trusteeship invoked the aristo-hereditary sensibility that eugenicists 
like Davenport embodied. Speaking of the elect stocks who had “transformed America from 
wilderness to [an industrialized] world power,” Wiggam asked, “Will these men and women of 
prayer and iron and children be America’s continuing breed? Or will the children disappear and 
the prayer and iron vanish with them?”81 Trusteeship of the racial germ plasm also necessitated 
keeping America’s stocks pure and thus greater attention to strengthening national boundaries, 
which would “help prevent the peoples of lower development from wandering and migrating en 
masse hither and thither over the earth, pouring their mongrel blood into richer racial streams.” 
“Nations,” Wiggam concluded, “can not progress to any high standards of social life, gentility 
and polish, nor to any ordered working of political institutions, without a homogeneous national 
mind, a common racial outlook, similar cultural traditions, common language and literature.”82  
Wiggam’s concept of trusteeship represented a way of socializing eugenics’ specific 
approach to race betterment, facilitating a shift in race betterment discourse that enabled 
eugenicists to moralize race propagation as a sacred duty to the racial body. In this respect, the 
matrix of Christian symbols that it marshaled were important in translating eugenics into idioms 
familiar to liberal Protestant audiences. But, as we will seem more fully in the final chapter, the 
specificity of this matrix is less important than the more general racial theism that Wiggam 
helped to deploy and that appealed to a significant number of modernist Protestants during the 
1920s. Wiggam’s work provided modernist clergymen with a theistic paradigm for reimagining 
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America’s churches as trustees of the racial germ plasm, which underscores the extent to which 
trusteeship had become the dominant model for conceiving the redemptive promises of race 
propagation.  
The notion of trusteeship allows us to reframe mainline eugenics as an important chapter 
in the history of racial theism in the United States. In important ways, trusteeship testifies to the 
fact that biological science superseded moral nurture in the quest for race betterment. To 
embrace trusteeship meant that one had to follow the dictates of modern biology, which stated 
that race advancement occurred through the production of germ plasm and not directly through 
religious or moral influence. But if this is true, then we must understand that this paradigm shift 
occurred through the development of racial theism and not apart from it. The rise of eugenics did 
not require the abandonment of God’s promise to propagate a righteous race. In fact, to modern 
day prophets of race redemption like Wiggam, eugenics fulfilled this promise. “And now, to-day 
in the electron of the atom and in the germ cell of living protoplasm,” Wiggam wrote, “we have 
at last come upon God in His own workshop.”83  
Wiggam and the AES Sermons 
 A number of AES contest participants followed Shailer Mathews in defining evolution as 
a social process that would be assisted by eugenic interventions within human heredity. But the 
modernist vision endorsed by contest participants was largely different than the one proposed by 
Mathews. It was different because it defined evolution as a material process. And it was different 
because it was also a highly racialized modernism. Following Davenport and Wiggam, contest 
participants overwhelmingly supported a racial theism that articulated Christianity’s evolutionary 
role in terms of the cultivation of the racial germ plasm rather than the inspiration of the higher 
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faculties through nurture and education. The difference represents not a distortion of Mathews’ 
“true modernism,” however, but simply a development within modernism itself. During the 
1920s, Wiggam provided a template for modernist clergymen to reimagine the church as an 
important agency for the cultivation of the white racial body.  
AES contest participants frequently quoted Wiggam in their sermons. They also often 
implicitly or explicitly referenced his ideas. The 1926 contest winner, Phillips Endecott Osgood, 
for example, compared the germ plasm to a “bit of yeast” that a “mother sets aside for her next 
baking,” just as Wiggam had in The New Decalogue of Science. Directly quoting Wiggam, 
Osgood explained to his congregation that, like yeast, the “germinal material” “takes no part in 
the plant or animal but in due time is passed on so that another animal or plant grows from it.”84 
In the idiom of eugenic science in which it was couched, such an idea supported the practice of 
trusteeship. Indeed, Osgood encouraged his congregants to become stewards of the racial germ 
plasm. “Our bodies are trustees of this immortal continuity of the germ plasm,” Osgood told his 
Episcopal parish in Minneapolis, Minnesota, “which has come down from generation to 
generation since life began.” This biological fact, Osgood maintained, “enhances our realization 
of the sacredness of sex.”85 Christians should live to protect the racial germ plasm from 
corruptive influence of bad heredity by redefining the sanctity of marriage as a privilege for fit 
people only. In this way, Osgood promoted Wiggam’s work by enjoining his church to become a 
coworker with God in improving the racial body. Importantly, neither Osgood nor any other 
contest participant ever completely dismissed nurture. Nurture was still important for bringing 
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out pre-existing capacities within the germ plasm. Like many other participants, however, 
Osgood characteristically prioritized trusteeship as model for understanding God’s redemptive 
plan for the race. 
Following Wiggam meant that contest participants conceded quite a bit of ground to 
scientific materialism. After all, it would have been impossible to reference Wiggam without 
suggesting that it was biology and not religious nurture that would ultimately prove to be the 
source of human redemption. Generally speaking, the modernism espoused by the sermons was 
thus different from Mathews’, which had described science as a tool or method for religion. But 
focusing too much on this subverted hierarchy runs the risk of missing an important point about 
the relationship between eugenics and Protestant modernism. Mainline eugenicists were keenly 
aware that they required Christian churches’ help in authorizing both the narrative and the 
initiatives of eugenics. Tersely put, eugenics needed Jesus. 
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CHAPTER 6: TRUSTEESHIP: THE AMERICAN EUGENICS SOCIETY’S SERMON 
CONTESTS 
 
“There is a higher law of evolution, that is the improvability of the race, through improved families. All social 
progress is the result of mentality wedding mentality. Religions have failed, governments have failed, social systems 
have failed, but the blending of noble traits through marriage has never failed.” 
 
-Cameron P. Duncan, AES Sermon Contest, 1926 
 
 
Introduction 
In the late teens and early twenties, eugenicists began paying greater attention to churches 
as allies in promulgating mainline eugenics. In their popular eugenics textbook, for example, 
Paul Popenoe and Roswell Johnson celebrated religion as a “motivating force,” a culturally 
specialized “agency adapted to reach great masses of people with a eugenics ethics, and to infuse 
this with the necessary emotional basis that will result in action.” 1 Religion, in other words, was 
well equipped to motivate people to “foster lines of conduct that on the whole will be good for 
the race.” 2 In addition to the emotional power that the churches wielded over action, mainline 
eugenicists regarded churches for their natural selective function. Such was reflected in the 
advertisement that the American Eugenics Society ran for the 1926 contest: “Since the churches 
are in a measure a natural selective agency and since a large percentage of the intelligent classes 
are church members, it is hoped that the message of eugenics will be received by thousands of 
people who would not otherwise hear it.”3 As eugenically selective agencies, churches interested 
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eugenicists for three specific reasons: because they served as an important place where young 
people met and married; they exerted authority over the reproductive sphere; and they attracted 
people who were, allegedly, inherently moral and intelligent. As both shapers of conduct and 
reproductive agencies, eugenicists viewed the churches as institutions that could help them 
promulgate eugenics as a modern reproductive morality aimed at protecting and enhancing the 
racial germ plasm. The churches, eugenicists believed, were agencies naturally disposed to 
spread their gospel of trusteeship. 
 This chapter explores pro-eugenic sermons written by modernist Protestant ministers for 
the AES in the late 1920s. Established in 1921, the AES was a eugenics agency organized with 
the explicit purpose of promoting mainline eugenics across the country.4 As part of its 
propagandizing program, the AES sponsored sermon contests in the late 1920s and early ‘30s in 
order spread the gospel of mainline eugenics in American churches. This included the 1926 
contest in which Kenneth C. MacArthur, the minister who we met at the very beginning of this 
dissertation, participated and took second prize. The sermon contests were one of several 
“special short-time ‘stunt’ projects” staged by the AES in its effort to ignite eugenics into a 
popular movement.5 Sermon contests were held in 1926, ’28, and ’30 at the height of mainline 
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eugenics’ influence upon American social policy. Despite the legislative victories for mainline 
eugenic initiatives during the 1920s, American eugenicists sought to capture the hearts and 
minds of everyday Americans. Eugenicists believed that their science of race betterment would 
not truly succeed unless transformed into a popular religion. Eugenics, they insisted, should not 
work externally and negatively through the law but internally and positively through the hearts 
and minds of everyday Americans. With contest rules stipulating that the sermons be preached in 
front of regular church-going congregations, the AES saw the contests as a way of converting lay 
Americans to the cause of eugenics.6 Sermons were submitted by ministers from across the 
country, but primarily from the Northeast, Midwest, and West. Over seventy of these sermons 
still exist in the AES archives. It is unclear how many ministers participated in these contests in 
total. Christine Rosen notes that the AES reported having received 150 requests for written rules 
for the 1926 contest.7 
 The overwhelming majority of sermons submitted to the AES were preached by 
modernist Protestant ministers. These ministers’ participation in the contests does not simply 
demonstrate modernist enthusiasm for eugenics. It underscores a much longer history of 
modernist engagements with evolutionary thought and practice in an effort to transform 
Christianity into a propagative faith. Through its analysis of the AES sermons, this chapter 
argues that participating ministers promoted eugenics as part of an established theological 
tradition of drawing upon evolutionary ideas and practice to conceive God’s redemptive work in 																																																																																																																																																																																		
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racially propagative terms. Contest participants were overwhelmingly racial theists. The majority 
also supported the biological approach to race betterment promoted by mainline eugenicists, 
following Charles Davenport and Albert Wiggam in viewing race propagation as a material 
practice of cultivating the racial germ plasm. 
Mainline Eugenics and the Churches   
Contests participants were aware of the role that they and their churches were being 
asked to play by the AES. Many even argued that only churches possessed the necessary 
resources for making eugenics a popular religion. On Sunday morning, June 6, 1926, at the 
Church of the Christian Union in Rockford, Illinois, Rev. Charles Parker Connolly typified the 
self-awareness demonstrated by contest participants in attempting to galvanize his church to the 
cause of eugenics. Like many of his fellow contest participants, Connolly insisted that the 
churches were uniquely suited to transform eugenics into a matter of conscience:    
The treatment this hour is impelled by deep conviction. The most important need of the 
[eugenics] campaign now is an emphasis upon its distinctly religious aspect. That is not 
the bias of the pulpiteer, but the verdict of the scientists. Francis Galton, ‘the founder of 
Eugenics’, said that this science ‘must be introduced into the national conscience like a 
new religion’. The American Eugenic Society desires ministers to preach on the subject 
[…] But in the pulpit our great contribution to the cause is an appeal to conscience.8 
 
Scholarship increasingly demonstrates that American churches powerfully shaped the 
popularization of eugenics in the United States. American Catholic churches, as Sharon Leon 
argues in a recent work, represented mainline eugenics’ most vociferous opponents. While 
Catholic clergy were often sympathetic to eugenicists’ attempts to strengthen marriage and home 
life, they rejected the explicit racism that often energized American eugenics discourse.9 
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Especially after Pope Pius XI’s condemnation of sterilization in 1930, Catholic clergymen 
doggedly opposed negative eugenics. Leon’s analysis demonstrates how the ethnic make-up, 
religious sensibilities, and ecclesial organization of the Catholic Church allowed for a sustained 
and rather uniform rejection of mainline eugenics within American Catholic communities, 
particularly as the issue of sterilization came to divide public support for eugenics.10  
Like Catholicism, Southern evangelical Protestantism also negatively shaped America’s 
acceptance of eugenics. While he does not focus on the role of Southern Protestant churches per 
se, Edward J. Larson argues that the “peculiar religiosity of the South” thwarted the 
popularization of eugenics in states like Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, and Mississippi.11 
The “biblically orthodox standards” of the “Deep South,” Larson maintains, prevented eugenics 
from ever gaining inroads into white Southern communities. Larson suggests that, among other 
things, the ideological opposition between Southern evangelical Christianity and evolutionary 
science precluded eugenics from capturing public support as it did in the North, Midwest, and 
West, where a pro-evolution, liberal form of religiosity often dominated Protestant church life.12  
If Catholic and Southern evangelical churches stymied public acceptance of eugenics, 
however, liberal Protestant churches facilitated it. This is the consensus of a small body of 
scholarship that, since Larson, has focused on the ideological convergences between liberal 
Protestantism and eugenics, especially in those professional circles where theological modernism 
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dominated. Using the sermons written for the AES’ contests, for example, Christine Rosen 
argues that liberal Protestant leaders and churches helped to popularize eugenics through a 
modernist commitment to harmonizing religion and science within the cooperative endeavor of 
building God’s kingdom to earth.13  
In insisting as much, Rosen follows the conclusions of Dennis L. Durst, who argues that 
the postmillennial rhetoric of the kingdom of God “provided a key nexus” between liberal 
Protestant churches and eugenics.14 Both Rosen and Durst help us to understand how, especially 
as it developed in the 1920s, theological modernism threaded liberal Protestant churches and 
eugenics together within a common ideological matrix. Yet they neglect to consider the issue of 
race as it applies to liberal Protestant religiosity at the time. Focusing exclusively on Christianity 
and science, Rosen and Durst overlook the explicit racialism that often animated theological 
modernism and that helped socialize eugenics discourse within liberal Protestant churches. Amy 
Laura Hall’s more recent work captures this point. Hall shows how modernism functioned as a 
multi-dimensional platform that allowed mainline Protestant churches and leaders to imagine 
themselves as “spokespersons” for the eugenics movement.15 In Hall’s analysis, theological 
modernism synthesized religion, evolution, and racial thinking within an expansive ideological 
matrix that, at the level of popular discourse, blurred the boundaries between religious and 
eugenic rhetorics.  
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Importantly, Rosen, Durst, and Hall all emphasize that eugenics did not develop apart 
from liberal Protestant denominational life; rather, modernist Protestant churches, leaders, and 
publications provided the very ideological and institutional circuitry through which mainline 
eugenics spread. Their work thus helps to explain the regional limitations of eugenics’ popularity 
and the national distribution of participating churches in the AES sermon contests. Sermons 
came predominantly from ministers from the Northeast, Midwest, and West, those areas in which 
modernist currents were most prevalent. Of course, there were exceptions –one sermon was 
submitted by a minister from the South (North Carolina) and another by a minister from the 
Deep South (Louisiana) –yet these exceptions can be taken to prove the rule. 
Following these scholars’ conclusions, one might view the sermons not simply as 
instances of Protestant ministerial support for mainline eugenics. Much more significantly, one 
might see them as a window into the formation of Protestant modernism itself. The sermons 
demonstrate that the popularization of mainline eugenics and the development of theological 
modernism proceeded hand-in-hand during the 1920s, with the theistic framework of modernism 
transforming eugenics into a pressing issue for liberal Protestant churches. In fact, the sermons 
are only the tip of a much larger and longer historical formation in which white, liberal middle 
class Christianity came to understand itself in terms of race propagation. Understanding the 
sermons in this way helps to explain the earnestness that many ministers demonstrated in arguing 
that race betterment was fundamentally a religious issue. Rev. Joseph MacNaughton Waterman 
from Baltimore, Maryland, for example, asked his congregants, “Is it any wonder that the Church 
should be concerned with the subject of eugenics? Is not the Church trying to bring humanity 
into a living union with God? Is it not keeping with the will of God that the race should 
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improve?”16 Rev. David E. Adams from Ware, Massachusetts, insisted that Christianity was 
fundamentally concerned with progress and that the only true source of progress was “race 
progress.”17 Rev. Connolly from Rockford, Illinois, agreed. “We must become convinced that 
there can be no subject greater than [eugenics].” “All other fascinations of our age pale before 
the glory of this unique challenge of modern thought. For after all, what are improved radios and 
automobiles in comparison with an improved race?”18 
The Nature of Human Nature 
 “Man is not yet made,” a contest participant declared to his congregants. “The process of 
creation is not yet complete. It is a slow process, all creation is.”19 Invoking the modernist tenant 
that humanity represented an unfinished creation, the sermons unanimously concluded that 
eugenics was not simply moral, but a Christian method for achieving God’s spiritual purpose for 
the race. As Kenneth R. Close, a Methodist minister from Rock Creek, Ohio, pleaded to his 
congregants, “Let religion join forces with science, then, and direct humanity upward, by 
processes of natural growth, to the perfection of the Father, revealed in Jesus.”20  
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 There were two forms of modernism preached in the sermons, both of which saw 
eugenics as a tool for evolving a more Christ-like personality in the race. The first, or personalist 
modernism, followed Shailer Mathews in emphasizing evolution as a social process and in 
defining Christianity in terms of its regenerative power upon the human animal. The second, or 
determinist modernism, followed Albert E. Wiggam and mainline eugenics by emphasizing 
evolution as a biological process revolving around the practice of race hygiene. Both 
modernisms assumed that human animality imposed material constraints on the development of 
moral volition, while they also both identified morality, intelligence, and will power as higher 
faculties. Moreover, both modernisms saw eugenics as a way of strengthening volitional faculties 
through hereditary endowment. Yet the two modernisms diverged over the nature of personality, 
with personalists viewing the higher faculties as transcendent or non-material powers and with 
determinists insisting that these faculties were genetic in origin. Other significant points of 
divergence included personalists’ commitment to Lamarckism and determinists’ attempt to 
pattern a modernist faith on the principles of mainline eugenics. Determinists also 
overwhelmingly promoted racial theism. The majority of contest participants articulated a 
determinist viewpoint. Indeed, personalists represented only a small minority.  
Both personalists and determinists followed the modernist position in viewing evolution 
as a struggle against the animal part of human nature. Rooted in biology, animality was a source 
of human sinfulness that threatened to undermine social order.  One minister from the 1926 
contest articulated this idea when he opined that man must attain “victory over himself. Man’s 
own self by him must be redeemed and glorified, then follows the train of Kingdom Come.” The 
minister saw eugenics as a method for triumphing over the base impulses of the human animal, a 
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victory that promised a greater realization of the divine in the race.21 J.B. Hollis Tegarden 
invoked a modernist understanding of human nature by describing criminals as being “governed 
by animal impulses and not by human mental control.” In asserting as much, Tegarden implied 
that criminals lacked the “human” part of human nature. Criminals were too instinctual, bereft of 
higher capacities that could keep their animal propensities in check. They were, in short, 
spiritually degenerate.22 Another minister echoed Tegarden. “Perfection,” he avowed, “is not 
within the grasp of the mentally and morally defective. It is an achievement that requires the 
complete working together of body, soul, and mind.”23 Yet another contest participant described 
criminals as “not sensitive to fine distinctions of right and wrong.” Overly animalistic, the 
minister exclaimed, criminals were “devoid of spiritual imagination and irresponsive to Divine 
touch!”24 For all of these ministers, animality described a base instinctiveness that came at the 
expense of higher spiritual faculties. These ministers support for eugenics was thus a part of their 
modernist commitment to evolving a higher spiritual comportment within the race. 
Personalists differentiated themselves by insisting that the higher spiritual faculties were 
non-material in nature. Thus, one minister averred, “Man is an animal. He is more than an animal 
–he is an animal plus Something. But he is an animal. He has a biological background.” The 
minister identified the spiritual nature of humanity as that which separated it from the animal 																																																								
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order, while simultaneously conceding that “man” was a part of that order. Like Shailer 
Mathews, he located the possibility for human uplift within the spiritual. “By virtue of that 
‘something plus’ in man,” the minister concluded, “he is the only animal that can be self-
improved.”25 In insisting as much, the minister was invoking the non-materialist idea that 
Mathews had championed in arguing that it was only by virtue of the personality that human 
nature could be improved. Human evolution, Mathews had maintained, only progressed because 
of the spiritual nature of humankind itself, which allowed the human race to rise above its 
animality by aspiring to ideals that originated not from below but from above. For Mathews, 
human nature was a spiritual-biological composite, but it was the spiritual that truly defined the 
human in so far as it alone could aspire to the heavens. Hence, in arguing that evolutionary 
advance proceeded by way of the “something plus in man,” the contest participant was locating 
his support for eugenics within a modernist position that maintained, as a matter of faith, a 
distinction between the spiritual and material elements of human nature. 
Ministers supported eugenics because it promised to improve human nature by 
regenerating the material conditions of life. This was true for all ministers, even those who, like 
the minister above, espoused the personalist view. A.F. Cunningham, for example, argued that 
“man has a spiritual nature,” one that distinguishes him from the rest of creation and that makes 
him innately long for God. “There is a kind of deity in every man that cries out for the divine,” 
Cunningham insisted to his audience. “There is an immortality in every human soul that hungers 
for the Immortal. And to satisfy these longings, these yearnings, these hungerings of our 
Spiritual nature, is the chief aim and end of the Christian Religion.” As a personalist, 
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Cunningham believed that human nature had a material basis and this meant that Christianity had 
to focus on biology if it wanted to enlarge the personality. Cunningham argued, therefore, that 
Christianity had to teach the importance of good ancestry as part of its ministrations of life: “The 
time to begin the training of a child is four hundred years before he is born,” he maintained in a 
passage that underscored his Lamarckian commitments while also emphasizing his concern for 
biology.26 Cunningham believed that the spiritual nature of the human race would grow with 
better hereditary endowment. Hence, regardless of whether or not contest participants agreed on 
the exact composition of human nature, they unanimously affirmed the Christian import of 
eugenics as a method for making righteousness inborn. 
The difference between personalists and determinists often came down to the limitations 
they ascribed to the regenerative power of Christianity. One minister, articulating a personalist 
viewpoint, believed that the human animal was always responsive to the regenerative influence 
of religion. “Ever over us bends the Eternal God, offering inward reinforcement, fresh accession 
of energy, help immediate and immense,” the minister assured his audience.27 The minister 
explained that the human will was never beyond hope of redemption. The “miracle of humanity,” 
the minister concluded, is that “hereditary tendencies may be resisted by the strength of the 
human will.” The minister rejected hereditary determinism, while affirming the power of 
Christianity to reform human nature regardless of its material limitations. His rejection, however, 
placed him in the minority.  
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The majority of ministers articulated a determinist viewpoint by arguing that heredity 
represented a medium or substrate of life that was closed off to the influence of religion. Quoting 
Thomas Carlyle, a Presbyterian minister named J. Calvin Mead from Tenafly, New Jersey, 
observed, “Everywhere […] the human soul stands between a hemisphere of life and another of 
darkness.” Instead of arguing that the hemisphere of “darkness” could be filled with, or 
transformed by, the light of Christianity, this minister came to a much different conclusion: “But 
there is a line below which the soul is not permanently responsive to religion; a stratum of 
society where education and sociology are helpless and ineffective.” Mead supported eugenics 
because, as he reasoned, it provided a potent method “for dealing with those below the line we 
have indicated.”28 Mead was not alone in insisting that heredity imposed serious limitations upon 
religion. Nor was he singular for championing eugenics as a science that made it possible to 
reform human character from the ground up, or from the animal outward, rather than from above, 
as the personalists maintained. “Character is not some transcendental thing, imposed from 
without,” a minister explained to his congregants. “It is in the germ-plasm. The idea that 
character is accidental or issues through some special providential interference is pure 
superstition. Character is unfailingly the sum of human inheritances.”29 Another minister 
articulated the determinist viewpoint as a ratio: “More than three-fourths of the elements which 
build up a human soul are in its nature, not its nurture.”30 This point supported determinists’ 
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more general claim that human direction of evolution had to subordinate the administration of 
nurture to the genetic cultivation of nature. 
Determinism corresponded with ministers’ endorsement of eugenics as a practice of race 
hygiene and their tendency to espouse racial theism. To argue that there was a place within the 
human animal that was unresponsive to the regenerative influence of Christianity was 
tantamount to accepting the idea that certain racial stocks would always be inferior to others. 
Determinists often accepted the biological superiority of old stock America as a given and 
associated God’s redemptive plan for humanity with its evolutionary advance. They supported 
eugenics as a biological method for protecting and improving the white racial body, seeking to 
supply eugenics with a theistic framework for sanctifying its evolutionary work and its racial 
sensibilities. 
All three winners of the 1926 contest were determinists. Phillips Endecott Osgood, 
minister of St. Mark’s Episcopal Church in Minneapolis, Minnesota, took first prize in the 
contest. In his sermon, Osgood educated his congregants on the principals of eugenic science. 
Modern hereditary science, Osgood insisted, teaches that the body has no influence on heredity. 
Heredity produces the body but the body plays no part in the production of hereditary materials. 
Lamarckism, Osgood argued, was wrong: heredity was beyond the uplift of religious nurture.31 
Kenneth C. MacArthur, winner of the contest’s second prize, concurred. While the environment 
was still important for the development of the inborn capacities within the organism, heredity 
represented the deciding factor in human difference. What made one person or group better than 
another was not environment but biology. “The Pilgrims have produced splendid personalities in 
spite of the harsh environment to which they were subjected,” MacArthur orated from his pulpit 																																																								
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in Sterling, Massachusetts, in a flourish that underscored his racial sensibilities. “While the 
convicts who went to Australia, in spite of favoring soil and climate, have produced great 
slums.”32 F. Olin Stockwell, the contest’s third-prize winner, struck a more philosophical note by 
speaking of heredity as an autonomous creative power that subtended environment. At an 
evening service at the Methodist Episcopal Church in Lamont, Oklahoma, Olin declaimed, “But 
that God has ‘breathed into man the breath of life’, the breath of creative life, of life that 
reproduces itself for generation upon generation and thus largely determines, not only its own 
destiny, but the fate of countless multitudes as well, -this is a fact that staggers our boldest 
imagination.”33 In Shailer Mathews’ idiom, Olin had effectively personalized the impersonal 
force of biology. 
It is important to observe that Osgood, MacArthur, and Olin all won the contest’s top 
three prizes not simply because they capitulated to the biological materialism of mainline 
eugenics. While their success no doubt had to do with their knowledge of mainline eugenic 
precepts, it had more to do with their ability to synthesize this knowledge with the modernist 
platform, a synthesis that contest judges imagined would provide an important contribution to the 
socialization of eugenics in America’s churches. Charles Davenport, who served as one of three 
judges for the 1926 contest, liked MacArthur’s sermon the best.34 As a scientist, he was no doubt 
drawn to MacArthur’s faithful rehearsal of a number of scientific case studies that allegedly 
demonstrated the power of biology in shaping human nature. But he was also drawn to 																																																								
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MacArthur’s racial theism. Suggesting that national virtue was tied to the cultivation of Anglo-
American “racial traits,” MacArthur’s theism framed eugenics as an agent of Christian 
redemption. “We believe that the whole creative process has resulted in man as its highest 
product, but that evolution will not be complete until a higher type of human beings, filled with 
grace and truth after the likeness of the Son of Man, prevails.”35 Davenport would have seen 
MacArthur’s statement of faith as an important medium for spreading the gospel of eugenics 
among church-going Anglo-American Protestants, the kind of people eugenicists like himself 
had always counted among the nation’s hereditary elect.    
In imagining biology as the primary shaper of the human personality, determinists were 
just as likely as personalists to champion Christ as a spiritual ideal, as Shailer Mathews had in his 
own work. Yet determinists viewed salvation through Christ as a hereditary process of 
incarnation rather than a social process of moral uplift. One might say that, for them, salvation 
was an inside-out matter of using biological processes to develop the Christ-like qualities up and 
out of the animal. Put differently, it was a matter of developing the mental, intellectual, and 
moral faculties by stewardship of the racial germ plasm. While not all of the ministers 
comprehended the fine points of mainline eugenics, they nonetheless understood and supported 
its prioritization of biology as a medium for populating God’s kingdom. 
Take, for example, Rev. Alfred O. Elliott, who preached a sermon on May 9, 1926, at 
Brooklyn Heights Presbyterian Church in San Diego, California. Elliott began his homily with 
the words of the apostle Paul to Timothy: “When I call to remembrance the unfeigned faith that 
is in thee, which dwelt first in thy grandmother Lois, and thy mother Eunice; and I am persuaded 
that in thee also.” Recalling the assertion made by Oliver Wendell Holmes that “man is largely 																																																								
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an omnibus in which all of his ancestors ride,” Elliott explained the eugenic significance of the 
verse: Timothy had inherited his character and capacity for faith from his mother and 
grandmother and, in insisting as much, Paul was conveying the eugenic ideas that “blood 
counts”; “family traits are transmitted”; “children resemble parents and grandparents in many 
ways”; “physical and mental characteristics and also spiritual qualities are passed on from one 
generation to another.” Now, a normal reaction to Elliott’s exegesis of 2 Timothy 1:5 might 
involve incredulity, for Paul or whoever penned the epistle clearly did not have eugenics in mind 
in this exhortation to early Christians to keep the faith. But incredulity over Elliott’s slipshod 
hermeneutics also helps to confirm something substantive about the religiosity of determinists: 
what was at stake for ministers like Elliott was not the historical veracity of scripture, but the 
body –its “physical and mental characteristics and also [its] spiritual qualities.” The religious 
preoccupation was not the Bible as the revealed Word of God, but the hereditary body, the Word 
made flesh, or the body that, to return to Elliott’s idiom, innately exemplifies “the ideal 
suggested by the Master when He said, ‘I am come that they might have life, and have it more 
abundantly’.”  
Elliott argued that Christianity and eugenics had a common interest: the production of a 
race that embodied the ideal of Christ. Like so many other ministers, Elliott compared heredity to 
a stream: “As a stream rises out of some pure mountain lake and starts toward the sea, blessing 
all the land through which it passes, so a noble family sends forth children, grandchildren and 
generations that make the world happier and stronger. They fill life of noble thoughts, worthy 
deeds and generous impulses.” Through his fluvial imagery, Elliott asked his congregants to 
imagine heredity developing over the course of generations, moving like a stream through the 
coming together of germ plasms in the production of wholesome American families. Salvation, 
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Elliott insisted, was a matter of attending to the stream’s purity. Marriage, therefore, should be 
reserved for those “worthy families” who, like Timothy’s, innately possessed “talents, abilities, 
and gifts of mind and heart.” For it is precisely these families, Elliott insisted, who will provide a 
pure stream and thus ensure that “the ideals, traditions, and principles of our national life [are] 
transmitted to future generations.”36 Elliott assumed his congregation was comprised of such 
hereditarily elect families, for their interest in the higher standards of Christian life allegedly 
confirmed as much. The point of Elliott’s eugenic homily was thus to encourage his congregants 
to re-envision salvation as a biological process of purifying heredity. Jesus, he suggested, was in 
the racial germ plasm, and he enjoined his church to participate in Christ’s salvation by marrying 
well, having a lot of children, and supporting negative eugenic measures.  
The Sermons and Racial Theism 
The AES sermons have confounded some scholarly attempts to make sense of them. 
After all, what business did religious clergymen have supporting a science that was concerned 
about germ plasms and not souls? Rosen, for example, answers this question by concluding that 
contest participants were, theologically speaking, “creative, deliberately vague, or perhaps even, 
as their critics contended, deeply confused.”37 But Rosen’s analysis, which clearly understands 
that the sermons played an important part in helping to popularize eugenics in modernist 
churches, misses one of their most important contributions to the socialization of mainline 
eugenics –namely, the discourse of racial theism. The sermons enjoined church-going 
Americans to see the white racial body –which was an intergenerational, national, and shared 
body –as something sacred and even divine. Overwhelmingly supporting eugenics as a practice 																																																								
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of race hygiene, the sermons imagined the white racial body as a hereditarily elect body, 
believing that this body needed to be protected from, and purified of, degenerative elements. The 
sermons are, therefore, not evidence of theological confusion. They represent a racialized 
trajectory of modernist theology, the origins of which go back to Horace Bushnell. If mainline 
eugenics taught white Americans to see the racial body as something that could be cultivated and 
improved, ministers encouraged their congregations to see this body as a medium or substance 
through which God was propagating a people who could build his earthly kingdom.  
Take, for example, a sermon delivered by Dr. George Huntington Donaldson at 
Grantwood Congregational Church in New Jersey on Sunday morning, June 13, 1926. 
Donaldson reinterpreted Genesis’ seven-day account of creation in evolutionary terms, 
describing each “day” of creation as an evolutionary epoch. At “the end of the sixth division of 
creation,” Donaldson narrated, “man appears, walking erect, superior to all other creatures, made 
to have dominion and lifting his face ‘from the clod’ and all its evolutionary strivings and 
struggles to the higher planning intelligence, his God.” As a modernist, Donaldson insisted to his 
congregants that the “creative plan of God” called upon humans to be “his co-worker or agent in 
continuing his progressive creation.” Maintaining that God’s creative work was presently 
ongoing in the evolution of American stock, Donaldson assigned Anglo-Americans a leading 
role in God’s redemptive plan. “Oh, my fellow Americans,” Donaldson addressed his 
congregants,  
Thine is no common heritage,  
Grand memories on the shine,  
The blood of Pilgrim nations 
Commingled flows in thine.  
 
 Donaldson’s ideas and arguments allow us to understand how theological modernism and 
mainline eugenics converged through the discourse of racial theism. In Donaldson’s mind, God 
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was not simply working through human evolution; moreover, God was working through the 
“blood of Pilgrim nations,” which possessed “no common heritage.” In this way, his sermon 
underscores how racialized modernist conceptions of the divine could be at the time. But his 
sermon also demonstrates the fluidity between modernist theology and mainline eugenic thought 
during the 1920s. In a rhetorical crescendo in which he purposefully collapsed any distinction 
between the white racial body and God’s evolutionary immanence, Donaldson imploringly asked 
his congregants, “Can we, after beholding the Stream of Life coming down from the Eternal, 
enriched by the struggles of all the noblest and purest lives of the Past: can we destroy that divine 
image, the Stream of Life in us or shall we transmit it, pure and undefiled, in all it richness, to the 
coming generations?”38 
Racial theism, or the idea that God was incarnating his spirit within and through the 
evolution of the white racial body, represents the most significant way in which the sermons, and 
theological modernism more generally, helped to socialize mainline eugenics in modernist 
churches across the country. Contest participants encouraged their congregations’ families (both 
actual and potential) to devote themselves to God by helping him reproduce a more righteous 
race. Importantly, however, there was some disagreement over which families should contribute 
to the eugenic cultivation of the racial body. As discussed in the last chapter, eugenicists like 
Davenport held up old stock American families as a hereditary ideal. While Donaldson 
represented the overwhelming majority of contest participants by celebrating old stock families’ 
uncommon pedigree, a few ministers were critical of the elitism expressed by the notion of old 
																																																								
38 “Donaldson, George Huntington,” American Eugenics Society Papers, American 
Philosophical Society, Philadelphia, PA. 
		
	
257 
stock America. Several wanted a racial ideal that white families from all social stations and 
geographic regions could embrace in committing themselves to God’s evolutionary work.39 
This critical awareness was demonstrated in a number of ways. A.F. Cunnignham 
insisted that fit, godly white families could be found in all parts of the country and thus, he 
implied, not only in New England.40 Thomas Colley, pastor of First Methodist Episcopal Church 
in Little Valley, New York, went even further by insisting that racial theism ought not to be 
conceived in classist terms, an argument that highlights Colley’s self-consciousness as a white 
man who had risen from rather humble beginnings. Colley articulated the most self-conscious 
critique of racial theism, arguing that, if it simply reflected the prejudices of well-to-do whites, 
racial theism would limit the work of eugenics and wrongfully narrow the scope of God’s 
creative purposes. “Whatever may be desirable eugenically,” Colley opined, “the criteria for 
fitness must be established on such a plane as to rule out such individual predilections and 
whimsicalities, as well as the baneful distinctions of caste and class, so often nurtured at the 
expense of that fair society involved in the old but noble phrase ‘the kingdom of God’.”41 Colley 
believed that white families from all social stations could produce fit offspring, although he did 
think that the bulk of the nation’s unfit came from the poorer classes. He also believed that, by 
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recognizing that fit people could rise from meager beginnings and by encouraging fit white 
families from various social stations to have more and better children, the churches would 
guarantee the propagation of a sufficiently wide set of attributes and values so as to ensure that 
the “prototype of the race” did not merely perpetuate class prejudice.  
Colley’s remarks draw attention to how supporters of eugenics understood the sources of 
race degeneracy. Most contest participants believed that unfitness primarily originated with 
immigrants and poor whites, assuming that middle and upper class white society was comprised 
of fitter stocks. While they would have admitted that some forms of degeneracy like insanity and 
certain genetic diseases (e.g., propensity to tuberculosis) were transmitted among the more 
affluent classes, they would have presumed that these classes were generally fitter since, in their 
minds, fit stocks naturally rose to the top of society while unfit stocks settled at the bottom. In 
this way, society reflected the natural stratification of stocks according to their taste, abilities, 
and overall fitness. These presumptions underscore the fact that eugenics could be as classist as it 
was racist. But they also highlight the stakes of Colley’s arguments. He emphasized that 
unfitness could come from all ranks of white society and not just the lower strata; but he agreed 
with other participants in assuming that the lower strata were largely to blame for the production 
of unfitness. He simply wanted eugenicists to be careful about dismissing the lower classes 
outright.  
The vast majority of contest participants were far less critical than Colley of the classist 
assumption that affluence denoted eugenic fitness. Duncan P. Cameron, a Presbyterian minister 
from Cottage Grove, Oregon, even insisted that the real problem facing American society was 
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not “race suicide” but “class suicide.”42 The idea was that well-born white American families 
were being out-reproduced by their inferiors. Like most of his compatriots, Cameron assumed 
that degeneracy proliferated at the bottom, which demonstrates that racial theism circulated 
predominantly within white churches of actual or aspiring affluence. 
Regardless of where they stood with respect to the origins of race degeneracy, however, 
participants agreed that unfitness thwarted God’s procreative purposes for Anglo-American 
stock. Colley himself enthusiastically supported negative eugenic policies like the segregation 
and sterilization of the unfit, which promised to eliminate degeneracy from the white racial body. 
He referred to these policies as a “eugenic sieve,” which, he conveyed, must “operate so as to 
eliminate ultimately, yet give temporary privilege to, the unfit, if racial improvement is to be a 
reality in the face of protections of civilization.”43 As the quote suggests, Colley was concerned 
that modern society coddled the unfit through the development and expansion of programs that 
helped the poor. Articulating a common argument from the sermons and from eugenics discourse 
more broadly, Colley insisted that public welfare programs upset natural selection by allowing 
the unfit to reproduce in prolific numbers.  
Ruth K. Hill, the only documented female participant in the AES contests, agreed with 
Colley. Delivering her sermon at Park Baptist Church in McKeesport, Pennsylvania, Hill argued 
that eugenics hastened “the coming of the kingdom for which we pray,” enjoining her 
congregants to throw their support behind a science that promised to produce a “society of 
perfected men and women functioning on this earth in an ever increasing perfection of goodness, 
																																																								
42 “Duncan, Cameron P.,” American Eugenics Society Papers, American Philosophical Society, 
Philadelphia, PA. 
 
43 “Colley, Thomas,” American Eugenics Society Papers, American Philosophical Society, 
Philadelphia, PA. 
		
	
260 
beauty, and intelligence.” In order to realize the “Christian ideal” of the kingdom, Hill insisted 
that eugenics had to purify the racial body through measures like immigration restriction and 
sterilization. If “our American heredity is to be continually lifted rather than lowered, the 
immigration to our country must be regulated according to the quality of the family stock.” Only 
eugenically fit families should be admitted to the country so as to ensure the purity of the 
national germ plasm. Hill also supported voluntary eugenic sterilization, declaring, “The 
feebleminded, the paupers, the criminals, the insane, the weak and the sick who are a burden 
economically and socially belong in the class of the unfit and should voluntarily eliminate their 
personal inheritable qualities from the racial stock.” Hill concluded by warning her congregants 
against the consequence of not embracing the “redemptive methods” of mainline eugenics: 
“Unless we can eliminate the defects in the present flood of unselected germ plasm […] we will 
find American greatness increasingly diminishing.”44 
As Colley and Hill’s arguments suggest, racial theism sanctified negative eugenic 
policies by describing unfitness as an affront or impediment to God’s purifying work in the life 
of the race. An anonymous minister who participated in the 1926 contest expressed this idea by 
describing degeneracy as a stain or impurity within the racial body. Comparing the racial body to 
a timeless river, like Donaldson had, the minister declared, 
Let us look back along its course, back through the generations of human life. Find the 
impure streams of social disease, bred of vice and sin, flowing into this river of human 
life. See the putrefaction of criminal strains of life added to it. Note the currents and 
eddies of diseased mind or enfeebled intellect. Gathering all these things into its tide, it 
flows across the ages down to the present hour and moment. It receives our own lives 
into its current and surges onward through all Time, onward to the ocean of Eternity. 
 
																																																								
44 “Hill, Ruth K.,” American Eugenics Society Papers, American Philosophical Society, 
Philadelphia, PA. 
		
	
261 
For the minister, the river represented not only the racial body but also the body of God: some 
call the river evolution, he asserted, “others call it God.” In this way, the metaphor of the river 
was highly reductionistic, collapsing a series of scientific and religious concepts together within 
a single fluvial image (e.g., God, life, heredity, evolution, and race). But the river conveyed an 
important religious idea –namely, that the transmission of unfitness through reproduction 
represented a stain on the body of God, an idea that, in turn, justified negative eugenic measures. 
Hence, if the transmission of unfitness polluted the river and attenuated God’s life giving power, 
as the minister reasoned, then Christians ought to support negative eugenic policies, which 
promised to remove unfitness from the river.  “From this Stream of Life,” the minister avowed, 
“we shall have cut off every source of pollution and contamination, and the promise shall be 
fulfilled that ‘Everything shall live whither the stream cometh’.”45  
As I discuss in the next section, racial theism also supported modernist churches’ 
endorsement of positive eugenics through the concept of trusteeship. If God was working to 
perfect the racial body, so the argument went, then fit church families should cooperate with him 
by bringing eugenic principles to bear upon their reproductive lives. Here, however, I would like 
to focus on the relationship between racial theism and negative eugenics.  
While the above minister’s metaphor of the river allowed his congregants to visualize the 
importance of negative eugenics, racial theism did not do its most important work through the 
visual register. Rather, its most significant contribution with respect to the socialization of 
mainline eugenic initiatives in American churches was the affective work it did with respect to 
the problem of unfitness. If the sermons are any indication of things, racial theism did not simply 
provide Americans with a religious framework for understanding the issue of degeneracy, if by 																																																								
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understanding we mean strictly a cognitive process. Much more profoundly, racial theism 
influenced church-going Americans’ attitudes about unfitness. Most contest participants were not 
as illustrative as the minister above. Rather than painting fluvial images that would allow their 
congregants to visualize the divine in the life of the race, they simply assumed that their 
congregants already associated whiteness with divinity and instead played upon their emotional 
sensibilities. This demonstrates that racial theism was just as much an affective comportment as 
it was a cognitive framework. Indeed, when racial theism was working at its best, it operated 
primarily as the former. 
Racial theism structured an affective economy in the sermons that opened and circulated 
between two poles: love for fitness and perfection, on the one hand, and repugnance and even 
hatred for unfitness, on the other. Take, as an example, Rev. J.B. Hollis Tegarden’s sermon, 
which was preached at First Unitarian Church in New Orleans, Louisiana, on June 20, 1926. 
Tegarden began by lamenting the decline of “the old sturdy stock of New England” and by 
expressing adoration for this stock’s racial vigor. But Tegarden spent the rest of the time 
attempting to incite his congregants’ hatred for degeneracy, implicitly and explicitly likening it 
to an affront against God. He described the unfit as “weeds” in God’s garden. Switching 
metaphors, he decried the rise of a “lesser breed” of “mental defectives” governed by “animal 
impulses.” Indeed, Tegarden’s sermon seethed with righteous indignation, comparing the unfit to 
animals and refuse and blaming them for a rising tide of degeneracy that threatened the purity of 
the racial body. Thus, he praised the immigration law and other mainline eugenic measures as a 
means for “protecting our own germplasm [sic] from being contaminated.” But what is most 
telling about Tegarden’s sermon with respect to the affective work of racial theism is that he 
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American devotion to the racial body. Referring to the vision of God’s kingdom recorded in the 
book of Revelation, Tegarden averred, “It has been and still is the work of the church to keep 
that vision before men, for without a vision the people perish. Without that vision which the 
church keeps alive there would be no divine end toward which to work. The divine end creates a 
zeal and enthusiasm which no science can create, and scientists should take cognizance of that 
fact.”46 
 Zeal, enthusiasm: these are emotional registers, but they are also, as Tegarden argues, 
religious registers. Christianity would make its greatest contribution towards the popularization 
of mainline eugenics by creating a religious intensity that “no science can create.” This was the 
major intervention made by racial theism with respect to the popularization of mainline eugenics 
in America’s churches. By inspiring fervor for the inviolability of the racial body, the churches 
would transform eugenics into something felt and intuited, something that circulated beneath the 
cognitive faculties of the mind and that surfaced like a shock of righteous indignation, a pang of 
conscience, or even, an outpouring of love. In this way, modernism supported the popularization 
of eugenics as a practice of race hygiene. 
Trusteeship and the Churches 
 The sermons written for the contests drew upon Albert Wiggam’s concept of trusteeship 
in order to convince their congregants that the church and eugenics were copartners in racial 
redemption. Ministers addressed their congregations as both believing bodies and reproducing 
bodies, using the concept of trusteeship to bridge Christian belief in God and white middle class 
reproductive habits. The AES contests encouraged these ministers to view their congregations as 
reproductive communities, while the concept of trusteeship, in turn, enabled ministers to appeal 																																																								
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to the religious and moral sensibilities of their congregants as both believers and parents, thereby 
rallying their congregants to the cause of eugenics. In this respect, the sermons performed an 
invaluable service to the AES, as they brought the message of eugenics to communities that 
mainline eugenicists viewed as hereditarily elect. Drawing upon Ellsworth Huntington and Leon 
F. Whitney’s popular 1927 eugenic text, the rules for the 1928 contest explicitly referred to 
members of the country’s churches as “Builders of America.” America’s mainstream churches, 
Huntington and Whitney believed, were comprised “men and women whose brains are balanced, 
well directed and active; people of fine temperament, fine intelligence and fine health.”47 Indeed, 
contest organizers saw the contest as an opportunity to encourage reproduction within the 
churches and to thereby increase the “proportion of the population” of the “Builder type.” In 
turn, contest participants used the notion of trusteeship to encourage their congregants to see 
their eugenic responsibility as Builders in Christian terms and to have more children for both 
God and race. 
  Adapting Wendy Kline’s arguments in her 2001 work, Building a Better Race, 
trusteeship represented a modernist “reproductive morality.” Kline uses this term to refer to the 
ways in which eugenics functioned as a set of modern sexual proscriptions and incitements that 
moralized the reproductive body, especially the white female reproductive body. As a 
reproductive morality, Kline argues, eugenics endeavored to remove “reproductive decisions” 
from the personal and inevitably selfish realm of “individual desire” by recasting these choices in 
terms of “racial duty.”48 As it was developed and promoted by the sermons, trusteeship 
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constituted a distinctly modernist Protestant inflection of mainline eugenics as a reproductive 
morality, one that framed eugenic sex not only as a racial duty but also as devotion to God and 
his creative purposes. In this respect, trusteeship facilitated the popularization of positive eugenic 
initiatives. On the one hand, it allowed modernist clergymen to cast eugenics as a procreative 
agenda that was Christian in scope and purpose. But just as importantly, it provided church 
leaders with a paradigm for establishing the church’s authority over the reproductive sphere and 
for insisting upon the continuing relevance of the church during an era when said sphere was 
becoming the privileged domain of science and medicine. In its multifarious significance as a 
reproductive morality, trusteeship served the interests of both mainline eugenicists and modernist 
clergymen, making it possible for churches and mainline eugenics organizations to envision 
themselves as copartners in race redemption. 
 At the broadest level, trusteeship denoted an attempt to theologically harmonize eugenics 
and Christianity within the common practice of race propagation. As one minister who 
participated in the 1926 contest declared to his congregants, “Today, science and religion are 
becoming reconciled […] they are walking in blessed fellowship, sharing each others vision of a 
well born race, -better physically, intellectually, socially, spiritually, than past generations have 
ever produced.”49 As the passage suggests, trusteeship described not just any partnership 
between religion and science, but a “fellowship” forged explicitly through the hereditary 
development of the white racial body. Underwriting the minister’s characterization of trusteeship 
as a fellowship between science and religion were a number of theological assumptions that 
made trusteeship a Christian concept. Most importantly, there was an implicit identification of 
God’s being and agency with the racial germ plasm. Trusteeship was thus supported by a 																																																								
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theology of racial immanence: God’s kingdom on earth would be revealed through the 
purification and perfection of the white racial body. It was this theology that sanctified eugenics 
as a fellowship between religion and science, allowing contest participants to encourage their 
congregants to view eugenics as an enjoinment to assist God in his procreative work. 
 On a more interesting level, however, trusteeship described a modernist reproductive 
morality, functioning as a call to procreative responsibility by redefining sex as a devotional act 
to God and his procreative purposes. Referring to the gametes, one minister reminded his 
congregants that God has “placed an enormous responsibility upon us by putting into our hands 
these cells of life to control as we will.”50 Another minister described the solemn purpose of 
eugenic sex to his audience in less explicit terms: “We know that God does work through human 
agency, that if his kingdom is to come on earth it will be by no divine intervention but by men 
and women cooperating with him.”51 Rev. Osgood, the minister who took first prize in the 1926 
contest, most forcefully conveyed the providential implications of trusteeship as a reproductive 
morality. In his Mother’s Day sermon, Osgood pleaded with his congregants to think of eugenic 
sex as nothing less than a religious duty, a living soteriology, or a righteous expression of one’s 
love for God and his chosen race. “The future is in our hands,” he intoned, invoking his 
congregation’s responsibility for the racial germ plasm. “By creative forethought we can cleanse 
and ennoble it; by sins of contemporary self-interest we can mar it. By acts as well as by 
traditional word are we praying, ‘Thy Kingdom Come?’”52  
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 As a reproductive morality, trusteeship involved a number of specific things. First, it 
entailed viewing marriage and family as a devotion to God and race. It necessitated living 
“purely” and “cleanly,” which involved confining one’s sexual activity solely to marriage and 
subordinating one’s sexual desire, if not exclusively then ultimately, to procreative ends. To 
invoke the most common metaphor employed by contest participants, the general purpose of 
trusteeship was to protect the “stream of life” (i.e., the racial germ plasm) from impurity while 
also ensuring that the stream grew in breadth and volume. In literal terms, this simply meant 
reserving sex for marriage and having more offspring.  
Trusteeship also hallowed the institution of marriage through its ideal of reproductive 
fitness. In describing procreative sex as an act of devotion to an immanent divinity, trusteeship 
necessitated that only fit people marry and have children, which supported the mainline eugenic 
initiative to transform marriage into a privilege rather than a right.53 In the eyes of mainline 
eugenicists, not everyone was called to reproduce, which meant that, for them, marriage itself 
ought to be seen as a sacred institution reserved for those who could further –and not impede –
racial development. Trusteeship inflected this point by insisting that marriage was an institution 
that God himself had reserved for the hereditarily elect. The eugenic function of marriage was so 
sacred, in fact, that contest participants insisted that children and teenagers should be taught to 
see marriage exclusively as a consummation of hereditary election. Invoking a common eugenic 
syllogism by linking idealism and righteousness with hereditary fitness, one minister admonished 
his young congregants, “Boys and girls, when you are seeking a mate look for one with high 
ideals and strong convictions and thus you will be helping to strengthen the race and build up the 																																																																																																																																																																																		
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kingdom of God on earth.”54 Osgood struck a more solemn note, arguing that children needed to 
be instructed in the virtue of “mated love.” “Constantly should we nurture in their little minds the 
concepts of marriage, which are noblest. Little children should be brought to church weddings 
whenever possible, that they may recognize the sacredness of that ceremony which founds a 
family.” Implicitly identifying his congregants with the hereditarily elect, Osgood later 
continued, “With all the awe and all the wholesomeness our reverent experience of parenthood 
can give us, we must surround the expectation of marriage and child-bearing with holiness.”55 
 But the most important function of trusteeship as a reproductive morality was to convince 
churchgoers to have more children. Reminding his congregants that God’s redemptive purpose 
for humanity was propagative in both mode and scope, one minister argued that trusteeship 
fulfilled God’s promise to the race. “The command is still, ‘Multiply and replenish the earth’,” 
the minister insisted. “Your body is the temple of the Holy Spirit –which you have from God –
glorify God therefore in your body.”56 Rev. P.O. Lowry, minister of a Methodist Episcopal 
congregation in Hilly, Louisiana, argued that large families alone exemplified the spirit of God’s 
creativity. Moreover, he maintained that the procreative ideal embodied by large families was 
solely capable of achieving the perfection that God planned for his race. “[It] is only in the holy 
relationship of parenthood and in the comingling of large families,” he averred to his flock, “that 
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the highest ethical and spiritual type can be developed.”57 Trusteeship thus inflected the mainline 
eugenic injunction to the fit to have more children, sanctifying and thereby naturalizing the 
eugenic ideal of more and better matings as a providential decree. 
 Trusteeship did important affective work in transforming eugenics into a popular gospel 
of racial theism. Yet it may seem difficult to understand how contest participants endorsed 
trusteeship when it so clearly minimized the influence of religious nurture upon race 
development. While trusteeship emphasized the importance of parenthood and family it 
nevertheless prioritized breeding. The concept of trusteeship thus represents a shift away from an 
established Bushnellian tradition of framing race propagation in terms of the affective bonds 
between parents and children and toward reconceiving race propagation first and foremost as 
production of germ plasm. This is not to say that trusteeship obsolesced Christian nurture, far 
from it in fact. While mainline eugenicists and their supporters insisted that environmental forces 
were powerless to affect the racial germ, they still believed that the environment played an 
important role in bringing hereditarily latent capacities to development. And this meant that 
religious nurture had an important function to play in the development of individuals if not the 
race. Nonetheless, trusteeship was premised upon a new understanding of race propagation in 
which heredity was conceived as a timeless continuity or an immortal substrate isolated from the 
immediate influence of religious nurture.  
 Historically, this new mode of interpreting heredity as a biological substrate 
corresponded with an attempt to relocate the moral and affective foundation of the home within 
the sexual bond between parents. Comprehending the appeal of trusteeship for ministers as a 
religious idea, therefore, necessitates understanding how trusteeship supported this modern 																																																								
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emphasis on the importance of sex. As a biological concept, the eugenic notion of the germ 
plasm referred to the creative material produced by the union of gametes. This material housed 
hereditary substances that supposedly determined human physical, mental, and moral 
development. Yet the germ plasm was more than a scientific theory that supported mainline 
eugenics’ commitment to biological determinism. It was also a modern scientific affirmation of 
sex as the cornerstone of healthy family life. For contest participants, therefore, trusteeship did 
not represent an obviation, obsolescence, or negation of a Christianity conceived in propagative 
terms, but an attempt to strengthen Christianity as such, albeit through a modern rationale that 
envisioned the sexual bond between husband and wife as the foundation of the home. As a 
reproductive morality, trusteeship represented modernist churches’ affirmation of this 
procreative bond and the modern rationalization for the home that it supported.  
In her study of American eugenics, Kline argues that during the 1920s and ‘30s mainline 
eugenicists were preoccupied with a falling fertility rate among middle and upper class whites, a 
trend that eugenicists associated with the diminishment of white middle class socio-political 
power. This preoccupation was exacerbated by a number of things related to female sexuality, 
including a growing feminist idealization of the career-oriented “New Woman”; an increasing 
valorization of a companionate model of marriage that emphasized romantic love and equality 
between the sexes and that de-prioritized childrearing; and, finally, a growing youth culture that 
celebrated sex for the sake of pleasure and not homemaking.58 Kline argues that these trends 
intensified mainline eugenicists’ characteristic obsession with the female body and their 
concomitant attempt to publicly enshrine female sexuality as a “potential panacea for the 
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problem of race degeneracy.”59 Thus, Kline insists, mainline eugenics developed in the 1920s 
and ‘30s as a reproductive morality that sought to redefine the social role of women in terms of 
procreation. Although eugenics represented a progressive discourse with respect to female 
sexuality in that it affirmed the importance of sexual pleasure for women, it was also 
conservative, seeking to put women back into the reproductive sphere by defining childbearing 
not as an individual prerogative but as a racial duty. In this way, eugenic sex functioned as a 
response to shifting patterns within white middle class reproductive culture, with eugenicists 
using procreative sex to affirm female sexuality while at the same time subordinating it to 
socially useful ends. Of course, the same shifting patterns within white middle class reproductive 
culture that preoccupied mainline eugenicists also conditioned white middle class’ acceptance of 
eugenic initiatives. 
 Following Kline, one ought to see trusteeship as an important intervention within white 
middle class reproductive culture, one that sought to subdue female sexuality for procreative 
purposes. In a sermon that he preached in 1926 at a Congregational church in Newburg, Iowa, 
Rev. J.D. Stoops declared to his congregants, “The warfare which has resulted between the 
newly developed romantic sentiment of love and the traditional unity of the family is one of the 
outstanding problems of modern life.” The issue for Stoops was that modern life severed sex 
from its proper objective, i.e., childrearing, causing an unhealthy disruption in the female psyche 
and precipitating social disorder. “Sex impulse dissociated from the objective situation of 
mother, child, family, community, race,” Stoops averred, “is experienced as a subjective desire 
which confuses and negates the will. This is a genuine disorganization of life.”60 Like scientists, 
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psychologists, and marriage counselors during the 1920s, Stoops imagined sexuality as an innate 
force or drive, which, unless directed toward proper ends, could be socially destructive. He also 
believed that, like men, women were sexually driven. As a reproductive morality, therefore, 
trusteeship represented an attempt to both champion female sexual desire and discipline it by 
reconnecting it to the “objective situation” of motherhood.  
 Stoops’ arguments regarding the disorganization of female sexuality supports Kline’s 
claim that, as mainline eugenicists sought to develop a successful positive eugenics program 
during the 1920s and ‘30s, women were increasingly burdened with the responsibility for racial 
progress. Kline herself sees evidence for this argument in eugenicists’ celebration of a new type 
of womanhood, a eugenically productive femininity that Kline refers to as the “mother of 
tomorrow.”61 One will find a frank idealization of eugenic motherhood in the sermons, which 
suggests that trusteeship participated in the construction and promotion of eugenic motherhood 
in important ways, especially through the positive links that it forged between female sexuality, 
domesticity, and the providence of race propagation. Contest participants used trusteeship to 
insist that female sexuality was natural and, when tied to the objective function of procreation, a 
pillar of the Christian home.  
In the version of his sermon that he published in his church’s bulletin, for example, 
Osgood concluded by reprinting Laura E. Richards’ famous poem, “The Torch Bearer.”62 “The 
Torch-Bearer” was a fable that placed hope for Christian civilization not upon the pen of the 
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“great sage” or the sword of the “Master of Armies” but within the affections between a mother, 
who represented the “keeper of the gates of God,” and her children. Osgood’s intention in ending 
his sermon with the popular fable was to idealize eugenic motherhood as an integral part of 
trusteeship. His objective was also to emphasize that, while trusteeship embraced a more 
progressive role for female sexual desire in the production of family life, it did not constitute a 
radical departure from the past. Rather, trusteeship ensured the continuation of traditional 
patterns of life and the gendered relations that sustained them.      
 In (anxiously) embracing female sexuality, trusteeship imagined a new basis for marriage 
and family, one built upon the sexual attraction between husband and wife rather than one 
exclusively premised upon women’s “natural” capacity as a nurturer. This is not to say that the 
sermons did not essentialize femininity in terms of women’s supposed inherent qualities as a 
mother. As Osgood’s sermon attests, they most certainly did. Yet if the sermons idealized the 
“mother of tomorrow,” they more commonly celebrated eugenic parenthood over eugenic 
motherhood, emphasizing cooperation (if not equality) between the sexes in childrearing. Hence, 
while trusteeship moralized motherhood along eugenic lines, it also attempted to moralize 
fatherhood and to thereby bring men into the procreative sphere. In a sermon preached on 
Mother’s Day 1926, for example, one minister admonished mothers and fathers alike to offer the 
following prayer in setting out to have a family: “May my offspring be goodly like unto myself; 
may they contribute to the betterment of the human race; may they be everything I should have 
liked to be; may they be beloved of man, and approved by God.”63 The prayer was intended to 
unite young parents in the holy providence of racially reproductive sex.  
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Other ministers were less serene in underscoring race propagation as a partnership 
between the sexes. Rev. J.A. Hansen chastised men in his congregation who forsook marriage by 
sowing their oats in “riotous living,” men who perversely filled their lives with the “pollution of 
lustful and self gratification.” Invoking the concept of trusteeship in order to insist that race 
propagation was the only godly outlet for sexual desire, the minister opined, “Every man has the 
substance of reproduction. Every woman has the power of life receiving, life sharing and life 
nourishing reproduction […] Surely God is not mocked!”64 While Hansen’s arguments suggested 
a more passive role for female sexuality in reproductive relations, his formulation of trusteeship 
nevertheless envisioned the production of the racial germ plasm as a co-creation between 
husband and wife, while providing a biological gloss of the significance of fatherhood for race 
propagation. 
Trusteeship represented an attempt to strengthen Christianity as a domestic practice, with 
contest participants redefining parenthood as care for the racial germ plasm and with trusteeship 
thus presenting a way of bringing men and women alike into the procreative space of the home. 
As a reproductive morality, trusteeship forged a middle way between New Woman feminism, 
which championed female participation in the economic sphere, on the one hand, and patriarchal 
conceptualizations of evolution, on the other, conceptualizations that imagined greater and more 
specialized differences between the genders.65 In the sermons’ view, both men and women were 
responsible for race propagation, while the strength of the Christian home was conceived first 
and foremost in terms of the sexual bond between husband and wife and their shared 
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responsibility for the race. As Rev. Waterman from Baltimore, Maryland, explained: “Every 
home should be a kingdom with its destiny pointed toward a better race. Homes where there is a 
union of good blood making for royal heritage. Homes where there dwells a great vision of the 
future of the race. Unbreakable homes which are held together by a spiritual bond.”66 Waterman 
essentially argued that the shared obligation between husband and wife to produce a better race 
provided the spiritual resources for a new and more powerful foundation for the white middle 
class home. Such an assertion naturalized sexual desire in terms of its propagative function, 
celebrated the cooperation of male and female sexuality in the production of “good blood,” and 
anchored the home as a religio-social institution within a spiritual desire to procreate evidently 
shared by husband and wife alike. 
As a reproductive morality, trusteeship allowed modernists to reconceive the authority of 
the church in terms of procreative power, defining a eugenic role that only the church –as a body 
of believing and reproducing “builders” –could fulfill. Contest participants insisted as much not 
only because of the church’s function as a reproductive agency, but because, as they firmly 
believed, only the church –as an institution and assembly –could supply the resources necessary 
to direct sexual desire toward wholesome, procreative ends. Some contest participants 
maintained that no matter how much eugenicists uncovered the mechanisms of human evolution, 
they would be at a loss to steer public conscience unless they could direct human sexual desire. 
This entailed not appealing to humans as rational actors, but as social creatures who desired to 
live in Christian communities, that is, as emotive, sensate, and sexual beings who desired the 
righteousness associated with family life. In a sermon that he delivered in Ottawa, Illinois, Rev. 
George C. Fetter earnestly intoned, “Religion alone can lead the coming generations to see that a 																																																								
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man and a woman are co-operating with God in building a spiritual universe when they carefully 
plan and prepare for happy eugenic parenthood.”67 Fetter’s assertion underscores a belief in the 
unique efficacy of religion to align sexual desire with its “natural,” or procreative purpose, a 
belief that Fetter shared with his fellow contest participants and that underwrote the special 
vision that trusteeship articulated for the church in its partnership with mainline eugenics.  
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EPILOGUE 
 
Introduction 
On Thursday, May 7, 1936, the American Eugenics Society held its annual meeting in the 
Delmonico Hotel on Park Avenue in New York City. The general topic for the meeting was, “A 
Eugenics Program for America.” As part of its roundtable discussions, the AES staged a 
discussion between religious leaders and mainline eugenicists. The purpose of the discussion was 
to think about the relationship between religion and eugenics. Kenneth C. MacArthur, the 
modernist minister and lay eugenics enthusiast whom we met at the beginning of our story, 
participated in the discussion, along with a number of religious and scientific professionals who 
believed that religion, especially Christianity, could help American mainline eugenics distinguish 
itself from Nazism.  
The debate recorded by the American Eugenics Society demonstrates the extent to which 
growing awareness of Nazi race hygiene was causing increasing self-consciousness and even 
consternation over Americans eugenics, especially among eugenics’ supporters. The Nazi quest 
for racial purity –including the totalitarian apparatus involved in its quest –was forcing American 
eugenicists and their sympathizers to reckon with the ideals, values, and assumptions that 
undergirded their own mission to achieve national fitness. The debate is worth paraphrasing 
because, in this way, it captures a critical self-awareness that was characteristically missing from 
eugenics as a discourse of progress in the United States. It is important to note that the 1930s has 
been traditionally viewed as pivotal decade in the history of American eugenics, with scholars 
		
	
278 
viewing the Depression and the rise of the Third Reich as historical developments that 
precipitated the rapid decline of mainline eugenics as a popular movement.  
 MacArthur, for his part, toed the line of modernism. His views on the relationship 
between Christianity and eugenics had not changed since he delivered his pro-eugenic sermon in 
1926. His continued involvement with eugenics came from the confidence and dignity that Christ 
inspired as an evolutionary ideal. “The church welcomes eugenics,” MacArthur declared to his 
colleagues at the roundtable, because it remains devoted to Christian “social ideals,” especially 
“the ideal of a just, friendly world as taught by Jesus –an ideal society among men.” The ideal of 
Christ and his kingdom, MacArthur furthermore insisted, was not an ideal realized through the 
death and destruction of unfitness, as the Nazis seemed to believe. Rather, it was an ideal 
“expressed in terms of the family.” For MacArthur, American eugenics was thoroughly 
Christian, motivated by the spiritual ideals of marriage and family life. For this reason, he saw no 
reason why churches should not continue to promote eugenics as part of its Christian mission to 
propagate human life in the image of Christ. He even outlined initiatives that churches should 
continue taking in promoting eugenics.1  
 There was one person at the debate, however, who was not as serene about the 
motivations of Anglo-American eugenics as MacArthur. Louis I. Dublin, Vice-President and 
Statistician at Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, did not believe, as MacArthur did, that 
American eugenics was safeguarded by its Christian ideals. In fact, Dublin questioned whether 
eugenics in the United States had ever been Christian. “I saw in the eugenics movement a clear-
cut challenge to all the ideals that civilization has brought down to us. Religion tells us that there 																																																								
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should “speak to families about the eugenic ideal”; they should “work these ways of looking at 
life into preaching and into Sunday School teachings.”	
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is an integrity and inherent dignity to human life. Eugenics said: there are better and worse 
groups of people. It stressed racial consciousness, which we see in its most diabolical form today 
in Nazi Germany.” It is important to observe how Dublin spoke of eugenics in the past tense. 
Unlike MacArthur and other participants in the debate, Dublin perceived eugenics as a science 
on the wane. Unless eugenics could become motivated by Christian principles, which Dublin 
associated not with the ideal of social perfection, as MacArthur had, but with the ideal of human 
dignity, eugenics would be rightfully superseded by more Christian enterprises. 
Surrounded by people who wanted to believe that American eugenics was different from 
Nazi race hygiene, Dublin would not let his interlocutors off the hook, insisting that there were 
direct ideological connections between American mainline eugenics and Nazism. The same 
prejudices and commitments that supported eugenicists’ belief in Anglo-American superiority 
and the same quest for bodily perfection that animated American eugenics, Dublin averred, 
propelled Nazi destruction of unfitness. Eugenics, if it were to be saved, must “associate itself 
with the best religious thought,” which, for Dublin, entailed “addressing itself to those causes 
which make for misery and poverty and depression of people.” In other words, eugenics had to 
come to champion the Christian ideal that all human life had value and dignity. “We must get 
away from the idea that because human beings are different, some are worse,” Dublin pled to his 
colleagues after noting the dangers of Nazi anti-Semitism. “Society must protect itself against 
pollution –yes; but pollution does not consist in the contamination of certain different groups.” If 
eugenics were to remain viable in contemporary America, Dublin maintained, it had to divest 
itself of its racialized tendency to discriminate against certain forms of human life and give up on 
its quest for embodied perfection. 
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Willystine Goodsell, a prominent writer on family and women’s education, sympathized 
with Dublin’s sentiments, although she seemed to believe that American eugenics was already 
becoming more Christian. Nazi Germany, Goodsell noted, was “distinguished not for its 
devotion to Christianity, but for its revival of neo-paganism.” Goodsell’s assertion suggested that 
American eugenics was not in danger of following Nazi race hygiene in its totalizing war against 
degeneracy. “It is true that eugenics in the past has laid great stress on the favorable and 
unfavorable, the desirable and the undesirable,” Goodsell admitted. “Eugenics must say mea 
culpa to this charge […] Today, however, the theory of dividing people into class divisions 
according to innate ability is definitely weakening in the eugenics group.”  
 Apart from Goodsell, however, Dublin’s impassioned argument seemed to be lost on his 
colleagues. They could not conceive eugenics without the idea that some forms of human life 
were inherently more valuable than others. Their consternation with Dublin speaks to the fact 
that, given its entrenched commitment to hereditarianism, eugenics was more or less 
inconceivable without a method for discriminating between qualified and unqualified life. Henry 
P. Fairchild iterated this conundrum in his response to Dublin. “There is a selective factor in 
eugenics,” he averred, insisting that eugenics would not survive along the path that Dublin 
prescribed for it. Warning his colleagues against the kind of viewpoint expressed by Dublin, 
Fairchild observed, “There seems to be a slight tendency, and it seems to be a real danger, for 
eugenists [sic] to get away from the idea that there are differences –that there is a qualitative 
element. If we deny this we might as well deny eugenics altogether.” Religion, as Fairchild saw 
it, must supply eugenics with ideals for guiding its propagative work, for without wholesome, 
moral, Christian ideals, eugenics would have no paradigm for distinguishing its objectives from 
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Nazi race hygiene. At the present moment, Fairchild suggested to his colleagues, “One of the 
things we need is to set norms or standards as to eugenic fitness.” 
 The other participants in the 1936 AES roundtable concurred with Fairchild. Ellsworth 
Huntington, president of the AES, refused to relinquish the idea that some American families 
were worth more than others. Following Fairchild, he believed that religious ideals should supply 
eugenics with its “selective factor,” which Huntington identified as “moral courage.” Invoking 
an established mainline eugenics argument, he insisted that America’s spiritual founders, the 
Puritans, embodied this ideal. Yet Huntington modified the racialized presumptions of his 
famous 1928 eugenics text, Builders of America, by stating that, if moral courage were 
propagated through biology and not environment, as he believed it was, “this quality can be 
preserved, no matter what the race or the religion.” In insisting as much, Huntington clung to 
racial theism while at the same time softening its implications. America’s Puritan forebears were 
hereditarily elect, he maintained, and American national life was rooted in its commitment to the 
higher ideals that these forebears possessed as a natural hereditary endowment. But Huntington 
suggested that other stocks could be selected for similar moral qualities. The present need for 
American eugenics was to continue to emphasize eugenics’ paramount concern with the unique 
source of American greatness while at the same time encouraging a propagative commitment 
among all racial stocks to moral courage.2 
 Nearly everyone at the 1936 AES roundtable missed Dublin’s point. Indeed, he was the 
only one who fully understood that the way to safely distance American eugenics from Nazi race 
hygiene was not to anchor eugenics in religious ideals for human embodiment. The norm and 
ideal of Christ, contrary to MacArthur’s claims, would not save American eugenics, if by that 																																																								
2 “Random Materials,” American Eugenics Society Papers, American Philosophical Society, 
Philadelphia, PA. 
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one had in mind a growing human perfection that demanded the elimination of degeneracy. For 
Dublin, the racialized quest for embodied perfection was itself the danger. American eugenics 
had to learn a different lesson from religion, one that did not revolve around transcendent ideals 
for human embodiment. Religion had to teach eugenics that all human life had purpose and 
dignity. Of course, it might be just as accurate to say that Dublin had missed the point. After all, 
what would eugenics look like without a standard for determining which kinds of life mattered 
more than others? For that matter, could there even be eugenics without a commitment to 
believing in qualitative differences between human groups? 
 In hosting the roundtable, the AES was not suddenly discovering Jesus in an hour of 
darkness. Anglo-American eugenicists and their supporters had long understood their science as 
something moral and even spiritual. Eugenics represented, after all, a struggle against the 
unevolved, the animalistic. Its theorists and supporters had traditionally comprehended eugenics’ 
higher purpose as a struggle for greater spiritual comportment. No, in hosting the roundtable, the 
AES was, in a moment of increasing insecurity about its motivations, strengthening its 
commitment to an established article of faith: eugenics was about preserving wholesome 
American values and ideals. In an especially anxious hour when Americans were becoming 
increasingly aware of the aims, ambitions, and excesses of Nazi race hygiene, mainline 
eugenicists and their supporters were reminding themselves that eugenics was simply attempting 
to fulfill a providential promise that had always been America’s birthright. 
 And yet, the AES roundtable demonstrates that, by the late 1930s, the modernist 
discourse of racial theism was on the wane. In this discussion between American eugenicists, one 
notices increasing anxiety over the plausibility of a singular ideal or standard for guiding the 
development of an increasingly heterogeneous society. The fact that American eugenics had 
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been traditionally concerned with producing a body politic more inherently disposed to Christian 
ideals of morality, ideals that were allegedly rooted in the bodies of those who founded the 
country, was proving insufficient to save American eugenics from growing consternation over its 
totalizing ambitions. 
Racial Theism and Eugenics after World War II 
 Traditional historiography of American religions insists that Protestant modernism 
collapsed in the years just prior to World War II. William R. Hutchison, for example, argues that, 
as a leading discourse of religious liberalism, modernism gave way to neo-orthodoxy in the 
1930s and an ascending distrust of society as an agent of progress. In direct response to 
modernism’s zealous overconfidence in the transformability of human nature and the redemptive 
authority and power of society, Hutchison maintains, neo-orthodoxy repudiated what it saw as 
modernism’s overt conflation between the natural and supernatural,3 with neo-orthodox 
spokespersons like Reinhold Niebuhr characteristically expressing disillusionment about “human 
nature and the idea of progress.”4  
Traditional historiography of American eugenics argues that mainline eugenics also 
largely disappeared in the 1930s. Contrary to these traditional historiographical assumptions, 
however, neither modernism nor eugenics disappeared in the 1930s and ‘40s. Modernism 
continues to exert influence on liberal Protestantism through the latter’s commitment to social 
stewardship, while eugenics persists through ideas, attitudes, and policies that continue to shape 
Americans’ reproductive lives. What did change in the years before and after the Second World 
War was that racial theism increasingly became a morally untenable discourse, which meant that 																																																								
3 William R. Hutchison, The Modernist Impulse in American Protestantism (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1976), 293. 
 
4 Ibid., 297.	
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the Anglo-American Protestant establishment stopped imagining itself, its power, and its 
civilizing mission in hereditarian terms. These changes brought an end to mainline eugenics as a 
professional and popular movement, although they did not bring an end to eugenics, if by the 
latter we simply mean ideas, practices, and policies aimed at facilitating the reproduction of 
certain groups and preventing the reproduction of others. 
I do not mean to attribute the decline of mainline eugenics solely to the fall of racial 
theism. Nor do I mean to suggest that modernism and mainline eugenics were one in the same 
thing. They were not. Nonetheless, the two converged through a mutual faith in the ability and 
authority of society to direct the sources of human life so as to ensure its Christian development. 
Indeed, they both championed the biopolitical idea that human life –its barest and most basic 
elements –could provide the material for building a perfect social order. By encouraging a 
religious habit of identifying heredity with divine creativity and by enjoining humans to 
cooperate with God in his creative work, modernism facilitated the popularization of eugenic 
thought and practice within affluent white Protestant communities. It seems hardly coincidental, 
therefore, that the decline of racial theism corresponded with the demise of eugenics as a popular 
Anglo-American movement.  
The revelations of the Holocaust went a long way in discrediting mainline eugenics.5 As 
scholars argue, however, eugenics was not solely done in by the Holocaust. Critical opposition 
within the scientific community against mainline eugenics arose in the decades prior to World 
War II.6 And yet the Second World War proved decisive. Afterwards, the religious mainstream 
																																																								
5 Elazar Barkan, The Retreat of Scientific Racism: Changing Concepts of Race in Britain and the 
United States Between the World Wars (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991). 
 
6 Daniel J. Kevles, In the Name of Eugenics: Genetics and the Uses of Human Heredity. 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), 129-47. 
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in the United States would condemn mainline eugenics as pseudoscience, with Americans 
coming to identify eugenics with the notorious violence and discrimination of racial 
engineering.7 The term eugenics has yet to recover. Indeed, it casts a long shadow over twenty-
first century genetics and the efforts of those who promote genetic approaches to population 
development.8 
 But while mainstream America may no longer be able to countenance eugenics as a 
practice of racial engineering and a political ideology that locates national progress exclusively 
within the white racial body, eugenics has not disappeared. As a habit of locating socio-political 
progress within human propagation, as a tendency to discriminate between the propagative 
potential of certain groups, and as an inclination to use the power of the state to control the 
reproductive behavior of its citizen-subjects, eugenics persists in the United States. Eugenic ideas 
and practices persist because the body politic remains an object of management and cultivation. 
Tied to political and economic discourses of productivity and efficiency, the body politic is still a 
moralized body, a body subject to the discerning gaze of a governmental apparatus aimed at 
achieving progress through the healthful development of its citizenry. The privatization of the 
economy over the past thirty years or so has meant that the production of health is, more than 
ever, dictated by the ethos and pathos of consumerism. Privatization has seen the emergence of a 
new form of subject defined first and foremost in terms of his or her economic duties as a 
																																																								
7 Edwin Black, War Against the Weak: Eugenics and America’s Quest to Build a Master Race. 
(New York: Four Walls Eight Windows, 2003.) 
 
8 For a self-conscious example of a contemporary evolutionary scientists support for more open 
engagements with eugenics and the application of genetic knowledge to the controlled growth of 
human populations, see Geoffrey Miller, “Chinese Eugenics,” Edge. Available at 
https://www.edge.org/response-detail/23838. Accessed 1/20/16. 
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consumer/entrepreneur and less in terms of his or her political responsibilities as a citizen.9 
Nonetheless, the moralization of the body politic as something living and cultivable means that 
the potential to discriminate between the propagative capacities of certain groups –and therefore 
eugenics –remains with us. 
 One need not look far to find proof of the persistence of eugenics beyond the era of racial 
theism. State sterilization, for example, was practiced in North Carolina as part of its social 
welfare administration through the 1960s. In fact, state sterilizations in North Carolina increased 
after World War II.10 North Carolina sterilizations, which tended to target the reproductivity of 
poor black females, were rationalized in economic and social terms rather than overtly racial 
ones, although certainly one could easily make the case that the persistence of sterilization as a 
viable social policy speaks to the reality of structural racism.11 Nonetheless, the North Carolina 
eugenics program did not, at least not explicitly, operate under an ideology of racial theism or 
biological determinism, as mainline eugenics had. Its sterilizations were justified as cost-saving 
measures and as protections against the destabilization of parenthood and family. North 
Carolina’s eugenics program is, perhaps, most accurately understood as a state-sponsored 
attempt to eliminate the propagative cycle of poverty. This, of course, does not make North 
Carolina’s program any less eugenic. It simply means that eugenic rationalities have found 
different inflections through their history. 
																																																								
9 Michel Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France 1978-1979, ed. 
Michel Senellart, trans. Graham Burchell (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008) 267-89. 
 
10 Kevin Begos, et al. Against Their Will: North Carolina’s Sterilization Program and the 
Campaign for Reparations (Apalachicola, FL: Gray Oak Books, 2012). 
 
11 Johanna Schoen, Choice and Coercion: Birth Control, Sterilization, and Abortion in Public 
Health and Welfare (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2005). 
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 Most recently, nearly 150 female inmates in California prisons were sterilized by doctors 
under contract with the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. From 2006 to 
2010, the Sacramento Bee reports that 148 women received tubal ligations in California 
correctional facilities. Women who were “deemed most likely to return to prison in the future” 
were especially targeted. Doctors who performed the operations justified the sterilization 
procedures in terms of female empowerment. One of the doctors said the sterilizations “provided 
an important service to poor women who faced health risks in future pregnancies.” Importantly, 
however, doctors also noted that they were concerned about the burden that inmates’ 
reproductivity imposed upon society. The same doctor quoted above argued that the costs of the 
sterilizations was minimal “compared to what you save in welfare for paying for these unwanted 
children –as they procreated more.”12 The recent California sterilizations are evidence that 
eugenics persists through logics and procedures that attempt to control the allegedly deleterious 
fecundity of the poor. While prison doctors may not have agreed with mainline eugenicists’ 
claim that poverty was rooted in the biology of inferior racial stocks, they nonetheless believed 
that sterilization could help end the propagative cycle of poverty and criminality. The fact that 
the sterilizations received very little national attention suggests that twenty-first century 
Americans are willing to ignore heavy-handed paternalism when it is aimed at the bodies of 
criminals and poor people. 
Americans today tend not to recognize eugenics apart from scientific racism and negative 
eugenic policies. This helps to explain why a 2014 book by the conservative and anti-feminist 
author, Jonathan V. Last, senior writer at the Weekly Standard and contributor to the Wall Street 
																																																								
12 Corey G. Johnson, “Female Inmates Sterilized in California Prisons Without Approval,” 
Sacramento Bee, July 7, 2013. Available at http://www.sacbee.com/news/local/health-and-
medicine/article2578036.html. Accessed 1/20/16. 
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Journal and Los Angeles Times, has not been understood as a eugenics text. Entitled, What to 
Expect When No One’s Expecting: America’s Coming Demographic Disaster, Last foretells the 
economic and political doom awaiting America as the fertility rate among its fitter classes 
continues to decline. Equating “demography and destiny,”13 Last encourages America’s affluent 
–the people who, given successful careers, are likely to reproduce less –to have more children for 
the sake of keeping America’s population young, productive, and competitive with China and 
other economic powers.  
Interestingly, Last seems to have no idea that he is proposing a eugenic solution to the 
problem of American economic fitness. Not once does he use the term to help him define his 
project or the problems it attempts to solve. Yet what Last proposes is eugenic in scope and 
practice, even it is not explicitly racist and despite the fact that it is missing a sterilization 
program to go along with its reproductive inducements to the fit. The quote from the Hungarian 
Prime Minister, Viktor Orbán, which Last reprints on the first page of his book in order to 
convey the scope of his message, could have come straight out of the era of mainline eugenics: 
“Demography is the key factor. If you are not able to maintain yourself biologically, how do you 
expect to maintain yourself economically, politically, and militarily? It is impossible. The answer 
of letting people from other countries come in […] that could be an economic solution, but it’s 
not a solution of your real sickness, that you are not able to maintain your own civilization.”14 
Last’s book suggests that if eugenics does once again become a popular gospel for rejuvenating 
American destiny, it will be couched in the social, economic, and perhaps even religious 
conservatism of twenty first century America. 																																																								
13 Jonathan V. Last, What to Expect When No One’s Expecting: America’s Coming Demographic 
Disaster (New York: Encounter Books, 2014), 19. 
 
14 Ibid., ix. 
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 While eugenic ideas, practices, and policies are no longer tied to a discourse of racial 
theism, eugenics nonetheless persists as Americans continue to conceive propagation as a 
mechanism for both social decline and advance. The tendency to associate eugenics with the 
destruction of unfitness, the discourse of scientific racism, and genetic engineering may even 
elide the recurrence of eugenic thought in the United States. Apart from scientific racism, 
Americans may not be able to recognize eugenic logic as such even when, like Last, they openly 
endorse it. As a habit of discriminating between who should and should not reproduce or of 
discerning whose reproductivity is most desirable for societal advance, eugenics endures in spite 
of the mainstream decline of that rhetoric of racial election that supported Anglo-American 
eugenics in the early twentieth century.
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